Every day, we fight several battles – from inflation to traffic to our friendly neighborhood cop. Our battles are many, but our defeat in one particular battle stands out, quite spectacularly.  Sign boards saying “Mehi kunu dameema ballanta pamanai” (Only dogs may dump garbage here) are testimony that we did not go down without a fight, that we tried our best.

Whenever I see these signs on people’s walls I’m always intrigued because the garbage issue seems to be problem that never seems to go away, and in true Sri Lankan style, we are always quick to blame the Government or even cite a Western conspiracy. While the blame does partially lie in the hands of the Government, the average Sri Lankan’s attitude towards, or, if you like, solution for, the garbage problem never fails to amaze me.

Dumping your trash in front of another person’s house seems to be the common and recommended solution. Live on the 4^th floor and have no time to place your garbage bag in front of your neighbor’s gate? No problem, just throw it from your balcony in the general direction of your target. If the garbage collection service on your road is a myth, it is still always best to keep your garbage bags on the road anyway… just in case.

It IS frustrating, not to have a regular garbage collection service or even a dumping ground nearby. But leaving it outside another person’s house is not the answer. That garbage has to end up somewhere and most often than not, garbage that is gifted to different parts of the city end up in the same place – the gutter.

Since the Government is clearly not giving any solution to this problem, we should keep dumping our garbage anywhere, as we please. And during the torrential rain, we shall watch as they block our drains and flood our streets and keep complaining that while the Government can win the war against the LTTE, they cannot conquer the garbage crisis.

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Louise Arbour of the International Crisis Group is reported to have  said during an interview in the BBC that the government violated the laws of war by blurring the line between combatants and civilians, and that its killings of civilians were not accidents.   Perhaps in response to this, speaking to the BBC Tamil Service recently,  the Sri Lanka’s Ambassador to the United Nations, Dr. Palitha Kohona is reported to have said that  the commission on Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation  set up  recently by the government is sufficient to investigate the allegations of humanitarian standards and human rights violations  during the war.

Let us therefore have a look at some of the commissions of inquiry appointed by the governments in the past to check  how effective they have been to understand the veracity of the statement made by Dr. Kohana with regard to the current commission. It is common knowledge that several commissions of inquiry had been appointed from time to time to inquire into disappearances of persons and other serious human rights violations in Sri Lanka. I do not intend to go into matters relating to all these commissions now. Instead, as a sample,  I  propose to  deal with the two Commissions of Inquiries into Disappearances to which  I was the  Secretary  and the  Commission of Inquiry into Certain Serious Human Rights Violations  in the recent past  where I was  an adviser to the International Independent Group of Eminent Persons (IIGEP).  The IIGEP  had been  invited by President Rajapakse, to dispel the fear expressed widely at that time, on the efficacy of such commissions. He wanted give credibility to that commission by asking the IIGEP  to ensure that the investigations and inquiries conducted by that Commission are in keeping with internationally accepted norms and standards.

Commissions of Inquiry in Sri Lanka, are appointed in terms of the provisions of the Commissions of Inquiry Act. This Act provides for the President to appoint such Commissions whenever he thinks there is a need to find out more information on any matter of national interest and direct such Commission to inquire or investigate and report to him on matters set out in the Mandate given to such commissions.  In other words, their inquiries should  be strictly confined to the terms of reference.  It is mandatory for the Commission to submit the report to the President and not to  make its contents public.

In 1994 three such commissions  known as Zonal Commissions on Disappearances of Persons,  were appointed to inquire into and report on disappearances of persons after 1^st January, 1988 ,  while another was appointed in 1998, known as the All Island Commission on Disappearances,  to inquire only into the complaints received by the Zonal Commissions and remain  un-inquired.  These Commissions handed over their Reports in September 1997 and May, 2000, respectively.

These Commissions, inter alia, reported that they came across evidence that several torture chambers managed by the police and the military existed in different parts of Sri Lanka during the relevant period. Many persons who had been taken to be caused to be disappeared had  been tortured in these chambers to elicit information from them.  A few of them had  escaped. They appeared  before the Commission and  gave evidence  on the  gruesome manner in which they and others who are no more, had been tortured. They even gave the names of the persons who had been managing these torture chambers.

