The purpose of this article is to try and explain the behaviour of aid agencies in the context of Sri Lanka’s conflict. With the escalation of the armed conflict between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan state in recent times, there have been a number of developments within aid agencies that seem to be contradictory. While some agencies have reduced or even closed down their operations, others continued to support Sri Lanka. The recent decision by the IMF to grant a loan to Sri Lanka is the latest in the latter category.

In order to understand this behaviour there we need to move our analysis beyond the confines of the Sri Lankan state and take into account the globalised world. This is true not only in the case of a clearly global phenomenon like foreign aid but for many other aspects of our society in the new millennium. Despite the protests of anti-globalizers, globalization is already a part of our society. This realization is essential not only to understand our society, but also to find answers to the problems that we are facing. In a globalized world we need to work both at the global and national levels to find answers to our problems.

Aid agencies operate in a world dominated by two tendencies.

• First, the expansion and deepening of global capitalism to all corners of the world.
• Second, post-Cold War security issues manifested at a global level.

The needs to strengthen and promote capitalism and ensure a stable world are two of the central concerns that drive the policies of aid agencies. The actual policies that emerge from these concerns depend very much on the specific context. But it is essential to keep in mind global imperatives in the analysis of aid policies.

Support to capital
In the post-colonial history of Sri Lanka, the general election held in July 1977 was an important turning point in deepening capitalist relations.  The centre-right UNP government elected to power during that election, undertook a series of policy changes that shifted the Sri Lankan economy in a direction that gave emphasis to markets, the private sector and a greater degree of openness to the global economy. These were steps that were essential for strengthening capitalist relations in the economy and satisfying demands of capital.

Although there were regime changes since 1977, none of them have shifted the fundamentals of the post’77 economic ideology. Of course there are differences in implementing specific policies, in the speed of the reforms, etc. But what is important to note is compared to the pre ’77 period of post-colonial Sri Lanka, where there were debates about diverse models of economic development, in the post’77 period promotion of capitalism, where private sector and markets are the dominant entities, has become the only model available. All discussions on development such as participatory development, sustainable development, etc., take place within this framework.

Liberalisation of the economy in 1977 had a very positive response from the developed west as well as Japan. A key indicator of this support was increased aid flows. One of the estimates published in 1985 stated that from a total of $ 1640 million foreign aid received between 1960 and 1985, 70% was received after 1977.[1]

What is important to understand is the political nature of this support. If we define politics broadly as a clash and interaction of interests, ideas and values, the 1977 shift in economic policy signified strengthening of capitalist interests, a set of ideas how we should develop our economy and the values that go with it. Taking steps to promote these interests, ideas and values is a political step. This is what UNP did in 1977. Increased aid flows reflected political support from developed centres of capitalism to a state that has taken these steps.

The beginnings of this transition were internally driven. J.R. Jayawardena, who gave leadership to these policies in 1977, tried to promote them while he was Minister of State in Dudley Senanayake regime of 1965-1970. However he did not get support from the cabinet. In 1977, with a five-sixths majority in parliament, he took the initial steps in implementing more capitalist friendly policies.

Under JR, Sri Lanka did not implement classical structural adjustment policies as advocated by aid agencies such as the IMF and the World Bank[2]. However his regime managed to secure support from aid agencies at an unprecedented level. There was the support for overall reforms as well to lead projects such as Mahaweli development, setting up of a free trade zone, urban development and at one time, to fourteen Integrated Rural Development Projects (IRDPs) spread all over the country.

The support for the JR regime by aid agencies was so high in spite of not following classic structural adjustment policies, Mick Moore for example, argued that it is easier to understand the behaviour of aid agencies as  political support for the regime rather through a technical discussion focusing on structural adjustment policies.[3]

This is not to argue that aid agencies were not interested in pushing structural adjustment policies. Every agency, including those who supported social development projects like IRDPs, have their own ideas about what is good for Sri Lanka. No aid agency operates without such a framework.  But it is difficult to understand persistence of support to a country only by focusing on these narrow technocratic policy issues. It is much more important to focus on politics at a global level.

