Sixty years later, I do not laugh at the words any more. I see their wisdom particularly in relation to the resolution of our ethnic conflict. They seem to indicate the way to put an end to this cancerous problem.

ldquo;Hurry uprdquo; implies urgency, commitment and absence of prevarication. The ethnic problem has dragged on for 60 years after independence and there has never been a dedicated commitment to resolve it. Dilly dallying has always been the order of the day. Wisdom demands that all stake-holders assume a genuine sense of immediacy to put an end to the awful dispute.

ldquo;Gordquo; is a command to start immediately. On record we have started more than eight decades ago but really we are still where we started, if not even further behind. If commissions, committees, conferences, seminars, debates and draft bills mean anything, our lsquo;make-believersquo; of ‘goingrsquo; may be unparalleled in history. Wisdom demands that we start without humbugging.

ldquo;Slowlyrdquo; denotes circumspection, patience, and foresight. We have to see all around us, be patient enough to respect opposite views and be mindful of the consequences of our actions. That is just what we have failed to do all these years. Most of the time we have been bogged down in emotive words like ‘federalrsquo;, ‘unitaryrsquo;, lsquo;patriotismrsquo; and ‘sole representativersquo;. Words have been the bane of our life.

Upatissa who later became the Chief Disciple of Lord Buddha under the name of ‘Sariputtarsquo;, met Rev. Assajee, a Buddhist monk once and inquired from him as to what the Buddha taught. On being told that it was a vast subject, Sariputta-to-be remarked ldquo;attheneva me attho. kin kahasi vyanjanan bahunrdquo; (I need only the essence. Of what use is a cacophony of words?)

Unfortunately, most of us who hold Arahat Sariputta in utmost reverence do not appear to follow his words of wisdom in practice. If we did we would have made much headway with our ethnic problem by now.

The UNP appears to have seen some wisdom in these words, when they removed the word ‘federalrsquo; from their political vocabulary. Although they have been maligned as deceitful ‘turn-coatsrsquo; when they did this, it has to be appreciated that it is the jettisoning of that word that has brought them closer to a consensus. Imaginably and hopefully, the jettisoning does not affect what they want to do for the minorities.

Going slow also implies gradual progress in the correct direction, a ‘step by steprsquo; approach. We have always wanted to take quantum leaps but tarried at the very beginning, due to controversies about the final destination. This reminds one of the nervous driver who does not start his car because he is worried about crossing the Maradana Junction.

Controversy is not a dirty word. It helps in the clarification of issues and the choice of options and brings about equilibrium. In that sense, we have to be thankful to rivals on both sides of the ethnic ‘tug-of-warrsquo;. If not for the force of their pull, the rope would have been snatched away to one side or the other long ago.

Political leaders should be astute enough to act at the point the marker on the rope comes to the ‘nadu centerrsquo;, as the Tamils call it. One occasion it was at the ‘nadu centerrsquo; was when the Thirteenth Amendment was passed.

It is foolish to idle because the ideal is not possible. We can only achieve the optimum practicable at any point in time depending on the balance of forces currently operative. In this sense, the Presidentrsquo;s declared move to implement the Thirteenth Amendment appears to be a first step in the right direction. May be no party agrees unreservedly to this move. Only it happens to be a move that no one would seriously oppose.

In fact it is a step backwards for we are supposed to have taken it 20 years ago. Nevertheless it would be a step forward in the sense that we have been going backwards since the Amendment. However it is important that the Amendment is implemented in full and in real earnest for it has been since diluted mostly by the greed of politicians in power to expand their ‘empiresrsquo; and the misguided priorities of the national budget.

To think that implementing the Thirteenth Amendment is the end of the race would be deceiving oneself for want of a sense of history. The sincerity with which the Amendment is implemented should generate greater trust among the communities which in turn would doubtlessly make the stake-holders more amenable to greater consensus on further progress.

‘Gorsquo; also demands that we move forward on a time frame that would be practicable after the successful implementation of the Amendment. In the light of past experience the next possible optimum move appears to be the adoption of the Draft Constitution of 2000 or an improved version of it made possible by the ‘breaking of the icersquo; by the previous move.

Perhaps it is too early in the day to visualize where we ‘gorsquo; after implementing the Thirteenth Amendment on which we are already focused. Besides conjecturing on further moves at this stage faces the danger of initiating another controversy that would hold back even the promised ‘small mercyrsquo;. Let us not upset the hornetsrsquo; nests within sight of the Sigiri frescos. Our destination is the top of the rock.

Let us get ourselves going now and cross bridges when we come to them. It may well be that none of us living today would come to the last bridge. It would be crossed by our progeny who by then would have developed a mind-set capable of crossing the bridge with ease. They will make decisions on the dictates of their own social and intellectual environment. It is dogmatic and futile to dictate terms to future generations on the strength of existing power bases.

This does not mean that we do not have a role to play. Our obligation is to develop policies that would facilitate the crossing, not to mention the avoidance of false steps that would vitiate the atmosphere and embarrass a final resolution.

It is also important to realize that we do not have the status to dictate to the powers that would preside over the destiny of a future electorate that would carry the baby beyond the reform within our sight. That electorate would be influenced in their choice by the imperatives of their own environment.

Our immediate task then, is to ‘hurry uprsquo; with the Thirteenth Amendment. That happens to be the most pragmatic move immediately possible. Then we must lsquo;go slowlyrsquo;, but progressively, step by step, towards a harmonious, integrated and equitable Sri Lanka with honesty of purpose and commitment.

We have also to make way for those coming after us by removing road-blocks and implementing conducive and proactive policies that would facilitate them to progressively make optimum decisions towards the ideal. Even after ten Prabhakarans, Peace will not dawn on us until the system makes it possible for every citizen to share and share alike the bounteous legacy of this land.

• APRC: The Year of the Rat has begun



• In Search of a Peace Package



• Terraffic



• Diaspora lsquo;Wisdomrsquo; - An interview with Lionel Bopage



• Post Arbour

The Presidentrsquo;s decision to include the Treasury Secretary P.B. Jayasundera in his delegation to China for the opening ceremony of the Olympic games days is a case in point. Just days after the man found guilty of corruption in the privatization of Lanka Marine Services Limited by the Supreme Court and fined Rs. 500,000, the Presidentrsquo;s action illustrates that anybody has a place in the regimersquo;s inner circle as long as he is a ldquo;yes man.rdquo;

The Court upheld the findings of a the report released months earlier by the Parliamentary Committee on Public Enterprises (COPE) which said that the privatisation of LMSL when Jayasundera served as the Chairman of Public Enterprise Reforms Commission (PERC) had been ldquo;executed blatantly without Cabinet approval, with several flaws causing loss and detriment to the Government.rdquo; But the abject failure to act against those named in the Report meant it took Public Interest Litigation initiated in the Supreme Court to name Jayasundera as a guilty party in the LMSL case.

Even though the Government is slow to act against such persons, we got to know last week that two police officers attached to the Commission to Investigate Allegations of Bribery and Corruption were abruptly transferred out of the department while they were probing the assets of a Government (non-Cabinet) Minister. In their fundamental rights application filed in the SC, the petitioners made a shock revelation that two top officials in the Bribery Commission - Commissioner Indra De Silva, who is also a former IGP and Director (Investigations) Neville Guruge - were attempting to cover up the case against the Minister.

A look at some of the convictions that the Commission has to its credit amply shows that while the sharks cut their way out of the bribery net, itrsquo;s the small fry that is gets caught. A Police Constable was convicted in 2002 for accepting a bribe of Rs. 2,000 to refrain from filing a case for a Traffic Offence. His punishment from Court was two years imprisonment for each charge. A minor employee of a government office was convicted for a bribe of Rs. 2,000 and got 12 months imprisonment. Another Police constable who accepted a bribe of Rs. 300 for a traffic offence was convicted and got two years rigorous imprisonment.

Clearly, engaging in bribery and corruption must be punished irrespective of the sum of money involved. But going by the severity of the punishment that has been meted out to the three persons I have cited as examples, I ask you to determine what punishment is suitable for a man whose actions have resulted in the loss of millions. Paying Rs. 500,000 as a fine must have been like handing over pocket money for Jayasundara when one recognises the magnitude of the fraud involved in the LMSL case. And this may only be the beginning. Similar irregularities may well come to light in cases such as the privatisation of the Sri Lanka Insurance Corporation, where Jayasundera also figured, that are pending before the Courts. The COPE report said that in the SLIC privatization deal, Jayasundera had ldquo;failed and neglected to act in the interests of the Government.rdquo;

What does inaction against the rot at the top of the ladder tell the ordinary citizen of this country? Steal millions in public money and you are safe to live a life of luxury and comfort and hobnob with the politically powerful but be honest but try to stand up against the rot, all you can expect is to get transferred, demoted, harassed and hounded.

But Jayasundera is only one in a along list of wrongdoers that the President has chosen to mollycoddle even when their atrocities are staring him in his face. There can be no more glaring example than the case of Minster Mervin Silva. The President famously asked Silva to be present at a meeting with employees of the Rupavahini Cooptation who were being signalled out for attacks after the trashing Silva got following his outrageous behaviour against the New Director of the SLRC. What the President did here is pat the man on his back and tell him it is time to stop such attacks. Obviously this sickening molly-coddling has not stopped the man and only encouraged him to worsen his attacks on journalists and media organizations.

And what has come of allegations against a Minister for robbing the money meant as compensation to the farmers affected by the Mavil Aru incident? What of another junior Minister who was allegedly involved in a visa racket to the USA using government influence? What of the fertilizer subsidy tender racket which again meant massive loss of public funds?

The media has to a great extent done its best to bring such issues to the public forum. Some opposition legislators have even attempted to bring them up in Parliament.

Sadly and tragically though, a government blind to bribery and corruption continues to be in deep slumber when confronted with these uncomfortable truths.

• Impeachment of Public Officials



• Letrsquo;s stop corruption in Sri Lanka!



• THE CONTINUING VIOLATION OF THE SEVENTEENTH AMENDMENT: YET MORE UNCONVINCING EXCUSES



• Significant Other



• Defence Secretary: The epitome of bad governance

August 2008

About this poll

Peace was achieved in Northern Ireland, after many years of bitter conflict, failed negotiations and broken ceasefires only when all the parties to the conflict and the people of Ireland and Northern Ireland were brought together in the same peace process. As part of that process a series of ‘peace pollsrsquo; were run to find out what the people wanted in terms of a just and lasting settlement. The first such peace poll run in Sri Lanka was completed between March and May 2008 in collaboration with the staff of Social Indicator of Colombo and Dr. Colin Irwin from the Institute of Irish Studies at the University of Liverpool who developed the peace polls method. That poll included a random sample of 1,700 people from all parts of Sri Lanka with the exception of the Northern Province. As Social Indicator are presently not able to operate in this region of Sri Lanka arrangements were made for a separate poll to be undertaken by the academic community in Jaffna. This new poll was run in June and repeated all the questions asked in the previous poll with 200 interviews completed in 5 Divisional Secretariats (DS). The full results of both polls are available at the project website http://www.peacepolls.org along with a more detailed explanation of the methodology used.