It was the same in the case of more than ten mass graves in the in various parts of the country.  Information about them had been  made available to these Commissions by persons  who knew about them. These graves have still not been disturbed. All that the Commissions could do in respect of these torture chambers and the mass graves  was to list the locations of the torture chambers and the mass graves in their Reports  and make  a recommendation that the President should take further action  to investigate into them.  They could not investigate into these because their  mandates  did not authorize them to do so.  Up-to-date no action whatsoever had been taken on this recommendation about the torture chambers and mass graves. Instead,  some of those  who were alleged to have been responsible for these,  are still in service having  received promotions in their respective services. Others have retired  without having to face any consequence on their dastardly  criminal actions.

The same is true with regard to the recommendations made to take disciplinary action against several police and military personnel whose misconduct during the performance of their duties came to light during the investigations. There was evidence of their violation of   departmental rules and regulations  in  dealing with complaints of disappearances, detention of persons taken into custody,   destruction of Police  information books relating to  the relevant period,  in spite of a directive by the Inspector General of Police to preserve these books and make them available for investigation by the Commissions.

As stated earlier, these Commissions were mandated to inquire only into complaints of disappearances that occurred after 1^st January, 1988. This resulted in a large number of disappearances of persons that occurred prior to that  being excluded from being inquired into.

Similarly,  the Commission that was appointed in 1998 had a specific limitation debarring it from  inquiring into any new complaints but  was authorized to deal only with those  complaints  which  had been received by the Commissions appointed in 1994 and remain  un- inquired.  Consequently this Commission could not inquire into about 12,000 new complaints received by this Commission. This number included  complaints of about 600 persons from the North who had disappeared following the military operation in 1996 called ‘Riviresa’ after which  the government took control of the Jaffna Peninsula from the  LTTE, and about 7000 complaints of persons who had gone missing in the Batticaloa District during the relevant period.

To cap it all, the manner in which action was taken against those  police and security forces personnel and others against  whom the Commission reported that there is credible material indicative of their responsibility for the disappearances,  is a sad reflection on the sincerity of the successive governments in dealing with perpetrators of such incidents.   This only helped to perpetuate the culture of impunity   which had, by this time, pervaded into the police and security forces personnel.  Consequently the families of the victims of disappearances are yet to receive justice being meted out to them though nearly  20 years have lapsed since most of these incidents had occurred while   many of them who had given evidence on the alleged perpetrators live in frustration seeing them still in service after having caused the disappearance of their loved ones.

A Report of  the International Commission of Jurists reveals that “The lack of state accountability for human rights violations in Sri Lanka crosses ethnic divides, all governments and political parties. Neither the regular criminal justice system nor commissions    of inquiry have been able to satisfy the state’s obligation to its citizens.”

It appears that  the only useful purpose   served by these Commissions was  to help successive governments  to know who and who in the police and security services are experienced and  competent in effectively carrying out disappearances of persons, so that those in these governments who required their services  could use them when the need arose.   It is perhaps such persons are the ones behind  the disappearances  that continue even today, and are often conveniently  blamed to be acts of unknown persons.

Another matter that needs to be remembered is that the Commissions of Inquiry Act does not place any obligation on the part of the President to make public the findings of any Commission of Inquiry.  There are reports of several commissions appointed  in the past that have never been published. Others have been published only in parts. It is the sole discretion of the President to publish the whole or any part of the Report if he so desires or not publish them at all.   It may not be known to many  that a special report was called by the then President Chandrika Bandaranayake into the killing of a prominent politician in a hilly district, allegedly by another who had contested him.    The Commission concerned did an exhaustive investigation  and reported that there was enough evidence  against  the alleged person who was at that time  a prominent Member of Parliament.  Yet no action was taken against him.  The wife of the person who was killed was later made a minister and the matter ended there.  No action whatsoever was taken on this Report which was never   published !