Conflicts and security
During the first decades of liberalisation of the economy, despite disturbing political trends both within the Tamil as well as the Sinhala community, conflicts did not receive much attention from aid agencies. The TULF contested elections in 1977 on a separatist platform reflecting the worsening of the relationship between Sri Lankan Tamils and the Sri Lankan state. There was violence related to this issue in 1977 and 1981. In July ’83 we saw the worst attack on Sri Lankan Tamils that the country has ever seen. The government enacted the PTA and sent troops to the North to take care of Tamil militancy, which began the military approach to the conflict.

With regard to the politics among the Sinhalese, the UNP with its massive majority did not brook any opposition to the new policies. There were numerous attacks on opposition political parties and other organisations and individuals who questioned UNP policies; in 1983 the government used all its power to defeat a general strike. Around 40,000 workers lost their jobs; using a highly questionable process Mrs. Bandaranaike was deprived of her civic rights. Through this process JR eliminated the principal candidate that could oppose him in the forthcoming presidential elections due in 1982; in 1982, after assuming the duties of an all powerful president for the second time, JR using a fraudulent referendum postponed the general elections due in 1983; and finally in 1983, making use of July’83 violence, the JVP was suppressed.

These political trends within the Tamil as well as the Sinhala community signified maturing of a crisis of the post-colonial Sri Lankan state, first signs of which were seen in the early seventies. The beginnings of violent challenges to the Sri Lankan state within the Tamil as well as the Sinhala community go back to this period.

However the aid agencies that flooded into Sri Lanka after 1977 were not interested in these political trends and instability that they could create. Their primary interest was in promoting capitalism. The conflict blindness prevailed although some of the authoritarian political trends were directly linked to the economic policies that donors were supporting. For example, JR used the referendum in 1982 to postpone the elections due in 1983 because he wanted to ensure the continuation of the majority that the UNP had in the parliament from 1977. He felt the UNP needed more time to consolidate the achievements in economic policy. Therefore elections due in 1983 had to be sacrificed. Donor support continued despite these authoritarian trends and their political repercussions.

The conflict blindness of aid agencies could not last forever. Both internal and external developments pushed agencies to take into account conflicts and therefore security issues in their aid policies. Internally, violent challenge to the state in the mid-eighties and nineties led by the JVP, and counteraction by the security forces, led to a high level of destabilisation of the country. The impact was felt in most areas other than the North and East. Many agencies found it difficult to implement projects outside Colombo. Travel became difficult. The impact of the violence was stark. Dead bodies floating down rivers and by the roadside made it impossible to ignore the conflict. By this time some of the European bilateral agencies began to raise questions about the conflict mainly through the angle of human rights. These issues came to a head during the annual aid group meeting held in 1990. Many representatives from bi-lateral agencies raised questions about the conflict, human rights violations and the need to link these issues with aid policies.

The recognition of conflicts and their implications starting somewhere in the mid-eighties did have an impact on aid policies and aid flows. Some of the bilateral agencies took into account the conflict and human rights violations and changed their policies accordingly. There was a reduction in the grant component of aid flows. However agencies focusing on various aspects of economic development continued to support the Sri Lankan state. In fact there were new commitments from the IMF and World Bank, because the Premadasa government began to implement structural reforms such as privatisation. The commitment of the ADB increased. Japan continued to have bilateral programmes that brought in assistance. As a result, in the late eighties and early nineties the IMF, World Bank, ADB and Japan accounted for about seventy percent of net aid flows. In other words while conflicts became prominent, those agencies concerned with promoting capitalism continued to support Sri Lanka.

However in the latter part of the nineties even these agencies could not ignore the conflict, because the escalation of the conflict in the North/East was beginning to have an impact on the economy, especially its future prospects for growth. The discourse on economic costs of the war became a prominent theme. But it is important to note that the interest on the conflict was not so much based on solving structural reasons for the conflict, but because it was affecting the principal agenda of these agencies, i.e. promoting capitalism.

