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Monks of War - Al-Jazeera on the JHU

Monks of War is Al Jazeera’s second news feature on Sri Lanka aired in August. As noted on their site:

To many of us, Buddhism, with the sacred principle of non-violence, is the most peaceful religion of all. But in Sri Lanka a group of radical monks who say they represent the Singhalese majority are urging the government to take a hard-line, pro-war stance against the Tamil Tiger rebels.

To make their voices heard in the political arena the monks have even set up their own political party - the JHU - which participated in the 2004 elections and secured nine seats in parliament.

They are monks, they are political and they are not shy of controversy. Their belief that only a full-out military offensive will end the conflict with the Tamil Tiger rebels has put them at loggerheads with peace activists, foreign mediators, and Buddhists who favour non-violence. Pro-war monks have attacked peace marches and accused international NGOs of secretly funding the Tamil Tigers to stop the global advance of political Buddhism.

But how representative are they of popular Singhalese feelings? Is it true that Buddhism in Sri Lanka is under threat? And can war really be the way to peace?

Watch Monks of War below, and How the East Was Won here. Both programmes are reviewed here.

Part 1:

Part 2:


August 30, 2007 | 10:08 AM Comments  0 comments



The Capture of Thoppigala – A Phyrric Victory

By Air Vice Marshal Harry Gunetilleke (Rtd)

Come around mid-July this year, there were victory celebrations with much euphoria, if not in the North and North East of Sri Lanka, with some enthusiasm certainly in the rest of the country, at the behest of the State which gave the lead with a colourful military parade at Independence Square, reminiscent of the yearly Independence day celebrations, on the occasion of the conquest of Thoppigala, even before the powder ran dry.

Here, it must be noted that the military hierarchy desired another week or two for mopping up operations but the power that be would have none of it perhaps, wanting to put up a great show before the other big event of the opposition planned for 26th July through a mass rally where crowds in six figures were expected for the event.

I leave it to the readers to judge the reaction of the masses and other organizations as to who outdid the other and at what expense to the nation. As an ex-military chief, I am pleased at the exploits of our soldiers, sailors and airmen in the battle-field which commenced with the Jaffna Peninsula being brought under the writ of authority of the Government in 1995, followed eleven years later with the reacquisition of a large land area in the Trincomalee district comprising Muttur, Sampur, Thopur, Mavil Aru and Kattaiparichan in July/August last year, ending up, to this point of time, at Thoppigala in the Batticaloa district after securing the seaward defences in Verugal, Mankeshi, Panichchankerni and Vakarai areas.

Having said that on behalf of our fighting men, I begin to wonder what strategy the Government is adopting for future exploits – Is it to search and destroy or acquire territory or real estate as the late General Denzil Kobbekaduwa was to tell me a few months before his demise? He abhorred the latter prospect and always stood for “the weakening of the enemy and forcing him to the conference table, whereupon my job is over,” he used to say. No wonder we eye to eye on most matters, although I was retired over a decade by then.

Be that as it may, let’s get down to the crux of the issue – Do we wipe out the terrorist, and by extension, terrorism, or do we chase them out of all their strongholds/habitats and occupy their terrain to maintain the authority of the State? Perhaps, “patriotism” demands most southerners to say, lets do both simultaneously. Easier said than done, as the history of the world would record. Take for instance, the phenomenon of capturing territory and thereafter, holding it. At a cautious estimate where an advancing force requires about a thousand foot troops, backed up with fire power and assistance from sister forces to conduct a successful operation to seize an area of say about 100 square kilometers, you would require approximately ten times that number, to hold that piece of territory securely, depending on the terrain. It is being mentioned that the re-captured Thoppigala region as a whole is approximately 760 square kilometers in extent, without considering the seaward areas of Vakarai, Verugal, Mankerni etc., and if the entirety of this land area in the Batticaloa district that has been brought under the writ of authority of the State has to be fully secured, my calculated guess is that we would require between thirty to forty thousand troops in sit in this region to safeguard it from the known enemy. In fact, Minister Rambukwella was to say as such late July in a television broadcast but whether he refers to the entirety of the North and East being provided with an extra 30,000 troops after its recapture was complete, is not clear. I would think that his figure would suffice only for the Batticaloa district, therefore, a further thirty to forty thousand would be required for the defence of Trincomalee which will have to include the envisaged High Security Zone of Sampur, Thoppur, and Muttur, amongst other areas in the Southern district, not including the northern sections of Trincomalee.