Introduction

Can the Government of Sri Lanka negotiate a peace agreement with the people of the Northern Province? This question depends of course on a desire and willingness of both the Government in Colombo and the political representatives of the people in the North wanting to negotiate such a peace. But if we assume they do then is there a basis upon which such an agreement could be made between the Sinhala people of Sri Lanka on the one hand and the Tamils of the Northern Province on the other? Both the previous peace poll in this series and political developments in the rest of Sri Lanka suggest that a new dispensation between the Provinces and the Central Government could lead to such a peace. But what of the North, could a similar dispensation lead to peace there? With this point in mind all the questions asked in the first Sri Lanka peace poll were asked again in and around Jaffna. The results suggest, as in the rest of the country, that fully implemented constitutional reform coupled with effective measures to deal with problems of discrimination and good governance would enjoy wide popular support. It therefore follows that bringing the people of the North into the peace process, as full partners for peace could both strengthen the legitimacy of any agreements reached and hopefully make an end to hostilities that much closer.

The Problems

From a list of 51 problems given to the research team the top three items on the Northern Tamil ‘Problemsrsquo; list are ‘Escalating violence in the last 2 yearsrsquo; and ‘Violence over the past 30 yearsrsquo; 1^st and 2^nd, both at 72% ‘very significantrsquo;, followed by ‘The ongoing warrsquo; 3^rd at 71% ‘very significantrsquo;. These items are 4^th, 5^th and 6^th on the Sinhala list so both communities share the same concerns on this point. However, beyond this common appreciation of the violence of war the ‘problemsrsquo; of the two communities diverge. First and 2^nd on the Sinhala list is ‘The continued violence of the LTTErsquo; and ‘Abuse of human rights by the LTTErsquo; at 60% and 59% ‘very significantrsquo; respectively while 3^rd on the Northern Tamil list (after the issues of war) is the ‘Failure to implement language rightsrsquo; at 63% ‘very significantrsquo;. However, after this there is a degree of convergence again between the two lists. ‘Failure to bring human rights violators to justicersquo; is 5^th on the Northern Tamil list and 11^th on the Sinhala list while ‘The failure of successive governments to find a political solutionrsquo; and ‘Failure to provide Sri Lanka Tamils with a constitutional solution to their problemsrsquo; is 6^th and 7^th on the Northern Tamils list and 16^th and 19^th on the Sinhala list (out of a total list of 51 such problems). But ‘The continued violence of the LTTErsquo; and their human rights abuses are down at 38^th and 30^th on the Northern Tamil list while the ‘Failure to implement language rightsrsquo; is 33^rd on the Sinhala list. Clearly not much meeting of minds on these critical issues that must necessarily be addressed by both communities if peace is to be achieved. So what of the ‘solutionsrsquo; to these various ‘problemsrsquo; is there a basis for negotiations there?

The Solutions

Security: In the second part of the questionnaire everyone interviewed was asked to indicate which ‘solutionsrsquo; they considered to be ‘essentialrsquo;, ‘desirablersquo;, ‘acceptablersquo;, ‘tolerablersquo; or ‘unacceptablersquo; for lasting peace and stability in Sri Lanka. The options for security were then listed in order of priority calculated as the average ‘essential or desirablersquo; for both the Northern Tamils and Sinhala community. The first two items on this list are ‘All the people of Sri Lanka must come together through their representatives to solve the problemrsquo; and ‘The political leadership representing all stakeholders must come together to solve the problemrsquo; at between 72% and 85% ‘essential or desirablersquo; for both the Northern Tamil and Sinhala community. Rates of ‘unacceptablersquo; do not rise above 5% for these options. Next comes ‘Bring all IDPs under total civilian controlrsquo; between 67% and 71% ‘essential or desirablersquo; for both communities followed by ‘More inclusive and effective Peace Secretariatrsquo; at 87% ‘essential or desirablersquo; for Northern Tamils and 51% for the Sinhala of which a 22% minority consider this option to be ‘unacceptablersquo;. A consensus is restored again for ‘Reform the Police and eliminate corruptionrsquo; 5^th on this list of 23 items with rates of ‘unacceptablersquo; at only 3% or 4%. Although the Northern Tamils strongly support the suggestion that ‘The government should also negotiate with the LTTErsquo; at 94% ‘essential or desirablersquo; the Sinhala are split on this proposal at 40% ‘essential or desirablersquo; and 37% ‘unacceptablersquo; with similar results for ‘Restart the peace processrsquo; and ‘Stop the warrsquo; at 8^th and 9^th on this list. Other options in this list then continue to look at these issues in some more detail but the basic conclusion to be drawn is that the Northern Tamils want an end to the war now while the Sinhala community are divided on this strategy. At the time of running this poll 75% still considered defeating the LTTE by military means alone to be ‘essential or desirablersquo; compared to only 17% of Northern Tamils who took this view which perhaps underlines the point that no community should be seen in simple ‘black and whitersquo; terms. What both communities can agree to however is the necessity for their political leaderships to work together for a political solution to the conflict and for the institutions with responsibilities for establishing peace to be more effective and inclusive.

Human Rights: The question on human rights listed a variety of abuses ranging from ‘Attack civiliansrsquo; to ‘Deny freedom of movementrsquo; and everyone interviewed for this question was asked if these actions should be allowed so that the LTTE or ‘government forces, police and associated paramilitariesrsquo; could achieve their respective objectives. Generally speaking the results to this question are very reassuring with the Sinhala recording an average of 96% ‘unacceptablersquo; and Northern Tamils 94% ‘unacceptablersquo; over all. But some results are possibly matters for concern. In the Jaffna sample of Northern Tamils 7% considered LTTE attacks on civilians to be ‘tolerablersquo; and extra-judicial killings by the LTTE ‘acceptable or tolerablersquo; while 5% considered ‘Recruit Child Soldiersrsquo; ‘acceptablersquo; and 9% thought ‘Launch suicide attacksrsquo; was ‘tolerablersquo;. In fairness it should be pointed out that our previous poll showed very little support for these particular kinds of human rights abuses when the various communities were looked at for the rest of Sri Lanka as a whole and it may be the case that a small minority of Sinhala living in the war zones are also wiling to accept lower standards with regards to the observation of these human rights. However 5% of Sinhala do consider it ‘acceptable or tolerablersquo; for the ‘government forces, police and associated paramilitariesrsquo; to ‘Abuse emergency powersrsquo; and this rises to 7% ‘acceptable or tolerablersquo; for ‘Arbitrary arrest and detentionrsquo; and 14% for ‘Deny freedom of movementrsquo;.

Discrimination: There is strong agreement between the two communities on measures needed to address problems of discrimination with ‘Effective steps to ensure balanced access to university educationrsquo; 1^st at 97% and 76% ‘essential or desirablersquo; for Northern Tamils and Sinhala respectively. This is followed by ‘Effective steps to ensure balanced recruitment in the civil service at all levelsrsquo; at 84% and 69% 2^nd then ‘Distribute the resources of the state on a per capita basisrsquo; at 78% and 65% 3^rd and ‘Affirmative action for rehabilitation and reconstructionrsquo; 4^th at 85% and 57% ‘essential or desirablersquo;. Levels of ‘unacceptablersquo; range between 5% and 13% in the Sinhala community for these policies so they would meet with little resistance but they are split on ‘Ensure full implementation of Tamil as an official languagersquo; at 32% ‘essential or desirablersquo; and 34% ‘unacceptablersquo;. But as this reform is ‘essential or desirablersquo; for 94% of Northern Tamils this particular policy will need to be implemented all be it with some political care (it was also 4^th on the Northern Tamil ‘problemsrsquo; list).

Good Governance: When it comes to measures needed to improve good governance there is very little difference between the two communities. Both Northern Tamils and Sinhala want to ‘Depoliticise the public servicersquo; (81% and 87% ‘essential or desirable); an ‘Independent mediarsquo; (92% and 72%); ‘Effective institutions to combat corruptionrsquo; (79% and 74%); ‘Right to information except for matters of national securityrsquo; (88% and 64%); Reform of the criminal justice systemrsquo; (78% and 75%) and ‘Right to information at all timesrsquo; at 92% and 48% ‘essential or desirablersquo; for Northern Tamils and Sinhala respectively (of whom 16% are opposed to this policy as ‘unacceptable). Also both Northern Tamils (73% ‘essential or desirablersquo;) and Sinhala (64%) prefer that ‘Appointments of Supreme Court Judges and other high posts should be made on the recommendation of the Constitutional Council established by Parliamentrsquo; rather than at the discretion of the President (61% and 31% ‘essential or desirablersquo; respectively with 31% of Sinhala also opposed to this policy as ‘unacceptablersquo;).

Constitutional Reform: A consensus is reached on the first four items on the constitutional reform priorities for negotiations list. ‘Give equal status to all religious groupsrsquo; is at the top of this list of 27 items with 87% ‘essential or desirablersquo; for Northern Tamils and 73% for Sinhala. ‘Fully implement the 13^th Amendmentrsquo; is 2^nd at 64% and 68% respectively; ‘Clearly define the powers of the Centre and the Provincesrsquo; 3^rd at 83% and 46% (15% ‘unacceptablersquo; for Sinhala) and then ‘Fully implement the 17^th Amendment 4^th at 47% and 70% ‘essential or desirablersquo; for Northern Tamils and Sinhala respectively (17% and 13% ‘unacceptable). Clearly all these reforms can be done with the consent of the people. However the top priority for Northern Tamils is that ‘The North and East should be one provincersquo; with 92% stating that it is ‘essential or desirablersquo;. However, it comes in 5^th on the joint list as only 21% of Sinhala share this view and 53% of them are opposed to this reform as ‘unacceptablersquo;. But this item is probably something that will have to be negotiated with Eastern Tamils as well and early indications from their data suggest that they would also support a single province although not as strongly (64% ‘essential or desirablersquo; and 10% ‘unacceptablersquo; in an un-weighted sample from the first poll). The top priority for the Sinhala community is that ‘Sri Lanka should be a unitary statersquo; at 91% ‘essential or desirablersquo; with Northern Tamils opposed to this proposal at 75% ‘unacceptablersquo;. But this leaves about 25% of Northern Tamils with mixed views on this point and this ‘splitrsquo; is reflected in a series of related questions: ‘Two completely separate independent statesrsquo; is considered ‘essential or desirablersquo; by 53% and ‘unacceptablersquo; by 28% of Northern Tamils; ‘Two states in a loose union like Europersquo; is ‘essential or desirablersquo; for 39% but ‘unacceptablersquo; for 24% and finally in the constitutional package question ‘Two statesrsquo; is ‘essential or desirablersquo; for 47% of Northern Tamils and ‘unacceptablersquo; for 27%. This degree of consistency should be taken seriously and when combined with other results such as the full implementation of the 13^th Amendment at 64% ‘essential or desirablersquo; and, for example, ‘Devolution with the same powers for all Provincesrsquo; at 60% ‘essential or desirablersquo; and ‘No devolutionrsquo; at 69% ‘unacceptablersquo; then the prospects for a negotiated peace look very good indeed providing the extremists in both communities can be marginalised.