Internationally many of the donor countries began to focus attention on conflicts. With the end of the Cold War there was a lot of hope in liberal circles that there would be a reduction in conflicts in the third world. Many of the conflicts in these countries were interpreted as proxy wars of the two contending power blocs trying to extend their influence over different parts of the world. With the demise of the Soviet Union it was believed that the world would be a more peaceful place where capital would reign. This euphoria was short lived. Very quickly this perspective shifted to a notion where future security threats were seen to emanate from the underdeveloped periphery. Some writers popularised the vision of a ‘Coming Anarchy’[4] with centres of this process located in the third world. 9/11 strengthened this vision and it became clear to the western powers that it is difficult to ignore conflicts in the underdeveloped periphery.

Concerns about conflicts and security in a new world order had an impact on aid agencies as well. Gradually conflicts became a principal concern of almost all aid agencies. Other actors operating on a world scale and depending on foreign aid, such as international NGOs, incorporated conflicts as a central concern. Mark Duffiled has correctly interpreted these developments in the aid industry as a merger of security and development.[5]

The new focus on conflict and security among donors has given rise to a veritable industry of research, seminars, evaluations, studies, etc. It has produced a large volume of literature, concepts, tool boxes, etc. There is no space here to go into a detailed discussion of this debate. However we can learn a few lessons on donor behaviour by looking at how these policies manifested themselves in Sri Lanka.

Liberal peace of the UNP
The high point of the involvement in conflict issues by aid agencies was during the ceasefire agreement of 2002 and negotiations with the LTTE. During these events there was a remarkable meeting of minds between the UNP and aid agencies with their new policies on conflict.

The negotiations of 2002 were a major departure from anything that has been tried before to find a negotiated settlement to Sri Lanka’s conflict. The ceasefire agreement accepted the presence of two armies in the country and the control of one part of the territory by the LTTE. The agreement stipulated conditions that each party should adhere to.

The UNP strategy internationalised the negotiation process to an unprecedented degree. In addition to Norwegian mediation, the negotiation process established a monitoring mission consisting of representatives of Nordic countries to monitor the peace process. This was backed by three co-chairs – US, Japan and EU. In short the UNP placed a lot of hope on what is now popularly known as the international community to deliver peace.

In addition, the UNP was also ready to institute an extensive economic reform program to take the process of expanding capitalist relations initiated in 1977 to a qualitatively new level. In hindsight this aspect of the UNP strategy seems to have been a primary motivating factor in entering into the ceasefire agreement.

The entire strategy of the UNP had many of the elements of the liberal peace agenda that donors were promoting all over the world. Resolving conflicts through negotiations with a mediator from a western country as the go between, inviting other major players from centres of capitalism to underwrite the agreement, the promise of reforming the centralised state, an economic reform programme taking the economy further in the direction of strengthening markets and inviting many donor supported non-governmental organisations, now identified as civil society, in building peace were very much in agreement with what new donor policies were advocating. Sri Lanka became a possible success story of the new aid policies. There was massive support from aid agencies with new agreements and aid commitments.

The liberal peace of the UNP did not last long. It was defeated by Sinhala nationalism and Tamil nationalism of the LTTE variety, working in parallel. Social contradictions generated by the economic reforms were an added factor that helped the mobilisation by Sinhala nationalists. The collapse of the negotiations resulted in an all out armed conflict between the Sri Lankan state and the LTTE. What we have witnessed recently is the defeat of the LTTE militarily and assertions of the power of the Sri Lankan state over the area that was controlled by the LTTE during negotiations.

Much has been written on these issues elsewhere. What interests us here is the behaviour of aid agencies in the context of these developments. The public debate and discussions within civil society have been dominated by what prevailed during 2002-2004 negotiations. However a closer examination of what went on within aid agencies during these turbulent times of Sri Lankan history shows that there were two distinct trends and ideas:

- The first position, which dominated when direct negotiations were taking place, had all the elements of liberal peace mentioned above. It accepted the concepts reflected in the CFA in treating the Sri Lankan state and the LTTE on a par with each other. The optimistic scenario was the possibility of reforming the centralised Sri Lankan state through negotiations. Donors also funded civil society organisations to promote this agenda. Some continued without much of a deviation from these ideas.