Similarly,  When a   prominent Muslim leader  was killed  following a helicopter crash, to stem the allegation that he had in fact been murdered the then government appointed a commission to inquire into the circumstances of his death.  That Commission conducted extensive investigations and submitted its   report. That report was never  published but the wife of the deceased was later  made a Minister and a large amount of money had been paid to her and her siblings as compensation.  The matter ended there.

Journalistic ethics prevents me from mentioning the names of the persons concerned but these facts cannot be denied by those concerned.

Commissions of Inquiry were initially appointed to appease pressure from human rights organizations or the people, to end  systematic violations of their rights.  But successive governments have followed a pattern of subverting them. In fact, the non-implementation of the many recommendations of these Commissions on the need to deal with the perpetrators swiftly and effectively, promoted the culture of impunity prevailing among the police and the security forces personnel to become galvanized.  What is more, the Commissions spared no efforts in making well considered recommendations on the steps to be taken to prevent the incidence of disappearances of persons in the future.   These recommendations are gathering dust in the archives of the President.

Let me now deal with the Commission appointed in year 2007  to inquire into serious human rights violations such as the killing of five university students in Trincomalee, the killing of seventeen employees of and NGO  in Muttur,   bombing of  a children’s home in Sencholai in the Mullaitivu District,  etc.  The series of such high profile incidents that  took place during that period resulted in a public outcry for the government to end such incidents.  President Rajapakse  decided to appoint a commission to inquire into such incidents to contain the surging pressure on him from various quarters.  Given the past experience on what happened to the disappearances commissions and many others, both the local and international human rights organizations expressed  their  reservations on the outcome and efficacy of the Commission proposed by the government.   Consequently, the President himself came out with a suggestion that he was prepared to invite a  few  International Independent  Group of Eminent Persons  (IIGEP)  who could be tasked to ensure that the proposed Commission conducts its investigations and inquiries in keeping with international norms and standards  and does not end up  the way the other commissions in the past had ended.

The Commission of 2007 was  created  with seven members.  A few days after the commencement of the proceedings of this Commission  the IIGEP  found that the services of a representative of the  Attorney General (AG)  was being availed of  by  this Commission  to lead the evidence in respect of the cases  the Commission was mandated to deal with.  Former Chief Justice of India – the late Justice Bhagawathy  who headed the IIGEP  had  to point out to  Justice Udalagama who was the President of the Commission, and later to the President himself of the impropriety  of the AG leading the evidence of witnesses  during the proceedings of the Commission which was inquiring into the propriety of the investigations already carried out by the police.  Both the President and the head of the Commission persisted on insisting that  the AG should be there  and that he is an independent official.  Haggling over this issue went on for some time. IIGEP was  told that they being foreigners, did not understand the nuances of the laws in Sri Lanka and the independence of the AG.  Subsequently IIGEP had to obtain the opinion of two eminent retired judges of renown,  on the question of the independence of the AG  and the justification for the involvement of the AG in the proceedings of the Commission.  They gave a well-considered written opinion to the IIGEP,  confirming that  the Attorney-General is not an independent official  and that the role played by the AG  in the proceedings of the Commission was a conflict of interest as the AG’s representative had advised the original investigations in the cases which had been mandated for inquiry by the Commission. Even though this was pointed out, the AG’s representative continued his role in the Commission  and eroded the  Commission’s  real and perceived independence. Incidentally, this particular AG who has now retired has been appointed as the Chairman of the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission.  

In view of the  high profile nature of the cases the Commission was inquiring into, witnesses  to the incidents were hesitant to come  before the Commission and give evidence for fear of reprisals.  Though the IIGEP insisted on the need for a law to protect witnesses coming before the Commission,  the government failed to  take meaningful and effective steps to  provide protection for the witnesses.

Eventually the IIGEP had to abort its mission stating  that  they (I quote), found there a lack of  political and institutional will on the part of the Government to pursue with vigour  the cases under review by the Commission, with the intention of identifying the perpetrators or at least uncovering the systemic failures and obstructions to justice that rendered  the original investigations in to these cases ineffective.