Consider – with a square area of 978 sq. km. brought under the writ of authority of the Government in the Jaffna Peninsula form 1995, excluding the islands (another 196 sq.km.) employing 35 to 40,000 troops (excluding the Police) for its security; approximately 700 to 800 sq.km. in Trincomalee South in August last year, requiring another 20 to 25,000 hand for this area, and now a further approximately 35 to 40,000 men need for the entirety of the Batticaloa district of over 1,000 km; the total number of security personnel required for safeguarding the North East territory amounts to over 100,000!! For this specific task mentioned above. On the basis of remuneration alone for the lowest ranking military man of approximately Rs. 12,000/- per month, a sum of Rs. 7.2 billion per annum has to be provided for salaries alone, not considering the fact of providing uniforms, clothing, footwear, housing, food, weapons with ammunition, etc!!

Consider – just prior to the ethnic conflict breaking out in July 1983, the total Defence Budget for the Armed Services was Rs. 1.7 billion. Over the years, it sky rocketed to Rs. 61 billion by 2001. Then it came down again to approximately Rs. 58 billion for 2002 and 2003 as a result of the ceasefire agreement.

Thereafter, the rapid rise once again continued in 2004 until it reached Rs. 69 billion in 2006, and the astronomical figure of Rs. 139.5 billion was made for this year, exactly a 100% increase in Defence spending.

These are budgeted figures and do not take into account supplementary provisions over the years which included one of approximately Rs. 35 billion in 2006, to raise the level of expenditure for that year from Rs. 69 billion plus to Rs. 104 billion!! I am convinced, but I hope I would be proved wrong, that before this year is out, a supplementary estimate of around Rs. 60 billion would have to be entertained to meet the additional costs arising from the new problem created by the LTTE air threat in March this year. This was not anticipated when the budget was prepared for 2007 in September/October last year resulting in having to make extra provision for the three services by way of new Aircraft/Helicopter, radar, Ships and additional fire power. If this comes to pass, then we have a mind boggling figure of Rs. 200 billion as defence expenditure for 2007 or Rs. 0.57 billion per day!!

The question that emerges from the above facts and figures is have we the capacity, financially speaking, to prosecute a war which will not see light at the end of the tunnel at least for a few years, as stated recently by the Defence Secretary, more likely for several years, without the goodwill and assistance of the International Community that insists we forget about Military solutions to a political problem and get down to the negotiation table with their help.

Those of you reading this column may be pondering as to why little mention is made of Thoppigala quite out of proportion to the blazing news items in some sections of the print and electronic media that highlighted its re-capture.

To be quite frank, the last bastion of the terrorist stronghold was mainly jungle and barren land with patches of paddy fields to support approximately 5,000 inhabitants in this Thoppigala region. The best description was given by the then area Commander and its big chief, Lt. General Metha of the IPKF days upto mid 1990, who was compelled to respond to an accusation by the Ministerial Defence Spokesman recently that at no time in the history of Thoppigala, it was ever cleared of terrorists/insurgents by any force other then the present regime. He was to say in a newspaper interview in India about mid-July this year, words to the effect that he didn’t come with thousands of troops to sit out I camps in this difficult jungle terrain after his job was done to clear the area of the LTTE. The IPKF stationed there, went back to their main camps on the periphery when hostilities were over due to reasons of communications, logistics and route clearing problems, he further stated. I think he knew what he said, well, so much for the claims of the Government and the Opposition that they were the first to do so. Only time will tell, may be in the next six months to an year, whether a thorough clean up job was done, particularly with the infusion of a Rs. 6.5 billion ambitious development plan in 180 days to wean the Tamil people away from the Eelam concept, vis-à-vis the LTTE in the North eastern province. Let’s wait until January 20087 for the expected results.

This article first appeared in Montage Vol 1 Issue 8, published by Counterpoint. To get in touch with Montage, please email montagesrilanka [at] gmail.com


August 30, 2007 | 7:08 AM Comments  0 comments



Views of the Periphery - Competing Views on Thoppigala

In his Mahaweera Day speech in 2005, Vellupillai Pirapaharan, the LTTE leader, depicted Ranil Wickremesinghe as a calculating fox who tried to deceive everyone by entering into a ceasefire agreement with the LTTE. Ranil Wickremesinghe has once again shown his foxy behaviour in his comments on the capture of Thoppigala by the security forces of the Government of Sri Lanka. His initial position was that capturing Thoppigala would be a useless exercise as it is worthy only for collectors of fire-wood.