- The second perspective that informed international actors was much more statist. This position agreed that Sri Lanka had a serious problem regarding the rights of the minorities, and it had to be solved politically. They also agreed that resolving the problem involved reforming the centralised Sri Lankan state and devolving power, while maintaining its territorial integrity.

This position did not ignore the need for negotiations with the LTTE. But it did not treat the Sri Lankan state on a par with the LTTE. The notion of symmetry between the two parties was not accepted by this position. The LTTE was a product of the political problem faced by Sri Lanka. But it had to agree to a settlement within the Sri Lankan state and disarm itself once the conflict is resolved. If the behaviour of the LTTE threatened the security of the Sri Lankan state it was seen as a threat to global security as well. The ‘war on terror’ in the aftermath of 9/11 strengthened this position.

With the collapse of the CFA the second position came into prominence. This was reflected mainly in the attitude towards the LTTE. The LTTE was already banned in several countries. This ban expanded. Important actors like the EU also took steps to ban the LTTE. The LTTE’s fundraising mechanism and support organisations were disrupted. The Sri Lankan state also received support from some countries in its military operations against the LTTE.

The economic front of this second position was to continue to support Sri Lanka’s path of promoting capitalism. Aid policies of countries such as the US, Japan and policies of multilateral aid agencies such as the World Bank and ADB fit very well into this picture. During the time of the negotiations all these agencies formulated new strategies taking into account negotiations. But once the process collapsed they formulated their strategies and continued to support Sri Lanka. Recently announced support by the IMF is a continuation of these trends. To be fair they do have a notion of conflict sensitivity. But as we shall argue below it is not clear how these ideas can deliver peace.

However this support for Sri Lanka’s stability and security does not mean that the Sri Lankan state is having a free ride with the international actors. On the contrary this support is conditional, because the ideas of liberal peace have not disappeared. They continue, but take into account the importance of security of states as well. This is contrary to the earlier liberal belief of withering away of states in a globalised world. The Sri Lankan state also has to behave in a particular way for this support to continue. On the economic side, if the Sri Lankan economy deviates from the overall pro-market, pro-private sector, liberal capitalism inaugurated in 1977, this support will be seriously questioned. Any significant deviation from these policies will have negative repercussions. The other aspect is the possible impact of the behaviour of the Sri Lankan state on global stability and security. The recent concern about the humanitarian fall-out of the armed conflict is an example of this aspect. Finally, the overall direction in Sri Lanka’s foreign policy will be closely observed. If it moves in a direction hostile to western interests, the support can disappear.

Concluding Remarks
The two trends of donor behaviour that can be identified in the Sri Lankan context reflect the complexity of politics of aid agencies at a global level trying to promote capitalism as well as ensure stability. On one hand there are policies that emphasis the importance of negotiations, state reforms and building of liberal institutions for peace. Many civil society organisations play a role within this strategy. The other trend is that which emphasises security of the state. Contrary to what was believed at the time of liberal triumphalism there is no sign of states withering away. States are back on the agenda and 9/11 has deepened the focus on state security.

However both these dominant ideas of liberal peace or state security are inadequate for long-term peace. There is little focus on issues such as the politics of social exclusion and state-society relations in these discourses. Legitimate state-society relations are an essential part of long-term peace. Unless issues of social exclusion are addressed it is difficult to achieve this objective. Hence the debate on ideas that can ensure long-term peace in conflict affected countries is still open.

These are important considerations that need to be taken into account by civil society that looks towards the ‘international community’ in their search for peace. As argued at the beginning of this article, in a globalised world the focus towards the international level is important. It is difficult to find answers to Sri Lanka’s problems only by focusing within the confines of the Sri Lankan state. However we need to work at a number of levels covering the global, national and the local. In other words international actors will not deliver solutions by themselves. Any international intervention has to have legitimacy internally. To complicate the matter, it is not clear whether the discourses that dominate at global level have all the answers that can ensure long-term peace. It is only the specific experience in a particular social and historical context that can show up the limitations of these ideas. Therefore those of us that live and work in conflict affected countries have to intervene in global debates as well.