Ultimately the term of the Commission which was mandated to  inquire into 15 high profiles cases was not extended even though inquires in the cases concerned had not been completed.  That Commission then ceased to exist, confirming the suspicion that the government was not even at the outset,  keen on investigating into the serious human rights violations concerned.  A report this Commission is said to have handed over to the President, has never been made public.

From the disclosures  I have  made  so far about what happened to the Commissions  referred to,  it would be clear  that in Sri Lanka, successive  governments had  been appointing Commissions not with the honest intention of finding out what actually happened  and to mete out justice to the victims,  but with the intention of deceiving the people concerned and the international community.   Commissions have always helped governments to divert  pressure on the government regarding the relevant issues.

The commissions appointed so far, have failed to address the serious questions that have been affecting Sri Lanka in the conflicts in the recent past. These commissions have been condemned by international organizations  as well as by local human rights groups who have published extensive reports and analysis on the workings of these commissions. Amnesty International has  called the work of these Commissions as “Twenty Years of Make Believe”  in a report analyzing the work of these commissions. The International Commission of Jurists has published a work on this subject entitled “Families of the Disappeared, Still Waiting for Justice”. The reports of these organizations only confirm the fact of the ineffectiveness of these Commissions.

There isn’t a single commission appointed by the government  so far whose report or findings had been taken seriously and steps taken to implement their recommendations.  In fact, all such commissions have only been  exercises of denial of state responsibility, in instances when they  had been mandated to look into violations of human rights.

The recently appointed  ‘Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission’  in connection with the incidents relating to the conflict,  is bound to be another attempt at deception by the government which has now become well known for adopting such dubious tactics. As stated earlier this Commission is headed by the former Attorney General who crossed swords with IIGEP when he was in service and was well known for his  pro-government views.  His  personal links to the President  since their youthful days are also known.  Another key member of this Commission is the former representative of Sri Lanka at the UN where he had been vehemently defending the government’s  blood bath in the beaches of Mullaitivu during the war.  It is widely  alleged that  the President’s brother, the Defence Secretary who claims to have managed the war, had committed  violations of the rules of war and is responsible for the death of large number of civilians.  In the circumstances how can one expect  this commission to conduct its proceedings  without any bias ?

It is  obvious from the very beginning that this Commission is going to be another in the series of  deceptive commissions appointed so far,  and would suffer the same fate as most of the other Commissions.   To cap it all, the President was heard to say at an interview  Al Jazeera has  had with him recently,  that he was not going to punish any of his soldiers who fought the war valiantly to defeat the LTTE ! This statement is a pointer to the Commission not to find any military personnel guilty of any violation of the  rules of war or even the human rights of the victims of war.  Isn’t that statement of the President enough to expose the dubious intention of the President in appointing this Commission ?

[Editors note: The author was one of the secretaries of the first Provincial Council of the Western Province. We also encourage you to read Still waiting for justice in Sri Lanka by the author, published in March 2010, which also deals with Commissions of Inquiry in Sri Lanka.]

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‘Stories have been used to dispossess and to malign.
But stories can also be used to empower, and to humanize.’[1]
Chimamanda Adichie

I was inspired by the above words of Chimamanda Adichie talking about the ¨Danger of a single story’ and I reflected on how true this has been and will be in the case of Sri Lanka and its instrasigient history of political misfortune and human suffering. It’s been a year since the decisive end of the military offensive that had succeeded in re-claiming territorial sovereignity of the Sri Lankan state, but it was a victory that failed in claiming the Tamils as an integral and respected part of it is citizenry.

The recently concluded elections in Sri Lanka which registered a low voter turn out in the North & East  draws focus to a deeper political malaise. While procrastinations and empty promises along with an impotent Tamil political representation within the country symbolise a crisis in Tamil political representation including the fragmentation of existing political parties which plagues the post-war context, the desperate second bid for Tamil Eelam has taken centre stage in a renewed diabolic game.