However, at the signing of a MoU with the SLFP (M), Ranil Wickremesinghe claimed that under the Wijetunga-Wickremesinghe regime, Thoppigala was captured by the security forces. Did he mean that Thoppigala was strategically important then but not now? As I have no knowledge in military strategy and I have no idea to get an access to that sphere of knowledge, I do not wish to comment on his current position on the strategic importance of Thoppigala.

The UNP leader has said repeatedly that the security forces allowed the LTTE leaders including Ramesh and its cadres to escape from Thoppigala with military hardware that includes multi-barrel rocket launchers. Wickremesinghe told the press that this order that the LTTE leaders and cadres should be allowed to escape through an arranged route came directly from Colombo, allegedly from the political leadership of the Mahinda Rajapaksa government. In other words, the UNP leader is worried that the security forces failed to “annihilate the enemy” so that the victory became uncompleted and unfinished. It appeared that Ranil Wickremesinghe was highly worried because Thoppigala and its surrounding areas were not adequately littered by the dead corpses of LTTE cadres. He may recollect his memories about the operations by the security forces in the South in the dark days of the late 1980s and may be sad that it did not recur this time around Thoppigala. One may also pose the question: was the victory under the Wijetunga-Wickremesinghe regime a complete and finished affair?

On the other hand, the Mahinda Rajapaksa regime organized a big ‘thamasha’ to mark the military victory over the LTTE in the Eastern Province although there was no great enthusiasm among ordinary folks. The developments in the last few weeks have shown that his government’s parliamentary majority may dwindle in the immediate future as there is a possibility of SLMC and CWC changing their allegiance. The SLMC leader has already expressed his dissatisfaction about the way in which things are being handled in the Eastern Province. Thoppigala poses Mahinda Rajapaksa two options:

The first option is an extension of the Military victory beyond the Eastern Province to the Northern Province by attacking tiger strongholds there. Such a policy would please the JVP and JHU. It would also please, for different reasons, the UNP and SLFP (M). IF Mahinda Rajapaksa refuses to follow this option, Ranil Wickremesinghe would say that it proves their allegation that there is a secret deal between the GoSL and the LTTE.

The second option is focus on socio-economic and political reconstruction of the Eastern Province thus delaying the military campaign against the LTTE in the North even with or without a deal with the LTTE. This policy package includes inter alia holding of Provincial Council election, handing over the reconstruction and development efforts to newly elected PC, addressing human right issues. Reconstruction effort would face two main contradictions. As the event in Mavil Aru shows, the government politicians and their bureaucratic allies would engage in corrupt practices so that the people in the area will not be allowed to reap the benefits of the process. Secondly, there is a possibility of grabbing the control and the ownership of the process by the Colombo-centred government and its line ministries, I/NGOs and Colombo-based NGOs. These two problems can be avoided if the sole responsibility of the process is handed over to an elected Provincial Council or to an interim authority that comprises the Parliamentarians of the Province.

If Mahinda Rajapaksa goes for the first option, his government will be made unpopular in the South and it will be rejected as a legitimate government by Tamils especially in the North and East thus allowing new alliances to emerge and to topple the government. Increasing war expenditure would have adverse effects on the living standard, inflation and economic growth. So it is a trap. The UNP, SLFP (M), JVP and JHU intentionally or unintentionally are seeking to place the government in this trap. And all the indication suggests that Mahinda Rajapaksa would fall into it for multiple reasons. First, his own chauvinistic thinking would not allow him to develop an amicable solution to the national question as shown in the recent SLFP proposals that are regressive and backward. Secondly, as the concept of entrapment in conflict literature suggests that parties who have made investment in fomenting violence incur certain ‘sunk costs’ so that they are forced to continue in order to “make good” on prior investments.

If MR prefers the second option because of the pressure of the economy or the international community, he would be able to get a breathing space and use that respite to reorganize the economy, the international stature of the country, and to receive foreign assistance for Eastern development. So it has, as I call it, an instrumental rational basis, but it at the same time transcends instrumental rationality because it gives new space for Tamils to negotiate with the government and Sinhala politics. So it would be a best confidence-building measure to win over the Tamils.

Mahinda Rajapakse can either choose the path of destruction or the path of reconstruction.