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[1] Sorbor, Gunnar M., Grete Brockmann, Reider Dale, Mick Moore, Erok Whist (1987) Sri Lankan Country Study and Norwegian Aid Review, Bergen: Centre for Development Studies, University of Bergen.

[2] See Nicholas Howard (1987) ‘The post 1977 economic strategy: a comparative and theoretical overview’, in David Dunham and Charles Abeysekera (eds), Essays on the Sri Lankan economy, 1977-83, Colombo: Social Scientists Association.

[3] Moore Mick (1990) ‘Economic liberalization versus political pluralism in Sri Lanka?’, Modern Asian Studies, 24,2

[4] There was an article by Robert Kaplan with this title published in the Atlantic Monthly. Recently he has written on Sri Lanka’s conflict.

[5] Duffiled, Mark (2001) Global governance and new wars: The merging of development and security. London: Zed Books

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The video broadcast Channel 4 last week generated a number of responses from the readership of Groundviews. Much has been written about the video, including this well thought out commentary in The Lede, the New York Times news blog. Of the many comments in response to it, this one and the Lede’s response to it stand out:

Sinhala-Indian: I think this is Tiger Propaganda. American Should be worring about their own atrocities in Iraq and Afghanistan. We don’t really care about Americans anyway. We got our true Indian friends to help us. Indians helped us to defeat the Tiger terrorist and they will help us to defeat this American inspired Tiger Propaganda.

LEDE BLOG REPLY: Can you explain how video obtained by a Sri Lankan Sinhalese journalist could possibly be “American-inspired propaganda,” against a military run by an American citizen? If reporting that a video exists and that charges have been made is propaganda, what role do you think journalists should play?

If the New York Times acknowledges that the Sri Lanka’s military is run by an American citizen, could it also mean that this citizen is open to investigations of war crimes under US law? What can and should the US Department of Justice and the State Department, for example, ask of this individual in response to this video, and other media reports alleging serious war crimes?

Views on Groundviews have been unsurprisingly divided on the veracity of the video. ‘Required’ notes on the one hand that,

The real issue here is that secretly most Sri Lankans might feel that the footage is probably genuine. The tragedy is that the majority of the country probably believe it was justified, and that the soldiers who might have carried this out deserve to be rewarded for meeting out such callous brutality. The LTTE did it right? So we can do it? Who started it anyway, I forget… everyone do it and the whole world just might go blind. It’s ok to kill them, just like the IDPs that no one in the country seems very concerned about, they are all probably terrorists right? Let the tamils of the north die and laugh while you do it. And lets all laugh about the fact that anyone would take such a matter seriously. Such is the state of this revolting country today; so deep its rot, so foul its soul.

Concurring, ‘JMN’ avers,

In today’s age of cell phone cameras, amateur videos like this surface everywhere documenting important events that are hidden to the mainstream media. It is up to the powers that be to investigate if it is legitimate and investigate it. If the SL government doesn’t have the capability to identify the perpetrators of the white van abductions and the journalist murders that happen right HERE, then why on earth would you demand that an independent source that has to fear for his/ her life in order to publish this video be held to such a high standard?

Why are you so naive to believe that this HAS to be fake? We all know the history and bloodiness of this country, and we all know much worse has happened and still happens. ‘83, the JVP uprisings, the IPKF stint here – we don’t have to go so far back. A certain ‘doctor’ openly attacks a TV station, and proudly accepts responsibility for the recent high profile murder of a newspaper editor – yet he is more powerful now than before. The entire nation knows the truth about this man, but he is yet not brought to justice. Would you agree that the evidence for these crimes do exist, but to no avail?

On the other hand, ‘Observer’ counters that,

Ahem, why should anyone protect the person who took such a video? Despite leaking it he still should be punished for being part of it. But it’s FAKE! That’s why they can’t verify it (conveniently)! If I had the will I could have easily concocted such a video as well. A good film director can do even better job than this shoddy attempt. Such evidence in a law of court is thrown out the window. And rightfully so Sri Lanka does not need to respond more than a statement highlighting the obvious inaccuracy of it. Plus even to investigate such a thing you need at least a small lead. Which the people responsible for this video does not provide. No date, time, who, where? NOTHING! What can the government do?