A Constitutional Package: Finding common ground and marginalising the extremists in any negotiation is never easy but hopefully an objective look at the positions of the two communities on the key constitutional issues will help each side understand better where agreement can be reached. With this point in mind an additional constitutional question was asked that presented the various options put forward by both communities as ‘constitutional packagesrsquo;. As would be expected 95% of Sinhala reject the ‘Two Statersquo; solution as ‘unacceptablersquo; and 83% of Northern Tamils (from the Jaffna sample) reject the ‘Unitary Satersquo; option as ‘unacceptablersquo;. But 58% of Sinhala consider ‘13^th Amendment Devolutionrsquo; ‘essential or desirablersquo; with only 24% opposed to it as ‘unacceptablersquo; while 53% of Northern Tamils consider ‘Enhanced Devolutionrsquo; ‘essential or desirablersquo; with only 7% opposed to it as ‘unacceptablersquo;. ‘Enhanced Devolutionrsquo; (paraphrased here as ‘Full implementation of the 13^th and 17^th Amendments plus the devolution of significant powers to autonomous provinces negotiated at a peace conferencersquo;) is arguably the expressed policy of the All Party Representative Committee (APRC) and it is only opposed by 31% of the Sinhala community according to our polls. This may sound like a lot but it isnrsquo;t. For example the successful Belfast Agreement was opposed by 52% of Protestants in a comparable public opinion poll completed just before it was successfully negotiated and subsequently passed in a referendum. Given the political will of the elected representatives of the people of Sri Lanka and the support of the international community a peace agreement should be achievable in Sri Lanka also.

Implementation: Perhaps the problem in Sri Lanka is as much one of implementation as it is a matter of negotiation and with this point in mind two options were tested against public opinion on this issue. Both a Constitutional Council and a Constitutional Court were acceptable and with regard to the International Community India came out on top as the most acceptable partner to help facilitate peace with Norway second for Northern Tamils and SAARC second for the Sinhala. So perhaps the question Sri Lanka and her neighbours need to ask is not can Sri Lanka achieve peace but when?

• Poll results: How do you think we can end the war and attain peace in Sri Lanka?



• Consensus building for peace



• On ldquo;traitorsrdquo; and federalism: Beyond the hypocrisy, towards collaboration



• Traditional solutions for modern day problems



• Please leave us alone; a voice from Muslim community

Sometimes the obvious is the most difficult to see; and then when discerned in a flash of blinding light it does indeed seem so obvious. Lanka will never, never ever, settle its national question, or its ethnic conflict if you prefer this terminology, within its own parameters. That is the inescapable lesson of 60 years of post-independence history. Superficially one can point to the SLFP, the UNP, the LTTE, Bandaranaike, Jayawardena, Prabaharan and so on, but these are merely phenomenological manifestations of things more fundamental. If after the six decades from the disenfranchisement of plantation Tamils, through Sinhala Only legislation, communal riots and carnage, a bloody 25 year long civil war and heinous terrorism, anybody still thinks Lanka can solve this problem within itself, well though loath to quote the Bible, I have no option but to say ldquo;None are so blind as those who have eyes but cannot seerdquo;.

 

Some background

Sinhala-Buddhists are 70% of the population and for reasons reaching rather further back in history than I can recount here except in a sentence or two, the popular belief system of this community has evolved a certain ideology, a short name for which is Mahavamsa consciousness. It is about Lanka being the pristine land of the Sinhalese race, and the repository in which Buddhism was nurtured and salvaged when it was in recess in India and this country ravaged by South Indian invaders followed by four and a half centuries of colonial oppression. Modernists can think what they like of this deep-seated system of beliefs, they can call it the makings of a modern mythology founded on historical truths; no matter, it is the stuff of popular consciousness in this the land of Sinhala-Buddhism. It is learnt in school and temple, it is the substance of common lore and flavoured into motherrsquo;s milk. ldquo;The tradition of all dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brains of the livingrdquo;.

What has any of this to do with todayrsquo;s national question? Simple, this ideology of the Sinhala people is a near insurmountable obstacle to any constitutional dispensation such as a federal system, autonomy for Tamil areas, or substantial devolution and the sharing of power. It is hard for anyone sincerely steeped in Mahavamsa consciousness to reconcile with a Lanka that is not a unitary Sinhala-Buddhist land. Governments, regimes or leaders who toyed with far less dangerous precedents than federalism or autonomy (the B-C Pact of 1957, the Dudley-Chelva Agreement of 1965, the 1987 Indo-Lanka Accord and the 13^th Constitutional Amendment, Chandrikarsquo;s Draft Constitution in year 2000, the 2002 Ceasefire Agreement and the PTOMS proposals) have all been shown the door. We must learn from this history.

In modern times the evocation of this ideology was the vehicle for the execution of new tasks. The signal phenomenon of the last epoch in Lanka is the emergence of the petty-bourgeoisie to a place of prominence in the post-colonial political constellation. ldquo;Thus the awakening of the dead serves the purpose of glorifying new struggles, not of parodying the old but of magnifying the given task in the imagination, not recoiling from its solution in reality but finding once more the spirit for new struggles, not making a ghost walk againrdquo;. The purpose of celebrating the Mahavamsa ideology for modern class actors, to whatever degree they deluded themselves in their own imagination, was to execute the historic tasks of the moment. Let me explain.

In the decade after independence thanks to a progressive education system and welfare policies, good prices for one of the countries main exports, rubber, and a moderately efficient and relatively uncorrupted public service, prosperity seeped down into the rural areas. A large petty-bourgeois class of small businessmen, schoolteachers, traders and small landowners became more influential and began to play a powerful role in both rural and semi-urban politics. The privileges of the English educated Colombo elite and the entrenched position of the Tamils in government employment and the professions was an obstacle to the social mobility and economic advancement of the rising Sinhala petty-bourgeoisie. A strong Sinhala nationalist movement grew and is identified with the 1956 SLFP election victory, Sinhala Only legislation and Buddhism. The Sinhala Only Act declared the Sinhala language be the only official language of the country - the other option, both Sinhala and Tamil, was championed by the left parties but roundly defeated as a mood of race based antagonism poisoned the country.

What has this to do with todayrsquo;s national question? The rise of the Sinhala petty-bourgeoisie to a place in the sun, because of the specific historical conjunctures and ethnic modalities that mediated what was in essence a class process, nevertheless evolved, in the political landscape, into a manifestly ethnic confrontation.

Indian readers need to appreciate that though similar processes of petty-bourgeoisie ascent hand in hand with a cultural renaissance did occur in many parts of India, nowhere did it inflate to become the spectacular hegemonic process that it did in Lanka.

The aforesaid ideological roots and ethno-class processes, magnified by pogroms, riots and military brutality, aggravated by the armed militant Tamil youth groups emerging in reaction, complicated by Indian intervention in different phases (arming and training Tamil militants in the 1970s and 1980s, providing military intelligence and arms to the Lankan state at present), and convoluted by constitutional impasses and economic shifts (especially the post-1977 neo-liberal policies), have mediated a certain process and outcome. To borrow an Althusserian term, society and politics in Lanka, that is the social whole, is now overdetermined by the ethnic instance.

Thamil Eelam

The responses of Tamil politics have reinforced this overdetermination. The annulment of the citizenship of Tamil plantation workers and the Sinhala Only Act constitute the root of the ethnic imbroglio. From about 1972 passive Tamil resistance, protest marches and sit-ins were broken up by brutal police countermeasures and Tamil youth were horrified to see respectable and staid old gentlemen, their uncles and elders, beaten and degraded on the streets. These experiences were the first events that hardened attitudes and laid the foundations of militant youth politics; but it was the 1983 race riots (Black July) which is the watershed transforming a half-hearted Thamil Eelam cry into a slogan with substantial support.

In the absence of free and fair elections in the Tamil areas for many years, and without a democratic referendum explicitly asking the question, it is impossible to say with any certainty, whether at that time, or any other time, or at the present time, a majority of Tamils desire secession and the establishing of a separate Tamil state. But this is beside the point; does Thamil Eelam have any chance in pluperfect heaven of ever coming to pass? My answer is a resounding ldquo;nordquo; and not for indigenous but for international reasons. Kosovo is irrelevant, America and Europe wanted it, and wanted to tear Yugoslavia to shreds; India does not and likely will never want a separate Tamil state in northern Lanka, so QED. When the LTTE sent Rajiv Gandhi to his funeral pyre it placed another corpse beside him; Thamil Eelam forever died in the blast that dispatched Rajiv. 

There are reasons other than the absence of international support why Thamil Eelam is a non-starter (and it is amazing that an outfit of the LTTErsquo;s ability and sophistication does not have one other country as an ally because of its own international diplomatic incompetence). The ethnic cleansing of Muslims from the Northern Province in 1991 is a galling act of Tamil chauvinism. Just as Israel, after its creation, is embroiled in the appalling fate of Palestinian refugees, so Thamil Eelam, even prior to its birth, faces the conundrum of the Muslims that the LTTE drove out of their homes, businesses and lands; a challenge the LTTE has proved incapable of redressing for 17 years.

The reader may be wondering what the purpose of this rather lengthy introduction in two sections is. It was unavoidable because the point I am attempting to drive home is not a familiar one; the travellers on the road to Damascus are still few and far between. There is no way out for Lanka within its own borders and parameters, thatrsquo;s what I am trying to establish. The Sinhala-Buddhist unitary state of Sri Lanka is at a dead end, Thamil Eelam is a hopeless dream. If you are with me up to here, then we are making progress. When I say Lanka cannot solve its national question within its own parameters, I do, of course, factor-in the familiar types of international involvement, interaction, pressure and mediation as ordinary parameters.

Abolishing mental barriers

If Lankarsquo;s economy is to go anywhere, it must abolish its fences; we have missed the homemade bus, so we need to catch another bus; but more on this anon. It is not only our physical barriers but also our mental limitations that we need to overcome. We will make no progress if we continue to play ball in our own backyard; we need to go out and play ball in a much bigger playing field were we will forget the parochial pettiness of our ethnic teacup. Moving into a larger common market, interacting within a much larger and more diverse culture and the gestalt shift that becoming, albeit gradually, a part of a subcontinent will engender, this is the cathartic experience that will purge the Lankan psyche of its blinkers. There is no other sword with which to cut the Gordian knot. Lanka does not have an influential intellectual class, or a left political leadership, or progressive mass movements, proportionately comparable with India.

The most promising precedent is the successful integration of South India into the Indian national economy and hence the national psyche. The Thamilnadu of Periyaar and Annathurai, communist Kerala, Karnataka the home of IT famed Bangalore, and Andhra Pradesh, have all overcome an obsession with Dravidian schism to become front runners in the Indian market and beneficiaries of Indian intervention in the world market. Maharashtra, Gujerat and West Bengal too are players in the Indian market and its international extensions. The material basis for the physical unity of the Indian Republic, whatever the eventual fate of Kashmir, has been firmly laid and Marx would chuckle with some satisfaction at this validation of his thesis of historical materialism, albeit on a capitalist basis.