The Tamil diaspora has undoubtedly been very vocal during the last stages of the military offensive and has through its extreme activism summoned widespread international attention raising the question whether there has been an oversimplification of the power of diaspora activism. Their activism took the form of media campaigns and public protests which fueled nationalistic sentiments and crippled transport systems of their host countries but essentially their activism seemed to continue the chase after an unrealistic dream at an unbelievably high cost.

R. Cheran believes that this latest obsession of the Tamil diaspora, the Transitional Government of Tamil Eelam (TGTE) should be viewed positively and encouraged as an ‘experiment in democracy’[2]. But would this experiment steal another generation of Sri Lankans from an opportunity of breaking away from the time hardened vines of the failures of the past? and could it in reality be an attempt at harnessing international credibility, creating hardliners and even fuel the resurgence of terrorism?

The TGTE Advisory committee report[3] quotes examples of the Eritrean, Israeli and Croatian diaspora and their political activism regarding the politics of their respective homelands. While this reiterates the importance of diaspora activism and its contribution as critiques of internal political processes including political representation and their function as key players in reconstruction and investment, equating the activities of the Tamil diaspora with these diaspora groups seems to be inappropriate  even though the potential of the Tamil diaspora in functioning as a social movement would be able to harness more realistic and far-reaching consequences.

One of the most important issues is that the TGTE Advisory Committee while claiming to find a solution to the aspirations of the Tamils has made a colossal mistake in failing to de-link itself from the LTTE which is clearly highlighted in their final study report which glorifies the role played by the LTTE, ‘The LTTE’s military power and the resultant de facto state created a political space for Tamils to freely express their political aspirations for the realization of the right to self-determination. However, that political space no longer exists‘. This also symbolises a deeply fragmented Tamil community and its inability for self reflection. A future Tamil Eelam will not succeed in bringing together the whole Tamil community together as it transgresses the core elements of democratic theory; legitimacy and a healthy representation.

Another issue of concern is the potential resuscitation of the Eelam campaign of ‘fundraising for the cause’ which had a large part to play in the protraction of the military side of the conflict in Sri Lanka. Groups supportive of the TGTE and Eelamist propaganda are getting increasingly vocal in relation to this as illustrated by the statement of the spokesperson for the US based group ‘Tamils for Obama’ states[4] that ‘One of our duties will be financial support of the TGTE. We suggested that each diaspora Tamil should make a monthly contribution of $25 to the TGTE after the election when the TGTE is able to accept and use the money. Tamils should consider this a voluntary tax. The TGTE is going to need the money for all of the things of any national government does. For the TGTE these tasks will include maintaining a think tank to advise them on how to advance the goal of Tamil Eelam“.

In terms of the more operational aspects of the TGTE the final study report outlines the tasks of the provisional government states the following:

• Uniting Tamil entities and subscribing to the Vadukkodai resolution
• Work with the Tamil leadership in SL
• Negotiating with the Sinhala nation
• Direct links with foreign governments and international organization
• Political programme with participation of Muslim representatives

Nevertheless, these tasks are merely secondary when compared to a much more important issue which is the acceptance of the TGTE as a government or power centre. The report states that in order to recognise the TGTE as a power centre key actors such as the Tamil diaspora, Tamil people in homeland, global Tamil community from other countries such as Malaysia, India and Singapore and the international community need only to accept it through their ‘actions’ – ‘These actors need not publicly endorse TGTE but should accept it through their actions’. As it is the case with the entire report the vagueness and lack of forethought into the practical application of the concept of transnational governance is severely lacking as is the explanation of how such a government will ensure legitimacy and its territorial sovereignty .

Also while the TGTE claims that it will be ‘formed and sustained by the people‘ and that ‘it relies on the exercise of the democratic political rights such as freedom of association and freedom of expression’ and that it will accommodate the Muslims within the TGTE and ensure that they will be able to exercise their right to a separate autonomous state if the need arises, it has failed to acknowledge its part in the deaths, disappearances and its role in the deprivation of the Tamils’ right to peaceful coexistence thereby ignoring the need for truth seeking. Will the Tamil diaspora fail to acknowledge the past suffering of all Sri Lankans, the half-truths[5] and the wrong choices and continue this foolish gamble, deaf to the real aspirations of the Tamils who are living in the country, in a sad bid to appease their guilt ridden desires?