Email: sumane_l@yahoo.com

This article first appeared in Montage Vol 1 Issue 8, published by Counterpoint. To get in touch with Montage, please email montagesrilanka [at] gmail.com


August 29, 2007 | 11:08 AM Comments  0 comments



The Government’s “Eastern Rising”

The UTHR(J) is not known for its love towards the LTTE. It’s one time leader and revered academic Rajini Thiranagama was killed by the LTTE. Even today, it’s present leadership lives in fear and in hiding in light of the threats by the LTTE who are opposed to that which the UTHR9J) regularly publishes as reports on the human condition in the embattled North and East of Sri Lanka. These reports are some of the best and most impartial accounts of the conflict I have read and have a wide international recognition.

Their recent report, Can the East be won through Human Culling? Special Economic Zones – An Ideological Journey Back to 1983, is important in this regard. Often, the Sinhala media only publishes sections of the report against the LTTE. The Tamil newspapers often have no answers for what is published in these reports.

My article is based on excerpts from this report, translated into Sinhala, that I believe are vital for the Sinhala speaking community to be made aware of. Given that they will probably never be published in Government media, it is vital that they serve as a counterpoint to Government propaganda.

Download my article in full here and please read the UTHR(J)’s report in full here. My complete article is also available online here.


August 16, 2007 | 12:08 PM Comments  0 comments



Dismissing inconvenient truths - The Divaina’s take on Groundviews

Clearly, Groundviews seems to be doing something right in highlighting the plight of IDPs and refugees in the embattled North and East of Sri Lanka through stories such as I pray God that no one in this world should face the hardships, faced by my child and me and We are nobody’s children… and others.

The Divaina, a Sinhala daily published by the Upali Newspapers Group, had this to say on our recent story on IDPs in Trincomalee:

“මෙයට සමගාමීව කොටින්ට පකෂපාතී ස්වෙච්ඡා සංවිධාන අලුතින් අන්තර්ජාල වෙබ් අඩවි ආරම්භ කරමින් ත්‍රිකුණාමලයේ අවතැන්වූවන් අතිශය දුෂ්කර ජීවිතයක් ගත කරන බවට ප්‍රචාරයක් විකාශනය කර ඇත. මේ අන්තර්ජාල වෙබ් අඩවිය ආරම්භ කළ තැනැත්තා කවූරුන්දැයි දැන් හෙළි වී තිබේ.

ශී ලංකාවේ පූරවැසි මාධ්‍යවේදියා නමින් හඳුන්වා ගනිමින් ආරම්භ කර ඇති මේ කොටින්ට පකෂපාතී වෙබ් අඩවියෙන් පවසා ඇත්තේ හමූදාපති ඝාතන ප්‍රයත්නයෙන් පසූ යූද හමූදාව ත්‍රිකුණාමලයේ එචිලන්පත්තු ගම්මානයට මෝටාර් සහ රොකටි ප්‍රහාර එල්ල කළ බවයි. මින් පැහැදිලි වන්නේ වන්නි කොටි බේරා ගැනීමට මෙරට ස්වෙච්ඡා සංවිධාන විශාල මෙහෙයූමක් අරඹා ඇති බවයි”

This excerpt, from Divaina’s defence column published on 12th August 2007 (available here as a PDF) by Keerthi Warnakulasuriya, demonstrates the growing influence of citizen journalism in shaping the analyses of columnists in mainstream media. By labelling those who bring to light uncomfortable realities of war as “LTTE agents” and alleging Groundviews to be part of a giant conspiracy of NGOs supportive of the LTTE, Divaina demonstrates a marked intolerance of narratives that run counter to and questions the veracity of its own journalism.

In highlighting simply powerful stories from citizens living in the midst of violent conflict and who have been displaced on account of it, Citizen Journalism and new media in Sri Lanka demonstrate an increasing capacity to unsettle mainstream media’s influence in shaping public opinion. As noted in an article published on Madrid11 on Groundviews and Citizen Journalism::

The more Groundviews is successful in fostering new voices in support of peace, the more it will become a target of concerted attacks to prevent its growth.

And it is here that our greatest challenge lies. Not in the technology itself, but in the creation of a social and political movement - one fostered by citizen journalism mediated through new media and new technology - that is able to maintain, in some small way, the hope of a just and lasting peace in Sri Lanka.

This hope fuels Groundviews, not as a simplistic magic bullet against terrorism, but as an increasingly important vehicle for ordinary citizens to record their views in support of democracy as the only way through which terrorism can be effectively combated.


August 14, 2007 | 7:08 AM Comments  0 comments

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