Our epiphany wonrsquo;t happen overnight, the backward-looking nationalists who hegemonise Lankarsquo;s ideology and sway its social classes - especially significant sections of the petty bourgeois and plebeian mass - is profoundly antithetical to this thinking. Therefore a start will have to be made in the economic domain, without narrow nationalism comprehending what is really afoot in the ethnic domain.

Abolishing physical barriers

The eventual objective will have to be integration into a sub-continental market and economy and a start has to be made by developing a closer alliance with the Indian capitalist market. I have not shrunk from saying integration instead of pussyfooting with euphemisms like ‘participationrsquo; and lsquo;, and I frankly concede, that for the time being, involvement will have to accept the reality of capitalist domination. I have no particular model of long-term alignment to canvass; economic treaties, common market, confederation or eventual union, history will look after that. There will be investment, but this should mean neither a wholesale takeover by Indian investment, nor the predatory extraction of natural resources because a more mutually beneficial transition is possible. The early attractions should include employment in the IT sector for our youth, better education, good universities and modern technology. For a start we can relearn English, which thanks to our ultras we have all but forgotten; forgive the exaggeration but the havoc wrecked by the ultra nationalists makes for some irritation. And of course Lanka needs infrastructure development (railways, airlines, electricity, telecommunications and roads) and Indian capital has a role to play. Lankarsquo;s motto should be ldquo;If Tamil Nadu could do it and reap such gains, heck we can do it betterrdquo;. Sure there is room for other international players; international players are deeply engaged within India already, arenrsquo;t they? But Lanka needs to make India a special policy focus, a focus on growing an alignment with Indian markets, investment and technology within a reasonable period of time.

There is a fundamental difference between the stage of capitalist development at which India and Lanka are at this time. Indian capitalism has achieved what Walt Rostow called ‘the take of stagersquo;, that is structural change that can support sustained development (obviously on a capitalist basis). The definition he proposed was: ldquo;The old blocks and resistances to steady growth are overcome; the forces making for economic progress expand and come to dominate society; self-sustained growth becomes its normal conditionrdquo;. A report prepared by four economists from an American investment bank (India: Everything to Play for: John Lewellyn, Robert Subbaraman, Alastair Newton and Sonal Varma; Lehman Brothers, October 2007) summarise these structural changes as; high levels of saving and investment, the maturity of the manufacturing sector, substantial productivity gains, strong and healthy international trade, enhanced education and English language skills, deepening of capital markets and internationalisation of the financial sector.

The point is not merely that Lankan capitalism has failed to achieve these structural advances; no what is fundamental is that we have missed the boat altogether. Global developments have passed us by and it is too late to make a revolutionary leap now. If we want to climb out of the failed state syndrome that we have sunk into, Lanka has no choice but to hitch its wagon to another star.

From the frying pan into the fire?

One does read the newspapers and the Internet and watch TV. The following from the BBC of 26th June comes as no surprise. ldquo;Nearly 7,500 people have died in official custody in India over the past five years, according to a report by a human rights group. The report by Delhi-based Asian Centre for Human Rights says many of these people were tortured in custody. It says the Indian government is in a state of denial about torture. Even when action is taken against officials who are accused of wrongdoing the system tries to cover up any crimes. Nearly all the deaths were the result of torture. But the government routinely attributes deaths in custody to illness, attempted escape, suicide and accidentsrdquo;. The repression of tribal groups is no secret; the number of districts in India that are under emergency rule is cause for dismay; the shootings in West Bengal and the massacre in Gujerat are revolting. I am well aware of the rising crescendo of threats to secularism. It is only too well known that neo-liberalism is widening income gaps and engendering increasing inequity in India and elsewhere.

However, I could not by any stretch arrived at my conclusions without factoring in these concerns. This background, this reality, does not vitiate the conclusion. Someone commented: ldquo;Be careful what you wish for; mother India is still in the embrace of Kalirdquo;, but so is mother Lanka and so are many other places, Asian democracies and one party states alike. My argument for integration is not predicated on some imagined Indian utopia.

Having aid this, nevertheless one must add that there is indeed substantial formal democracy in India; the courts are more independent than Lanka, public opinion a great deal more sophisticated and influential, and the press hugely more free. On balance, neither the curbs on democracy and human rights in India, nor the increasing inequity between the social classes, are to my mind, sufficient disincentive to defeat the case for integration. From frying pan into fire is a false idiom in this instance. Most important for Lanka is that the ethos of pluralism is much stronger in India, and it is spreading beyond the kaleidoscope of languages, religions and cultures, to caste liberation and reordering of caste-based political power in many cow-belt states, notwithstanding the grand larceny of the Mayawathi and Yadev types.

Some curious criticisms of the thesis in this paper come from an unexpected quarter, the politically correct soft left. Some ask, would not the case advanced here be grist to the mill of Indian corporate capitalism. Others fear it could be misunderstood in the context of the onward march of diehard Hindutva politics. These are false objections; my case has been systematically built from Lankan perspectives and imperatives, the aspirations of Indian corporate capitalism and Hindutva politics are marginal to the argument. Concerns voiced for reasons of Indian political correctness are beside the point; one must have the intellectual stamina to follow through the line of thought relating to Lankarsquo;s way out of this conundrum to its inexorable logical conclusion.

The time domain as a concept

The fate and foibles of the Congress Party, or the BJP, the Rajapakse Brotherhood, and other transient entities called national governments, are ephemeral elements in the framework of the temporal conceptualisation that motivates this paper. They come and they go, the characterisation of any particular one does not much change the argument, because time in the conceptualisation of the future of nation states that permeates this thesis is another kind of dimension. Sure, governments are the immediate vehicles that transport the more enduring and bulky entity called society and the nation state from terminus to terminus, but they can only slow down, accelerate or distort the motion from time to time. True the mode of transport at any time also colours that enduring hulk that it bears, but there is also something that goes on, if not forever, at least for the longer duration than a nation state and its ethos survives. In this dimension of historical temporality the integration of Lanka into a greater subcontinental entity will be in fealty to a dynamic so powerful it will be akin to the drive of an elemental force, fortified by materialist advantage and political logic.

Kumar David, an electrical engineering professor has worked in Sri Lanka, USA, Sweden and Zimbabwe and was Dean of Engineering in Hong Kong. He has been with the Samasamaja tradition for over 50 years and is currently an ExCo member of the Democratic Left Front. He has published extensively, profesionally, and on the national question and socio-economics.

• A reponse to ETHNOS OR DEMOS? - QUESTIONING TAMIL NATIONALISM



• On ldquo;traitorsrdquo; and federalism: Beyond the hypocrisy, towards collaboration



• For a Sri Lankan Nationalism



• Buying Onions From India amp; China



• Federalism or Nationalism? Fears and Promises

The poll has had the effect of strengthening both pro and anti-devolution camps in their chosen opinions.

I suggest that a realist reading should result in a more nuanced approach to devolution, which escapes the trap of overreaction in either direction, namely allergic rejection and imitative appeasement. With or without the new data from Tamil Nadu, the debate on devolution in Sri Lanka reveals roughly seven and possibly eight points of view or ldquo;linesrdquo;. These are:

1. Zero or small unit devolution: Abolition of the 13^th amendment and Provincial Councils, replacement with District level devolution, if at all.


2. 13^th amendment Minus or Provincial Councils Lite: Retention of Provincial Councils, but deduction or non-implementation of even those powers granted by the 13th amendment.


3. 13^th amendment Classic: The full and speediest possible implementation of the existing 13th amendment, meaning the full devolution of those powers already granted by the 13th amendment.  


4. 13^th amendment Plus: the enhancement of the powers of the 13^th amendment by relocating or partially redistributing the powers of the Concurrent list. This position subdivides between those who are willing to risk a constitutional amendment and those who seek only that which is possible without one.


5. The Indian model: quasi-federalism; powers no less than those of an Indian state.


6. Full or classic federalism.


7. ISGA/Confederation of two states.


8. No ethnic based federalism or two unit model; a radical reform of the state, citizenship and identity, reflecting hybridity, secularism and pluralism. 

Positions 1-7 are present to varying degrees in the political domain, national and international (including the twin Diasporas) while the last arises from within the civil society intelligentsia (Prof Nira Wickremesingha in Open Democracy). 

While administrative decentralisation is needed for purposes of development, devolution or transfer of some measure of power from centre to second order units at the periphery, is needed as a bridge between the North and South, the Tamils and the Sinhalese.

Therefore any and all devolution proposals must pass the test of enjoying the support of some segment of both communities. It must at the least, be at the interface of the two ldquo;setsrdquo;, namely Sinhala and Tamil opinion.

No sustainable solution can be unilaterally imposed upon either the Sinhalese or the Tamils.  

Positions 1 amp; 2 (abolish or weaken Provincial Councils) have no takers outside the Sinhala community, and therefore fails the test of acceptability by at least some Tamils.

The international and regional blowback of any such move (which would have many powerful opponents and no supporters whatsoever outside the island), would be disastrous for our military efforts and our overall stability and security. 

Similarly, Positions 6 and 7 (federalism, con-federalism) have no takers among the Sinhalese, going by public opinion polls, the results of which, ranging from the 1997 polling by Research International Pvt Ltd, up to todayrsquo;s CPA polls, have been remarkably consistent.

Position 5 that of Indian model quasi federalism, enjoys, according to the CPA (and much to its regret) 5% support among the majority Sinhala community- thatrsquo;s 5% of 74%. No mainstream political party or candidate in a competitive electoral democracy (and that includes Senator Obama) would treat as anything other than radioactive, a position that was so hopelessly unpopular. And yet, otherwise sensible Tamil politicians expect the two main Southern parties to agree on this. If there were any such possibility, President Kumaratungarsquo;s 1995and 1997 ldquo;union of regionsrdquo; packages, or her admirable August 2000 draft Constitution would have obtained bipartisan support, instead of suffering the highly visible fates they did.

The new argument, basing itself on the Ananda Vikatan opinion poll, is that Sri Lanka can best protect itself from pro-Tamil Eelam sentiment by adopting the Indian model of quasi-federalism.

This argument runs up against several counter-considerations.

Firstly, by the same logic, Cuba can best protect itself from the extreme anti-Cuban Revolution sentiments of Florida-and by extension Washington DC, since Florida has a significant influence on American electionsndash; by adopting an economic and political model such as that which prevails in the USA. Any self -respecting Cuban, and there is an island full of them, would reject that argument with the contempt it deserves. 

Secondly, by what logic do 50 million ethnic Tamils in Tamil Nadu and a tiny fraction of that number in Sri Lanka require the same quantum and therefore model of devolution?

Thirdly, by what measure is the opinion of the citizens of Tamil Nadu of greater validity with regard to the internal arrangements of Sri Lanka, than those of over 95 % of Sinhalese citizens of this country, comprising 74% of the population, who oppose Indian model quasi-federalism?

Fourthly, this pro-Tamil separatist opinion in Tamil Nadu is a news flash? It would not have been so to generations of Sinhalese going back millennia, into antiquity. The anti-Sri Lankan and anti-Sinhala sentiment in Tamil Nadu represents an existential threat of long historical duration, which we must permanently protect ourselves against.

The new polling data must neither be ignored and brushed aside as irrelevant, nor appeased by mimicry of models.   