The elections for Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam (TGTE) commenced on May 2, 2010, in 26 countries with an expectation of a 60 – 70% voter turn out. While detailed information regarding the elections (number of votes polled etc.) is still not publicly available the representatives have been identified and the inaugural sessions of the TGTE took place on May 17 – 19, 2010 in Philadelphia. Conversations with some of the diaspora Tamils who had voted in this election reveal a disturbing but persistent trend that has marred the politics of the Tamils for a long time, essentially the danger of the single story. Tamils keep repeating the same mistake of uninformed decision making while standing steadfastly to the belief that as ‘victims’ all their actions would amount to self-defence; at any cost.

---

[1] ‘The danger of the single story’, Chimamanda Adichie, Novelist on TED Talks, www.ted.com

[2] ‘Transitional government of Tamil Eelam is an experiment in democracy – Dr. Cheran’, Antony Reinhart, http://transcurrents.com/tc/2010/05/transnational_govt_of_tamil_ee.html#more

[3] ‘Formation of a Provisional Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam: Final report based on the study’, TGTE Advisory Committee, http://govtamileelam.org/gov/

[4] http://diasporaweekend.com/a931917-tamils-for-obama-says-we-should.cfm

[5] ‘Provisional Transitional Government of Tamil Eelam is a dangerous exercise’, Rajan Hoole http://transcurrents.com/tc/2009/07/provisional_transnational_gove.html

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“Just then they came in sight of thirty or forty windmills that rise from that plain. And no sooner did Don Quixote see them that he said to his squire, “Fortune is guiding our affairs better than we ourselves could have wished. Do you see over yonder, friend Sancho, thirty or forty hulking giants? I intend to do battle with them and slay them. With their spoils we shall begin to be rich for this is a righteous war and the removal of so foul a brood from off the face of the earth is a service God will bless.”

“What giants?” asked Sancho Panza.”Those you see over there,” replied his master, “with their long arms. Some of them have arms well nigh two leagues in length.”

“Take care, sir,” cried Sancho. “Those over there are not giants but windmills. Those things that seem to be their arms are sails which, when they are whirled around by the wind, turn the millstone.”

—Part 1, Chapter VIII. Of the valourous Don Quixote’s success in the dreadful and never before imagined Adventure of the Windmill.

“Resisting the (terrorism) discourse is not an act of disloyalty, it is an act of political self-determination and it is absolutely necessary if we are to avoid another stupefying period of fear and violence like the Cold War. There is little doubt by now that terrorism discourse creates its own reality.

Joseba Zulaika in Terrorism: The Self-fulfilling Prophesy (2009: 2)

The weather gods have intervened to arrest the war gods in Lanka. Victory celebrations that were to feature military hardware, air power, and parades scheduled for V-Day on May 18, 2010 on Galle Face Green, while Colombo’s ordinary citizens were subject to yet another security lock-down to protect the Victors have been indefinitely postponed. Pre-monsoon rains and floods have displaced many poor and vulnerable families, living in “unauthorized shelters” (that the Urban Development Authority now headed by the valiant Defense Secretary, Gotabaya Rajapaksa is given to knocking down), in Southern Sri Lanka. It is apparent that the funds and energy spent on victory celebrations, would be better spent on rehabilitation of flood victims (almost 500,000) and, one might add, the 50,000 war displaced Vanni IDPs who still remain in camps.