This position does little to convince ‘Das‘, who believes the video is authentic and goes on to note that “Many more atrocities were commited on tamils in the past,more brutal than this and are documented elsewhere. In 1971 and 1987/88 thousands of sinhala youth were killed by the police/army squads & even burned on tyres by the roadside. These are the same guys who faught the recent war and are quite used to commiting atrocities.”

There are also those such as Hari Narendran, who call for a meaningful investigation into the authenticity of the video based on Sri Lanka’s atrocious record of State terrorism. Hari notes (in response to a comment by ‘Observer‘),

Your reaction to this latest video is exactly what the sinhalese souths reaction was when allegations about the Trinco student murders, the diyawanna oya bodies, krishanthy kumaraswamy and numerous other cases of abuse by military personnel first emerged. Facts and history proved those to be accurate. It astounds me how many in the South who have seen and in many cases experienced the scorched earth/spare no innocents policy the army took in crushing the JVP insurgency or see even today how the police treat ppl in custody on mere suspicion, all in full view of the press and southern society, suddenly assume that the forces conduct themselves impeccably in the northern theatre, far away from prying eyes (deliberately kept away by gov’t policy). It is simply beyond belief. The video that emerged clearly has some disturbing footage that needs to be honestly investigated to verify its authenticity.

This echoes the position of Philip Alston, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on extra-judicial, summary or arbitrary executions who stated yesterday that,

“If the government’s position is validated as a result of an inquiry, the international community can rest easy and the government will have been vindicated. There is no justification for not moving ahead with such an investigation in view of the government’s confidence that such atrocities were never perpetrated by its armed forces.”

Of interest here is a letter to Channel 4 sent by Justice Nihal Jayasinghe, Sri Lanka’s High Commissioner in London. It notes inter alia,

… I wish to emphasis (sic) that Sri Lankan Government forces have never engage (sic) in such atrocities alleged in your news cast. It was the LTTE who in fact carried out unspeakable horrendous atrocities against innocent children, women and elderly people in Sri Lanka. It is strange that channel 4 news not only this time (sic) but never in the past ever (sic) dared to report on these heinous crimes of the LTTE.

One questions whether the political will in Sri Lanka to investigate the authenticity of this video is as weak as the High Commissioner’s grammar.

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“These are Elephants, Those are Tamils”1
-words from a friend.

Baby Elephants- dearly beloved elders were killed before their tender eyes
Baby Elephants-arms, legs, teeth shriveled with the pain of the bullet
Baby Elephants- loose wrinkled skin hangs off starving, haunted frames
Baby Elephants-left over remnants of humanity scraped up from
The scorching earth of Vanni

Yes, they are Tamil.

Baby Elephants-no newspapers flare up for them in bold headlines
Baby Elephants-no person steps into the streets to demand their well-being
Baby Elephants-no believers in Ahimsa to speak for them, the intellectuals are mute
Baby Elephants-no one to beat their chest wailing “aney” “apoi”2 at their fate

Yes, they are Tamil.

you know
that your mothers
lie dead.
breasts heavy with
the swollen pain
of hardened milk.

you know
that your fathers
lie dead
who stomped the earth
trumpeting intensely
standing guard.

Whom are you the Beloved of now?
you know
no countrymen will
offer poojas to the gods
with flowers, incense or lamps
for you.
no countrymen will
make vows
at the Dalada temple
for your  tomorrow.

Baby Elephants-you whose eyes shed tears at every little hurt
Why do you not cry now?
as you lie curled up,
fallen in a heap
here and there.
in an orphaned corner
like a foetus.
in an abandoned camp.
an unknown world.
Behind Barbed Wire.
Unbeloved..

Translation by Francesca Bremner

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1 Refers to an incident in which the President of Sri Lanka donated baby elephants to the temple. The baby elephants were forcibly removed from their mother. This caused a controversy. The poet contrasts this to the apathy at the plight of Tamil orphans in the detention centers of the north.

2 terms of anguish

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Through Bearing Witness, Groundviews seeks to engender critical citizen journalism on two vital issues confronting polity and society in post-war Sri Lanka.