Many Tamil politicians and liberal commentators forget Sri Lankarsquo;s bitter experience with the Vardharajaperumal administration (from which I had resigned a year before, alarmed at the trends behind the scene), which made an Unilateral Declaration of Independence but could not be instantly dissolved by the Government without first bringing amending legislation which made that possible. 

What is needed by way of response is neither a model that is so tightly closed and claustrophobic that it generates irredentist sentiment, nor one that is so carelessly open that it permits irredentism.

This brings us to positions 3, 4 and 8. The last is probably the most attractive but seems unrealistic at the moment. The lamentable fate of the Equal Rights Bill presented by President Kumaratunga in 2000, withdrawn in the face of agitation by alumni of certain leading (boys and girls) schools in Colombo and the JVP run Inter University Students and Bhikku Federations, shows how far we are from that level of enlightened consciousness. As Mr Anandasangaree correctly reminds us, the easy abolition of Section 29, the anti-discrimination clause of the Soulbury Constitution, gives the minorities no reason to trust a solution devoid of political space and some measure of self governance.

That leaves Positions 3 and 4: 13th amendment Classic and 13th amendment Plus.

Position 3 and possibly 4 are the only ones with significant support from the Sinhala public and some support from some Tamils (both North and East). Thus 13th amendment Classic passes the test. (Arguably, so does 4, but this is a stretch).

Most recently at the SAARC summit, President Rajapakse has rightly re-iterated his governmentrsquo;s commitment to Position 3, ldquo;the comprehensive implementation of the 13th amendmentldquo;, drawing attention to the Eastern process with its elected Chief Minister and expressing his belief that the Northern Province will similarly possess a Chief Minister. Given that the Sri Lankan armed forces have gained the strategic initiative and are on the strategic offensive, this is a prospect for the foreseeable future. In his remarks the President also left room for submissions by the APRC.

Recent retrospectives surrounding the Karadzic trial regarding the events in former Yugoslavia recall the disaster of the holding of a referendum in Bosnia in 1992, with the Serbs abstaining and the Bosnian Muslims voting in favour. This was the schism that resulted in civil war. Bosnia shows the absolute imperative on avoiding a referendum in an ethnically or ethno-religiously polarised society, and therefore the imperative of avoiding any proposals that require a referendum.

This is why the only man with a roadmap, Douglas Devananda, has embraced President Rajapaksersquo;s ldquo;comprehensive implementation of the 13th amendmentrdquo; as the  only feasible start, while placing the 13th amendment Plus, and even consideration of the Indian model, as subsequent stages of political evolution. Between the various stages of his gradualist formula lie periods of the broadening of consensus and the building up of trust between the communities over time and through practical experience.

• Federalism: Some debates never die



• On ldquo;traitorsrdquo; and federalism: Beyond the hypocrisy, towards collaboration



• On the UNPrsquo;s ldquo;Repositioningrdquo;



• A military pathway to nation building



• Responding to Sumanasri Liyanage: On Mahinda bowing down to the ‘differing majority’ and On changing the terminology from ‘federal’ to ‘power sharing’

Once I blamed a Tamil friend of mine who is a leading professional, for not taking an active part in the search for a solution to the ethnic impasse. He was despondent and thought it a waste of time to get involved with a problem that no government after independence has had the guts to get to grips with. According to him, all of them have been intimidated by the threat of a highly inflated vociferous minority of demagogues and the moderate Tamils have been silenced by the violent reaction to that lethargy. Reason on both sides has become the prisoner of these forces.

‘If we are genuine and pragmatic in our search,rdquo; my friend said, ldquo;the solution is simple. Let the Tamils put down their minimum demands clearly and let the Sinhalese decide the maximum they are prepared to go along with. Then let the two sides sit down and hammer out the differences until a consensus is reached.rdquo;

The idea looked simple. Coming to think of it, that is what we are supposed to have been doing all the time. But it would appear on hindsight that we have only been going round and round the mulberry bush with the problem, for two main reasons. We never had a clear policy on the modalities of resolution. The second reason which is essentially the cause of the first, is that our leaders never had the wisdom, the sensitivity and the courage to handle the problem with statesmanship. In the alternative, they were exploiting the dispute for their own survival in power.

The latest make-believe is the All Party Representatives Committee without some of the most relevant parties, no less logical than ‘Sinhala only with Tamil alsorsquo;. Judging by its record of performance, the APRC is destined to drag its feet ad infinitum with even the only recommendation they have made so far, allegedly under dictation, not implemented in full up to now. It is in this scenario, that I say the intelligentsia has a duty to engage themselves in the search for a consensus to the vexed problem of our ethnic conflict, if the Tamils are not to be left at a dead end at the end of the fight.

At the going rate of state procrastination, the international community is very likely to become the final arbiters of the dispute, as has already happened in other theaters of ethnic conflict, sometimes to the detriment of the intended ‘beneficiaryrsquo;. No self-respecting nation could be happy about such an intervention. The best way to prevent such humiliation is for opinion leaders on both sides to engage themselves in a brave and open debate on the minimum mutually acceptable Peace Package.

It is my belief that coordinating the evolution of a Peace Package calls for an NGO eminently qualified and resourceful enough to handle such a momentous undertaking. Fortunately we already have non-partisan, intellectual institutions dedicated to the resolution of the ethnic conflict. It is earnestly hoped that one of them would rise to the occasion and undertake the venture. I suggest that the effort be coordinated on the following lines;

1. Publish a paper indicating what the minimum requirements of the Tamils would be. This could be written by an internationally recognized Tamil with a standing equivalent to that of the Late Dr. Neelan Thiruchelvam. The writer may remain anonymous to avoid imaginable risks from both sides.


2. The second stage would be extensive publication of support, objections and counter-objections to the Paper.


3. Once supporters, advocates and activists on both sides have had their say, a Constitutional Law Expert can sum up the debate short-listing the challenged moot points at the end of the report.


4. An Institution with wide experience in statistical analysis of similar questions, then conducts a survey on the responses to the vexed points. It is important that this survey is conducted in Tamil majority areas as well, unlike in the past. The East should present no problem now. Even the North may be roped in by courtesy of the Public Service and a diplomatic approach to the Peace Secretariat of the LTTE. Any objection by the latter would reflect on their honesty of purpose.


5. The results of the survey are then referred to an Expert with an international reputation, for formulation of a Draft Package. It would be helpful to ensure that the selected Expert is neither a Tamil nor a Sinhalese. But the selectee should have an abiding interest in the affairs of this country, having his umbilical code with the island still intact.


6. The draft Package is then considered at a Workshop. It is important to ensure that this occasion is well attended by representatives of stake-holders, intellectuals and international activists. The Workshop will fine-tune the draft and finalize its text. The experts referred to at A, C and E above would be an ideal Panel of Rapporteurs for this occasion.


7. The finalized Package is then presented to the Government for active and prompt consideration and implementation. No government will be able to play hide and seek for long with a package built up with such transparency, debate, investigation and analysis of optimum preferences.


8. The Government will then refer the Package to a real 100% APRC. It is possible that some parties would boycott the Committee for ulterior motives. Abstinence has always been a favourite weapon of sabotage among our political parties. But the Government should have the courage to ignore any party that does not have the guts to fight their case before a properly constituted forum. The final recommendations of the genuine APRC will then be implemented without trepidation.

In view of the grave urgency to find a way out of the canker of our ethnic dispute, it is necessary that the process of evolving the Peace Package is implemented on a strict time-frame. Though the ideal should be three months, imaginable problems of the statistical survey may extend it to six.

Armed with a Peace Package filtered through the above process, the President should feel confident to act on it decisively. The international community which appears to be closing in on our ethnic conflict, is unlikely to turn a Nelsonian eye on a Hamlet-like approach to the Package.

In implementing the Peace Package, the President should take the cue from his predecessor as Chairman of SAARC, Manmohan Singh, who only recently pulled out victory from the jaws of defeat with his undaunted action in the teeth of opposition to the Atomic Power agreement with the US. In the ultimate analysis, it is the determination and statesmanship with which the ethnic issue is handled that would decide whether Mahinda Rajapaksa or his challenger, Veluppillai Pirapaharan would live longer in history.

• Poll results: How do you think we can end the war and attain peace in Sri Lanka?



• What Can We Expect from the APRC?



• The Peace Confidence Index Survey: What the people think about peace, war and talks



• A ‘Hold-Firersquo; for One Month - Response to LTTErsquo;s ceasefire during SAARC



• Diaspora dilemmas: Australia and the Sri Lanka conflict

The small, completely cadjan thatched hut, teeters upon the mercy of the weather. It is one of the temporary shelters in the string of camps for the DPs, which dot Puttalam.

Madeenarsquo;s camp, a vast barren land which faces the Puttalam Saltern, is known as Saltern 01 and houses 120 families.  It has the most difficult living conditions and is adjacent to the camp, called Saltern 2, which has 65 families. In both the camps the houses are made of either wood or cadjan. In Madeenarsquo;s home the walls, roof and door are all a mass of mildew because there is no money to replace the cadjan.

If one stoops enough to enter the shack streaks of sunlight filtering through the rain decayed coconut cadjan would fall on the faces of six children sleeping away their hunger on the cold and broken cement floor.  If it is monsoon time, these children would be huddling in a corner with rainwater sweeping over and under them.

ldquo;When we were chased from our homes we were only allowed to take our travel fare out of the north. All our jewelry and money were taken away by the LTTE. We were reduced to begging. And that is how we lived for eighteen years in this camp,rdquo; says Madeen of Jaffna.

The ethnic cleansing of Jaffna was carried out when the LTTE had control of the peninsula in 1990. Today, Jaffna is under military control, but is virtually empty of Muslims, with no concentrated effort being taken to resettle them. While it is clear that living in their former homeland would not be easy under the present war situation, life in Puttalam is no better.

For the IDP families of Puttalam jobs are a luxury.

Madeenrsquo;s chest ailment prevents him from taking the only job easily available at the Puttalam saltern which pays Rs. 20 for hoisting 60 kilograms of salt from the salt beds to the store house, over a stretch of about 150 metres.

Help, in scanty proportions does arrive, but it does not change the status quo. Over the years, NGOs have assisted in procuring roofing sheets and in the construction of wells for the camps and in the building of a few brick houses in the camp. But these are a mere trickle in the context of the difficulties faced by these people.

ldquo;Some left for Jaffna during the peace talks between 2002 and 2005 looking for jobs. But we did not because we thought that we too would have to return like many of those who went home but came back to this camp saying they could not have access to their land which were now occupied by Tamil families. Others returned because their homes in Jaffna were turned to rubble in the thirty year old war,rdquo; Madeen says.

Not having the money to construct their houses anew in the land of origin, these families are back in Puttalam, living the lives of permanent refugees and battling to find the few available manual jobs.

For Ismath Inun Samath, chosen as the leader of the Saltern 1 camp by its residents, the return to Jaffna had proved slightly more successful. But his story too is that of a man forced to abandon the land he owned, and live in abject poverty.

ldquo;My home is in Osmania town, a predominantly Muslim area in Jaffna. Soon after the ceasefire between the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE in 2002 February and the subsequent agreement signed between the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC) Leader Rauff Hakeem and the LTTE leader Vellupillai Prabhakaran, my father, mother, brother and I left for Jaffna. We wished to see if we could earn a living by buying and selling old household goods.rdquo;

ldquo;We did not face any major problem with the LTTE and did well in the first two years after the ceasefire. There were many expatriate Tamils returning from abroad for short visits who dispensed with foreign goods when they leftrdquo;, recalls Samath.

It is with the money earned during the peace process that Samath had managed to pay Rs. 20,000 for 5 perches of government owned land in the Saltern camp in Puttalam.

ldquo;My family had land and a partially bombed house in Jaffna which we repaired as best as we could after we went there during the ceasefire, but we had no permanent guarantee that our home would continue to be accessible for us if the conflict restarted,rdquo; he explains.  Now, with the A9 highway, the only land route linking the North and the rest of the country, closed for the past two years, Jaffna is once again an illusion for Samath.

Therefore, like all others in the camp, Samath had used every cent he had saved to buy land in Puttalam. The effort to legally own land in Puttalam had been prompted by a housing project that is to be completed in 2011. World Bank is to assist the  construction of  7,850 permanent houses in IDP camps in Puttalam. The project is covering only those who had land deeds indicating ownership.

ldquo;People in this camp saved money by skipping their already frugal meals,rdquo; he says. Today, almost every family has a deed to their name, but that is about all they have.

Seated in the small compound in front of Samathrsquo;s home, I am invited to drink a jug of well water. I am warned that it would not be like the well or tap water available in Colombo. The water certainly did not taste like anything found in the capital or any other area in the country. It was salty in the extreme.

And this is what the IDPs in the vicinity of the Puttalam saltern are forced to drink if they miss the two hour drinking water service provided through the single tap outside the camp bordering the road.

Tap water facility is available for an hour in the morning from 6.30 to 7.30, and then for another hour in the evening from 5.30 to 6.30. Since this water is only meant for drinking, for all other needs, the IDPs make do with the well water which is so salty that it is unfit to be used for even washing.

It is lack of money that keeps these jobless IDPs from getting piped water.

Pointing to the Palmyra fence that separates his residence from the others, S. M. Jinnah, whose original home is in the LTTE-controlled region of Kilinochchi, says that the water pipe runs along his camp about 5 feet from the border. But to get a connection, Jinnah and the rest of those occupying the camp, have to pay Rs. 20,000.

S.M. Jinnah seated in front of his home

ldquo;I have no more money. I saved and borrowed and begged for work to pay for this land and to build a single room brick home with a proper zinc roof for my children,rdquo; says Jinnah whose house is one of four in the Saltern 01 camp which is made of brick.

Toilets too are another luxury. For both the Saltern 1 and 2 camps, which have 230 houses, there are a little over 90 toilets, some constructed with the assistance of some NGOs  and others crudely made by the residents themselves. The latter are unhygienic.

Around 3 kilometers away from the Puttalam saltern camps is Thillady, an excessively  dry area where there is an acute water crisis. Over 3,000 families from Jaffna and Killinochchi live in temporary shelters made mostly of wood or cadjan. In Thillady, the shacks are spread over a vast area unlike in Saltern 1 and 2.  Therefore, the overall living conditions seem to be more hygienic. In this area, 55 families had received land deeds in 1994 from Minister Douglas Devananda, who is presently Minister of Social Services and Social Welfare, for a nominal amount of Rs. 2,500 (25 USD).

The Saltern 1 Camp in Puttalam

ldquo;We received ten perches of land for Rs. 2,500.But there is no water here. To get even a little water we have to dig over sixty feet,rdquo; says Saleem Sansi from Jaffna, pointing to a deep well which is practically dry.

ldquo;There are no taps at all. The situation is so bad that people from other areas in Puttalam where the water facility exists, do a business here, selling water. A can of 30 litres of water goes for ten rupees, and a four-member family would need about three cans per day,rdquo; he explains.

Although these families live far below the poverty line, none of them, especially in the camps with the worst conditions such as Saltern 01 or 2, whom this writer spoke to, gets the food stamps provided by the government. The food stamps are worth a maximum of Rs. 1,260 (12.3 USD) for a five member family.

ldquo;There are various regulations, and sometimes, some families are suddenly cut off the list. Since the amount is very small, many do not make much effort to meet government officials to rectify the omissions. We have not been getting these food stamps for years now,rdquo; says Waseel a sixty seven year old widow whose husband was shot by the LTTE in 1990. She now looks after her widowed sisterrsquo;s children with money she gets by begging in Puttalam town.

There is a vast difference between the lifestyles of the IDPs from Kilinochchi, Mullaitivu, Jaffna and Vavuniya and those of the north western Mannar district. The reason is political.

While the IDPrsquo;s of Mannar have a Muslim government representative, the Minister of Resettlement and Disaster Relief Services, Rishad Bathiudeen, from their district, the residents of other northern areas donrsquo;t.

Displaced persons from Mannar have used this political link to transform themselves from jobless refugees to job holders. They are mostly located in the Karambe area, around 5 kilometres from Puttalam, in high walled residences, with many of them holding well paying government jobs.

ldquo;We do not have a Muslim Minister from either Kilinochchi or Jaffna to work for our welfare. This is why we have to pay Rs. 20,000 for piped water to be supplied while the Muslims displaced from Mannar, who have a Minister from Mannar, have to pay a mere Rs. 2,500 to get the tap service to their homes,rdquo; says S. Mohammed, father of four children in the Saltern whose entire savings had gone into building a brick toilet.

ldquo;We want government officials to either settle us in our own lands in government controlled territory in the North, or give us some basic facilities here in Puttalam so we can live like human beings,rdquo; Mohammed says, jabbing at a picture published in a local newspaper mid last year which shows several important government ministers and dignitaries visiting the camp.

ldquo;In Karambe, you will find luxury houses having been built for those who already own houses in other parts of Sri Lanka. It is these peoplesrsquo; names who were sent up when a project for 600 houses was initiated with the help of the UAE government,rdquo; alleges the Secretary of the Northern Muslim Rights Organisation, Maulavi Sufian.

Home

The Minister for Resettlement and Disaster Relief Services, Rishad Bathiudeen, denies that he discriminates between the Muslims of Mannar and those of Jaffna and Kilinochchi.

ldquo;There are still many from Mannar who are also in a difficult situation,rdquo; Bathiudeen claims. But he has no answer to the question as to why Muslim legislators did not take active steps in the ceasefire of 2002 - 2005 to resettle northern Muslims who wanted to go to their homes in the North.

At the Secretariat for Displaced Muslims, the sight which greets one is a stark contrast to what is witnessed in the IDP camps. There are many offices and around 150 officials who are at their desks purportedly attending to the needs of the Muslim IDPs. The Commissioner at the Secretariat for Displaced Muslims, M. Muhais, and Government Agent for Puttalam, Kingsley Fernando, insist that the government is lsquo;doing its bestrsquo; to solve the peoplesrsquo; problems.

Meanwhile, there is yet another issue which complicates matters for the displaced community of the North.  Deputy Minister for Livestock Development, K. Bais, who is a Muslim from Puttalam, has reservations about the resettlement of northern Muslims in Puttalam. He makes no secret of his view. He thinks it is the Puttalam Muslims who are discriminated against.

ldquo;The Muslims from the North, whether it be from Mannar or Jaffna or Kilinochchi or Vavuniya, have all got land now in Puttalam, but there are so many Puttalam Muslims who do not have their own homes or land,rdquo; says Bais. He claims that NGOs are paying ldquo;much attentionrdquo; to the Northern IDPrsquo;s and that Muslims lsquo;originally from Puttalam are

ldquo;ignoredrdquo;.

In this background, M. M.Kuthoos, the head of a new political party launched early this year says the fight for the rights of the Northern displaced Muslims will go on.

ldquo;The Peoplersquo;s Revival Front was inaugurated in March this year to give political representation for the IDPrsquo;s from Jaffna and other northern areas where they have no political representation,rdquo; says M. M. Kuthoos, a seventy five year old IDP from Jaffna who served as Deputy Director of Education from 1993 to 1996.

ldquo;Jaffna is the land of our birth. What our party wants is to fight for our right to live and die in Jaffna and in the other four areas of the North from where we were chased out,rdquo; he says. But he admits that the struggle might be a long one.

ldquo;Children who were born after 1990 do not know what Jaffna is. There is talk of devolution of power and a political settlement. In such a situation we want that our rights are looked into. The North, although predominantly Tamil, had a very strong Muslim presence for centuries. In the 1980s, there were three Muslim members in the Jaffna Council. There were towns and areas in the peninsula which were identified by Muslim names and completely occupied by Muslims. People talk of violation of human rights. Who talks of the violation of human rights of northern Muslims who have been living in Puttalam for the past

eighteen years in unbearable conditions? What has been done for them during the five year peace process? queries Kuthoos.

In a country that spends around Sri Lankan Rupees 117 billion on the war against the Tamil Tiger rebels and depends on foreign aid for its development activities, government officials bemoan that it is lack of funds that prevents them from giving the IDPs housing and other basic facilities.

ldquo;I want to build up to 14,000 houses for the displaced community but we are still trying to secure the money from foreign donors,rdquo; says Minister Rishad Bathiudeen.

With international criticism against Sri Lanka for alleged rights abuses such as abductions and disappearances in the backdrop of war, doubt hovers on the possibility of obtaining further foreign funds.

With no clear government policy on how to effectively deal with the hundreds of Muslims in Puttalam still categorized as internal refugees, and no streamlining or comprehensive government supervision of NGO assistance to this community, the question that these Northern Muslims seek an answer to is how long they would have to live in deprivation.

• Forgotten IDPs from the North



• The voice of an IDP single mother in Puttlam



• TMVP in same dustbin as LTTE in the past?



• The divide between Muslims and Tamils: Perspective of an IDP



• Doesnrsquo;t she have the right to live with her daughter?

The purpose of a military is to protect the nation and the democracy-in essence, to protect you and me. IF the system works correctly, we the people are the real rulers. We elect members from amongst us to represent our interests, and the military protects our right to do so. The military serves us. But the General thinks differently; he thinks we serve the military.

Here are a few sound bites from the interview that will help you get better acquainted with the General:

The common masses: ldquo;hellip; they have to go through hardships. They have to spend a lot of money. They have to sacrifice.rdquo;

Ok, ok, I get it! We need to tighten our belts so that the military can recruit, train, and arm themselves to protect us. But why did they purchase a 44 million rupee Mercedes S-class for the General? It isnrsquo;t even armoured, and therefore not suitable for use by a high-risk target, which the General certainly is. The Sunday Leaderrsquo;s sources said the car was for the Generalrsquo;s wife, though the army had denied this. Either way, how much belt-tightening is a Mercedes worth?