The ground conditions in Menik Farm, worsened by recent flooding, are a non-issue for most mainstream print and broadcast media in Sri Lanka. Yet, as this recent report from the UN’s IRIN news service notes,

• Close to 300,000 people now languish in 30 government camps in Vavuniya, Mannar, Jaffna and Trincomalee districts.
• Many of the camps – which were hastily erected in the final days of the war after thousands fled south from former LTTE-controlled areas – suffer from severe overcrowding.
• More than three months since the conflict ended, Zone two of Menik Farm continues to hold close to 55,000 – almost double its planned capacity.
• In fact, in some parts of Menik Farm, a single latrine caters to up to 80 people [Sphere standards call for 20], while some tents designed for five were accommodating up to 14.

There are also very disturbing reports of disappearances and abductions of IDPs from these camps.

On the other hand, a number of media reports on the brutishness of the Police, including high-ranking officers, have incensed those in the South. As the BBC notes,

The public in the South have reacted very angrily after recent incidents of two young people dying while in police custody in Angulana, Moratuwa and a brutal assault on a student in Malabe. The wife and the son of the former director of Colombo Crime Division, and a group of police officers are accused of abducting and brutally assaulting Nipuna Ramanayake, a young IT student. At least 18 police personnel and the family members of Senior Superintendant of Police (SSP) Vaas Gunawardena are currently detained in custody.

Groundviews invites you to critically examine either one of or both these vital and current issues. Entries can be in prose, poetry, cartoons, photos, video or audio, in line with our content submission guidelines. One person / identity may submit up to two entries.

Email all entries to bearingwitness@cpalanka.org

The last date for entries is 25th September 2009. The best submission will be announced on 1st October 2009. On offer as the prize for the best submission is the coveted Flip Ultra video camera. As featured by Amazon the Flip Ultra is;

• Simple to use, pocket-sized camcorder with one-touch recording and digital zoom
• Holds 60 minutes of video using built-in memory; no tapes or additional memory cards required
• Convenient USB arm plugs directly into your computer for easy viewing and sharing
• Built-in software lets you easily e-mail videos, upload to YouTube and capture still photos from video

Entries will be judged by the following distinguished panel,

• Dilrukshi Handunnetti, a lawyer by training and a leading, award winning investigative journalist.
• Sharmini Boyle, who has worked as a television director/producer in Sri Lanka for over 25 years and presently Chief Editor at Young Asia Television, an organisation that is dedicated to social and development communication, producing television programmes on issues of social justice, sustainable development and conflict resolution.
• Lakshman Gunasekera, senior journalist, former Editor of the Sunday Observer and President, South Asian Free Media Association – Sri Lanka Chapter.
• Nalaka Gunawardene, a  journalist, film-maker, media researcher, media trainer, communications consultant and TV host during the past 20 years.
• Shreen Saroor, Senior Change Manager at Ashoka Foundation, Sri Lanka and, amongst many other awards for her pathbreaking work, a recipient of the Women Peacemaker Fellowship from the Joan B. Kroc Institute for Peace and Justice in 2004.

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“Man generally resorts to dialogue, compromise and consensus in resolving human conflicts due to his superior intellect. However, it is not uncommon for man, when under pressure, to submit to his baser instincts of survival by resorting to physical confrontation and warfare despite the attainment of a high level of civilization.”

The ‘divide and rule policy’ of the British colonial administration in Sri Lanka covertly took advantage of the country’s ethnic profile to appoint better educated Tamils in key government positions  to act as a buffer against possible sedition by the Sinhalese majority. With the declaration of independence emerged extremist Sinhalese Buddhist nationalism as a response to such discriminatory policy which served as an effective political platform for power hungry Sinhalese politicians. Ever since, the Tamil community has been gradually victimized, marginalized, repressed and regularly subjected to extreme violence by sinhala extremists through pogroms, sometimes state sanctioned, which conveniently served to divert attention from economic mismanagement. Tamil youth who were generally identified as mild mannered and submissive slowly evolved into the ferocious  Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) demanding self rule and independence. Thus commenced twenty five years of armed conflict resulting in massive destruction to the economy and its social fabric. The conflict was   interspersed with attempts at dialogue between the protagonists with both accusing each of other of insincerity and deception in achieving a consensus.