The nation: ldquo;the Sinhala nation has to sacrifice if you want to protect the country and survive.rdquo;

The Sinhala nation? I thought I lived in the multi-ethnic nation of Sri Lanka. Have we already been divided into a Sinhala nation, a Tamil nation, and a Muslim nation? This seems to be the world the General knows, shaped by his personal experiences as a child. He speaks of being a victim: ldquo;I can still remember how the villagers used to run to a rocky cliff when Tamils attack our village. We spend two to three days there until the situation comes back to normal.rdquo;

And therersquo;s more-his opinion on the ethnic problem: ldquo;I donrsquo;t think the people in the North and East are subjected to any injusticehellip;This country will be ruled by the Sinhalese community which is the majority representing 74 percent of the population.rdquo;

Well, good thing I was born Sinhala! We Sinhala can all give ourselves a collective pat on the back for putting this guy in charge of our security-hersquo;s really looking out for us. Or is he? Read onhellip;

On the 11^th of May this year, the deputy editor of the Nation newspaper, Keith Noyahr, wrote an article titled: ldquo;An army is not its commanderrsquo;s private fiefdom.rdquo; It criticized the General for depriving senior, capable, and deserving officers of reaching command positions, and instead promoting junior officers with little battlefield experience. The article pointed out a whimsical (should we say dictatorial?) style of leadership where a Major General who spearheaded the victory in the East was thanklessly removed and kicked out of his official quarters, while the commander responsible for the Muhamalai debacle was rewarded with a promotion. When it came to nominating officers for service awards, the General was a scrooge, recommending a grand total of one person for the Vishista Seva Vibushanayahellip; himself. He determined that only he was fit to receive it, even though he was overlooked for a lesser decoration, the Uttama Seva Padakkama, by no less than five previous army commanders (they must have had their reasons, says Noyahrrsquo;s sources). The article clearly seemed to have the tacit cooperation of officers within the service: officers who felt that the army was transforming from an institution run by military professionals with an established procedural code, to one that operated on a cult of personality-the personality of Lt. General Fonseka.

Less than two weeks after the article was published, Keith Noyahr was abducted and tortured. The Chief Opposition Whip, Joseph Michael Perera, said in parliament:

ldquo;We are told by those in the army itself that journalists are abducted and subjected to grievous injury by none other than a special unit under the army commander.rdquo;

The Generalrsquo;s opinion of Mr Noyahr:

ldquo;If he has done some damage to our organisation or to a person, especially when he has done something which he is not supposed to do, then it is natural he must be living in fear. If they think that they have done something of that nature the best thing for them is to correct themselves and rectify the mistakehellip;These so called media guys are not responsible to the people and they are not entitled to such media freedom.rdquo;

So herersquo;s what we have so far: a man who is racist, egotistical, dictatorial, and extravagant. Add to this a contempt for public freedom, an inability to appreciate other points of view, and a tendency to hold personal grudges against any who defy him.

We have our leading man. Now we need a play. So herersquo;s where we peep in to our crystal ball and look at a possible scenario in the not too distant future:

The conventional war against the LTTE is won; the Vanni is taken. The General is celebrated as a national hero and President Mahinda Rajapaksha basks in the glory of victory. And thenhellip;the people start asking questions: why is the cost of living still so high; why are politicians so corrupt, with even provincial councillors travelling in motorcades of luxury limousines; why is Mervyn Silva still on the loose; why are obvious black holes of public money like Mihin Lanka Airlines still existing; why are political hangers-on and suck-ups selling their influence to the highest bidder; why is the country so morally decrepit, and rife with casino kings, drug peddlers, and liquor bars? And herersquo;s one more: why are bombs still exploding in the South? Didnrsquo;t we just win this war?

Who can solve these problems? Our hero in uniform of course: Lt. General Sarath Fonseka. Hersquo;ll promise to wipe out corruption and stop the bombs in the South-all he needs is complete control of the nation. He will return Sri Lanka to the morally pure dharma-dveepa that we keep hearing about. Therersquo;s already hinted support from the JHU. Athuraliye Rathana Thera in a recent interview (again with the Nation newspaper, bless them!) voiced his support for militarisation: ldquo;we think that military service should be compulsoryhellip;Two years of military service will inculcate the values of simplicity, labour, strength and discipline in our young men.rdquo; When military dictatorship comes, looks like some of the Buddhist clergy may be their cheerleaders.

Some of you will think this is a far-fetched idea. It will never happen, not in this country, you say. Think again. Why is it that the only viable candidate the UNP could come up with for the North Central Province election is former General Janaka Perera, who by the way was General Sarath Fonsekarsquo;s superior. The military is the only institution in Sri Lanka today that really commands respect among the people (or to use the Generalrsquo;s vernacular, among the Sinhala nation). They are also blessed with the most funding: estimates of 200 billion rupees for this year. Compare this to a mere 20 billion rupees for education and 25 billion rupees for higher education. If we spend so little on educating our people and giving them the means to climb the economic ladder, we are compelling them to be soldiers; it is a conscription of sorts. An article by the Associated Press titled ldquo;War is only job available in Sri Lankan village,rdquo; interviewed a mother who said, ldquo;but therersquo;s no option. What can we do?rdquo; By militarising our society to this extent, are we not strengthening a hand that could threaten us with a fist? Once these boys are done fighting the LTTE, whom will they fight next to earn their keep? If a hot-headed General orders them to turn their guns on us, they might just obey-they need the job.

Some of you will think, well why not have a military dictatorship? An oft-heard comment is that democracy has failed in Sri Lanka. It has brought us nothing but grief to the masses, and riches to the influential few. The people are so jaded by the incompetence and dishonesty of our politicians, and the clear failure of our political system, that they will celebrate a military coup. We will lose our freedoms, our right to vote, to protest, and to disagree. But surely these are just small sacrifices for the good of the nation. In any case, our vote is meaningless. We vote for an MP from a particular party, but they just jump to the other side after they get our vote. There are rumours of large payoffs for an MP to cross over; they sell the power that we gave them.  So why vote? Why have elections? Why have democracy at all?

Letrsquo;s answer that with another question: how bad can a military dictatorship be? Are there examples we can learn from? Yes. We can point to the brutal dictatorships of General Franco of Spain, or General Pinochet of Chile; both countries have returned to democracy (that might be a clue). The vicious military dictatorship in Burma has been in the news this year (and in the movies-see Rambo). When Cyclone Nargis hit Burma, the military rulers did little to help the 1 million homeless, and hindered others from assisting, watching callously as thousands died long after the storm had passed. But the military dictatorship we can learn most from is the one that is closest to us geographically. I refer to the military dictatorship in the Vanni, led by (General) Prabhakaran.

Prabhakaran promised the Tamil people that he would free them from persecution by the Sinhala-dominated government. All he needed was unquestioning control and complete submission to his dictatorial rule. Thirty years on, after murdering a long list of Tamil moderates simply because they dared to disagree with him (even though they still believed in the Tamil struggle), and with more than 20,000 LTTE cadres dead (a great deal of them young conscripts), the Tamil peoplersquo;s submission to Prabhakaranrsquo;s dictatorship has brought them no closer to their liberation. The University Teachers for Human Rights (Jaffna) has this to say about the LTTE:

ldquo;The civilian dead, including the thousands the LTTE killed in mass executions for real or imagined political reasons in its dreaded mass prisons in the early 1990s, and in regular individual killings, would be even higher.rdquo;

They describe life in the Vanni under the LTTE:

ldquo;Life in the Vanni is something between outright fascist repression and a horrid joke gone too farhellip; It appears to people that the LTTE endangers them as a matter of policyhellip; There are hardly any services but mainly extortionhellip;The LTTErsquo;s control hinges on poruppalars (persons-in-charge or divisional heads)hellip;They are the virtual maharajahs or fiefs. Many of them live in luxury houses amidst so much drabness and poverty.rdquo;

This then is the danger of allowing a dictatorship: he who pretends to be your saviour can soon become your oppressor. Although it is tempting to write off our democracy as flawed (and it has been especially oppressive to the Tamil community), there is always a possibility of change. Governments have changed several times since independence: the socialist regime of the 70s that brought queues and rationing was flung out by the vote; the murderous and profligate regime of the 80s was flung out by the vote. Wersquo;re all still waiting for a government that can bring real peace and real prosperity. If the political choices available to you seem poor, then come forward yourself and form your own party, run for office. That is your right. Do not give it up. Once you have sacrificed your freedom and your right to vote, you have opened up a Pandorarsquo;s box of evil that you will pay dearly to close.

So look out, be vigilant: the General is coming.

• Bala Tampoe on war and the erosion of democratic governance in Sri Lanka



• Between Eelam and War: Wherersquo;s the solution?



• Sri Lanka blocks TamilNet



• On Democratic Innings



• Human Shields In The Battle Of Sri Lanka

Internationally it was the 40th commemoration of the Tet Offensive in Vietnam, the student uprisings of May 1968 most significantly in Paris, the 80th birth anniversary of Ernesto Che Guevara, and the 55th anniversary of the Moncada uprising which initiated the Cuban revolutionary process.

Nationally, it is the 60th anniversary year of Sri Lankarsquo;s Independence and the 50th and 25th anniversary year of two large blots on that existence as an independent country: 1958 and 1983.

This year also contains triple anniversaries of heroic uprisings of our people: the anti-colonial armed rebellions of 1818 and 1848 and the 55th anniversary of the Hartal of August 1953.  

The anniversaries of the 1818 and 1848 anti-colonial uprisings are best commemorated by re-kindling the spirit of Keppitipola and Puran Appu, sustaining the ongoing military drive for the countryrsquo;s reunification, taking it to the next level while remembering the atrocities committed against us by imperialism which in its contemporary form, impinges upon our attempt to reunite our motherland. 

Though less sustained and widespread than the Rebellion of 1818, that of 1848 warrants greater retrospection.  Imagine the spirit of those who rose up in rebellion against the worldrsquo;s mightiest military power, which thirty years before, had mercilessly suppressed the uprising of 1818? Coming from the urban-coastal area, Puran Appu had seen British colonial power at its most concentrated, and yet he was undaunted. To quell the 1848 rebellion British reinforcements were brought in from India, and Governor Torrington confirmed in an official letter (archived at Durham university) that Puran Appu was correct when he claimed that had his mother given birth to a dozen men like him there would not have been a single White man remaining in the Kandyan provinces. The Governor writes that ldquo;we should have surely lost the country for a whilerdquo;.  

A Century of Pacification: 1848-1948

The sources of Sri Lankarsquo;s tragic contemporary history are located in the events commemorated by two of these anniversaries: the 1848 rebellion and the execution of Puran Appu, and the Hartal or popular uprising of 1953.

The first reason is the absence of a follow up to the 1848 uprising. Throughout the world, failed uprisings generated still others, fueled by the heroism of their forerunner and memories passed down by survivors, oral history and written chronicles, to the younger generations.  This did not happen in the case of Puran Appu who had been able to transcend the upcountry/low country, urban-rural and more significantly the caste divide in an anti-colonial armed rebellion. It is possible that class and caste prejudice had much to do with the inaudibility of the echo of that rebellion. However it does not explain why a new generation of anti-imperialists, the late emerging Sri Lankan left movement, did not actively rekindle his memory and that of the 1848 rebellion.

A reverse class prejudice could be one reason. The dominant nucleus of the Lankan Left had a narrow notion of class struggle under colonialism and Puran Appu did not fit the bill of a proletarian. This tells us more about the Left than it does about Puran Appu, because the Cuban revolutionaries always saluted their rebellious patriotic predecessors, whatever the class origins of the latter. In 1968, with the Cuban revolution at its most radically Communist, Fidel Castro described theirs as the end product of ldquo;a hundred years of strugglerdquo;. Piloting his project of ldquo;a 21st century Socialismrdquo;, Venezuelarsquo;s President Chavez designates his revolution and his republic ldquo;Bolivarianrdquo;, in honor of Simon Bolivar the Liberator, who died in 1830. The Ceylonese Marxists sought to do no such thing, make no such connection, no return to roots in rebellion.

The hundred years since the 1848 armed rebellion and Puran Appu were not followed by a replay or rectified version, but by an essentially pacifistic though verbally violent, parochial, divisive, religio-cultural revivalism. It was paralleled by an utterly gradualist legislative-reformism, followed by a quaint Leftism, rhetorically impassioned but cut-off from the great river of Asian Marxist militancy represented by Ho Chi Minh, Mao Ze Dong, Zhou en Lai and the Indian Communists.

The Scenario Sixty Years Ago

It is against this backdrop of forces that we gained Independence sixty years ago. It is faddish to regard our first post independence administration as something of a golden age, when our citizens inhabited a Garden of Eden from which the fall from grace occurred with Bandaranaike and 1956. The briefest glance at the record shows this to be a hollow view.

That first administration had so slim an electoral base, that had it not been for the sectarianism of the Trotskyite left, a different, progressive government could have been easily formed. Never had the Left performed better than at the 1947 election, and at the now famous Yamuna discussions, efforts were made to unite the various tendencies of the Left with the independent nationalists, which could have resulted in a progressive coalition government. Dr Colvin R de Silva denounced the effort as one that would give birth to a ldquo;three headed donkeyrdquo;. The same Left was to enter coalitions with the fully formed SLFP, constituting a bloc in which its influence was far less than it would have been in 1947. One hesitates to think of the kind of animal symbol that could do justice to those subsequent coalitions.

The first post independence UNP administration was not only possessed of a slender popular base, its disenfranchisement of the Hill Country Tamils also provoked the strategic political schism that has persisted until this day: the breakaway of SJV Chelvanayagam and the launching of the Tamil Federalist project. The dream of a united, broadly inclusive national identity was betrayed almost a decade before SWRD Bandaranaike and 1956.

If one had to identify the Original Sin, I would say it was the decision to split the Ceylon National Congress (CNC) and form the United National Party (UNP) instead.

August 1953: Hartal

Between Independence sixty years ago, and the policy of Sinhala Only of 56, came the popular uprising, the Hartal of August 1953, the 55th anniversary of which falls on August 12-13th.  It is the abortion by the Left leadership of the Hartal that led to the particular form of the 1956 outcome. 

The Hartal was called by the Left to protest the savage cutback in food subsidy by the second UNP administration of the post Independence period. The cutbacks themselves revealed the utter social insensitivity of the post colonial power-bloc as represented by the UNP. It would have been an impossible task to build a nation on so narrow a social base.

A snapshot of August 1953 shows a coming together of social and political forces of a width that was never to be repeated. Organized urban workers and poor people, men and women, Sinhalese and Tamils, Left parties, Hill-country Tamil plantation workers and Federalists, all participated. The fledgling SLFP, while not an official participant, supported the Hartal, and SWRD Bandaranaike presided over the Hartal rally at Galle Face Green. Thus, the anti-UNP, anti-comprador alliance in struggle gave pride of place to the convergence of the working people of South and North, with the nascent national bourgeoisie represented by the SLFP playing only an auxiliary role. A scant three years later, these roles were to be reversed and national bourgeois leadership was established over the anti-UNP struggle, with all else that came with the narrowing of ideological and programmatic realmsndash; including ldquo;Sinhala Onlyrdquo;.     

This reversal of roles was the by product of the abandonment of the Hartal by those who summoned it, namely the parties of the Left. The people responded magnificently to the Hartal call, with women baking hoppers on rail tracks to stop trains. The government cracked down harshly with Police shootings accounting for several fatalities. The people stood firm and the government was evacuated to a US ship waiting offshore-as sound evidence as any of the impossibility of nation building by a wholly non-national, pro-imperialist comprador administration.

The Lankan Left

It is at this moment of opportunity that the Ceylonese Left revealed its authentic character, and the countryrsquo;s history began shifting onto an alternative track. Only a fortnight apart in exactly the same year, an uprising had taken place in another tropical island across the world. That was the Moncada attack of July 26th 1953 (about which I have written in these pages on Saturday July 26, 2008). True, the despotic character of the Cuban regime necessitated an armed uprising, as the Ceylonese situation did not. However, the failed Moncada uprising led to victorious final outcome years later, as the successful Ceylonese ldquo;Hartalrdquo; would not. This paradox is explicable by the wholly divergent attitudes displayed by Fidel Castro on the one hand and the Lankan Left leaders on the other. As striking a contrast in the spirit of rebellion is provided by the events on the island of Ceylon itself, during the same months July-August roughly a century before, when the armed Sinhala rebels led by Puran Appu stormed and overran the British fortress at Matale.   

In an almost unprecedented act in the history of the global left in the face of the virtual abdication by a capitalist government and a power vacuum, the left leaders called off the Hartal, and went onto promise in Parliament (the Hansard of the day provides the proof) that there would not be a repetition. That promise, made to the bourgeoisie, is one that the Left would keep. No one can fault the Left for not seizing power, but what is aberrant from the perspective of comparative international politics are its two consecutive choices: firstly, not to continue the Hartal, pushing its success further, exploring its limits, aiming for the most progressive possible outcome, and secondly, not to make its post-Hartal political project one of a united front of all forces which had participated in or supported the popular upsurge (this would have meant the SLFP, the CWC and the Federal party, but under Left hegemony).  

With this avenue being blocked by the Left leaders, the national and social struggle found an alternative leadership, pathway and program, that of the national bourgeois SLFP, parliamentary elections and Sinhala Only.

That too was not inevitable. A document available in the superb archives of the ILO here in Geneva reports the Parliamentary proceedings in Ceylon in 1954, the year after the Hartal, in which the Government reiterates its commitment to the full transition within eight years to Sinhala and Tamil as the languages of public administration. So Sinhala Only was not the only way to dislodge the hegemony of English. The process of transition was already underway and to a fairer, more inclusive solution. Also unfounded is the received wisdom that the SLFP simply had to agree to the slogan of Sinhala Only so as to defeat the UNP at the lsquo;56 election. The Hartal of 1953 had already broken the back of the UNP and its post-rsquo;53 leadership was even more alienated from the national aspirations than its predecessor. In the very next year, 1955, the slogan of Sinhala Only was raised by the more parochial civil society lobbies, and adopted by the SLFP in a change of policy stance. At its founding in 1951 and in its first General election manifesto in 1952 the SLFP had stood for ldquo;Swabasha as national languagesrdquo;, meaning Sinhala and Tamil, not Sinhala Only. This was the stand of the SLFP that supported the Hartal. But a national bourgeois party was naturally more susceptible to the pressure of the provincial petty bourgeoisie. Thus instead of the broad, multi ethnic popular bloc led by the working people of the Hartal of 1953, came the Pancha Maha Balavegaya of 1956, with the workers and peasants bringing up the rear, and that too in reverse order (rdquo;govi-kamkaruldquo;).

A Left Lost in Translation

The dominant trend of old Lankan Left was to give birth to a younger generation that was an even greater oddity than itself, in that its leaders returned from the West of the late rsquo;60s in which Che Guevara and Fidel Castro, Ho Chi Minh and Mao Ze Dong were the heroes (as they were for radicalized students worldwide), and made the strange choice to follow instead the nondescript British Trotskyites Ted Grant and Gerry Healey.

A far more serious Left, which related itself to the tradition of armed resistance in Sinhala history, was born with Rohana Wijeweera and the JVP and manifested in the April 1971 Insurrection. Nonetheless this was a Left diminished and distorted by its ldquo;latenessrdquo;; a post-Sinhala Only Left and therefore a mono-ethnic Sinhala Only Left, which neither sought nor saw common cause with the strong anti-caste struggle led by the Jaffna branch of the Maoist Communist party. The JVPrsquo;s second edition in the 1980s would be even worse, a sociopathic post-Standardization Left.

The tragic contemporary history of Sri Lanka was determined at least in part by the Hartal, its freezing and abandonment fifty five years ago, resulting in the current polarization between the non-national/anti-national on the one hand (the ldquo;peacerdquo; lobby of UNP Right and soft Left) and the narrow ethno-religious national (rdquo;patriotsrdquo; of populist Left and radical religious Right) on the other. The Lankan Left leadership of that time did not see itself as the inheritor and continuator of the rebellion of 1848, the 160th anniversary of which we should be celebrating. The Left leaders lacked anything like the spirit of risk and resistance of that insurrection and its leader, the great rebel Puran Appu, who was executed by the British Empire on August 8th, 160 years ago. Despite the affront of arrogant social apartheid that continued throughout the period of British imperial domination of Ceylon, nobody picked up his rifle.

(These are the personal views of the writer)

• A question to the government and the LTTE



• Bloody anniversaries: Indepedence, pogroms, war and peace



• The heroine of democracy and the monks revolution



• A military pathway to nation building



• Political solution or political illusion?

Provincial Councils

Whether we like it or not, democracy in post-independent Sri Lanka was a decision of the British Government which we have happily practiced over the past sixty years with no interruptions.  Similarly, the provincial council system was a decision of India that has been practiced for the past twenty years though the outcome of it is argumentative. It is not wrong to say that late president Jayawardenarsquo;s decision to establish the provincial council system in 1987 was not a choice that he made out of his political maturity, but rather something that was given as a part of the indo-Lanka accord that he had to heed to at the time due to the UNPrsquo;s immature policies on international relations.  The 13^th amendment under which the provincial council system was introduced granted a great deal of powers to the regions for the first time since independence though some deficits were often highlighted.  This system was introduced with the firm belief that it will be a catalyst in devolving the power at the centre to the region and thereby provide a solution to the ethnic conflict. However, the chief party to the protracted conflict, the LTTE, rejected provincial councils even before the ink of the signatures dried up, challenging the prime objective of the provincial council system. Therefore over the past twenty years the provincial councils neither became a meaningful channel in devolving power to the regions nor did they mitigate the threat of the ethnic conflict. 

However, though the provincial councils system might not offer the desired and ideal autonomy for regional communities, it was considered to be a starting point for the devolution of power. If provincial councils were given the powers described under the 13th amendment, the role and the outlook of those councils would have been very different to what they are today. For example not only areas such as education, culture and health but even powers like the police should have been under the authority of these councils. If one examines the reason for this situation, it is not only the case that the centre was not ready to devolve their power but the regions too were not eager to demand these powers.  Therefore, the puzzle here is, WHY are those who were not enthusiastic in strengthening the powers of the provincial councils or those who sometime ago denounced the system are now ready to fight with full force to grab the power in th