No doubt, the armed forces defeat of the LTTE was achieved mainly on account of applying man power and firepower far in excess of required capacity such as six to seven times the combat force of the enemy together with lethal quantities of high tech weapons, ammunition as well as cutting edge spy technology which in addition, was far beyond the country’s affordability. Months of repeated heavy aerial bombardment of enemy territory resulted in extreme destruction to the ecology and heavy human casualties. Alleged violation of international conventions on warfare through aerial bombing, heavy fire power, particularly in safe zones demarcated for civilians, and non recognition of voluntary surrender by enemy during the last stages of combat has resulted in alleged war crimes that the state is unable to defend in a transparent and accountable manner due to implicating evidence via pre and post war recorded satellite imagery currently available. Hence the state has taken cover under a confrontational stance of defending itself as a sovereign and independent state with no necessity for accountability to the international community.

It is now acknowledged by the United Nations that the global community has‘Right to Protect’ the well being of vulnerable and marginalized populations victimized by autocratic regimes. However, the concept is condemned by the GOSL and other autocratic regimes as a violation of national sovereignty. Consequently, the GOSL has been compelled to align itself with authoritarian regimes which are unacceptable to the democratic world due to their unfavourable human rights records and undemocratic governance. Due to the mutual support of many such regimes in international forums such as the UN, the GOSL has temporarily survived international judicial processes being filed against them for alleged war crimes. The regime’s continued confrontational stance against the democratic west has earned their disfavour by way of delayed development and rehabilitation assistance and threat of cancellation of preferential trade terms as penalty for not abiding by internationally accepted standards of democratic governance. The GOSL has not attempted at positive engagement with democratic pre- conflict allies essential for the nation’s economic survival.  The probable reason being that they fear being subject to international demands for war crimes investigations and  a rapid political solution to the Tamil minority concerns as well as resettlement of IDP’s which they feel may not be politically expedient.

Due to the GOSL’s difficulty  in obtaining commercial borrowings internationally, they have rescinded on their stance not to seek assistance from multilateral lending organizations resulting in the obtaining of an IMF facility of USD 2.5 Billion disbursed in tranches subject to strict conditionality which the regime has not publicized as it will compromise their populist claim of refusing to be subject to intimidation by the superpowers. There is serious doubt whether the regime can comply with the imposed conditionality in obtaining the entire loan due to political expediency taking precedence over national priorities.

The major concern at present is the adverse treatment meted out to IDP’s who are all Tamils and therefore suspect of being aligned with the LTTE. The IDP camps are virtual open air prisons controlled by the armed forces as inmates are held against their will and not permitted contact with outsiders. The camps are overcrowded by about twice their capacity with temporary shelters made of plastic material which is flimsy and unsuited for tropical weather and long term use. Temporary sewage systems constructed with UN support are breaking down resulting in extreme pollution, contamination and threat of epidemics for which the government has found in the UN a convenient scapegoat.

The GOSL has not yet made public the names of the approximately 280,000 IDP’s. Donors, both international and local, are providing humanitarian assistance with little or now say in camp management or contact with inmates. It is common knowledge that many IDP’s have escaped by bribing the security forces indicative of insidious corruption. The public have no right to information on the status and management of camps. A serious shortage of supplies, food, services and facilities for inmates exist but is deliberately downplayed by the government as a face saving tactic. Consequently, donations are requested by the authorities only via informal channels of communication.  There is no formal public notification of deaths or health status of inmates. Allegedly; several LTTE suspects who are taken out of camps for interrogation often cannot be traced thereafter by their families. Access to camps by donors, aid workers, family and friends is highly monitored and media is strictly out of bounds. All the above factors are indicative of covert operations.

Under the circumstances, it is imperative that the United Nations exercises its ‘Right to Protect’ such a vulnerable population already suffering from extreme physical and emotional trauma. It would be to the detriment of the credibility and effectiveness of the UN and the democratic world if they continue to turn a blind eye to the true situation of the IDP’s in Sri Lanka.

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