Since the war ended a year ago on May 19, 2009, there has not been a single “terrorist” attack in Sri Lanka, as Ravinath Aryasinghe, Lanka’s Ambassador to the European Union pointed out in Brussels recently. Yet the State’s (anti)terrorism discourse continues with rumors of the LTTE regrouping in South America. Ravinath noted that the war had moved with the Diaspora to the Western hemisphere; an overstatement that seems to be more in concert with the Colombo regime’s propensity to fight windmills a la the valiant Don Quixote, ever in search of villains on the horizon.  Of course, a few ethnic entrepreneurs in the diaspora whose livelihood may depend on marketing “liberation” have announced a virtual state of Tamil Eelam in cyber space. This may not be the best way to keep up the pressure on the GoSL to treat its minorities right, since the declaration a Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam (TGTE) has been enormously helpful to those inclined to pursue post-conflict militarization and in-securitization in Colombo and the northeast.

Citizens of Lanka from all communities who were relieved and grateful to the armed forces for ending the war are increasingly confounded by the new (in) securitization and continued military footprint in Colombo, as well as, the permanent State of Emergency. The purchase of close circuit television (CCTV) cameras with training for service personnel (in Singapore), to secure the posh neighbourhoods of Colombo’s Cinnamon Gardens through which the Presidential entourage passes daily, is one such example of extravagance in the interest of post-conflict (in)securitization  aka. fighting windmills. Meanwhile, on the roads dug up for CCTV power lines, an unsuspecting pedestrian has fallen into a pot hole or two and broken her leg during the pre-monsoon down pours. Whose security is it, anyway?

Did the war end after all? The Diaspora and Amnesia

It is easy to forget that “terrorism” comes to an end somewhere, sometime, somehow, since the global ‘war on terror’ discourse is seamless, endless and has no exit strategy. As Harvard Political Scientist, Audrey Cronin, has noted in her book “How Terrorism Ends”: “Amid the fear following 9/11 and other recent terror attacks, it is easy to forget the most important fact about terrorist campaigns: they always come to an end–and often far more quickly than expected”.  Before the war ended we had become used to the idea that it would go on for a long time. Various local and international conflict and peace experts in the business of predicting and sometimes rendering “protracted conflict” a self-fulfilling prophesy had said so. Extended exposure to violence on an of screen also tends to anesthetize the public and creates an endless plateau just like the non-existent term limits of Sri Lankan political leaders impervious to the fact that all good things must come to an end. But it seems that the post/conflict (in)securitization has a more material explanation: the Army Commander that helped win the war is locked up and the V-Day celebration would have been like Hamlet without the Prince!

Post/modernist pronouncements on the end of “grand narratives” seem rather misplaced these days since “terrorism” appears to have become a new international grand narrative of sorts, of course. The terrorism narrative like previous grand narratives of progress, development and the forward march of civilization that underwrote various forms and phases of imperialism has a political economy that benefits among others, the security knowledge industry, the arms trade, and the “terrorism” spin mill. Terrorism discourse mimics other grand narratives as antithesis or apocalypse. As Brezinski has noted in an article titled “Terrorized by the War on Terror” in the Washington Post, in March 2006: “Constant reference to a “war on terror” did accomplish one major objective: It stimulated the emergence of a culture of fear. Fear obscures reason, intensifies emotions and makes it easier for demagogic politicians to mobilize the public on behalf of the policies they want to pursue. The war of choice in Iraq could never have gained the congressional support it got without the psychological linkage between the shock of 9/11 and the postulated existence of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. Support for President Bush in the 2004 elections was also mobilized in part by the notion that “a nation at war” does not change its commander in chief in midstream. The sense of a pervasive but otherwise imprecise danger was thus channeled in a politically expedient direction by the mobilizing appeal of being “at war.”

As the one year anniversary of the defeat of the LTTE approached the terrorism spin-mill worked overtime to equate the Tamil diaspora with’ terrorism’, rather than highlight the manner in which it sustains family and kin who survived the war back home. The constant repetition of stories about LTTE arms catches and arrests of members works to re-produce the terror discourse and legitimize militarization and the extra-ordinary security for the ruling family in post-conflict Colombo. While a few members of the Tamil diaspora have declared a Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam (TGTE), in exile and are engaged in anti-GoSL propaganda overseas the great majority has little interest in a Tamil cyber-nation-state. Several Tamil diaspora organization are actively opposed to TGTE, particularly, those who are conscious that ‘long distance nationalism’ may negatively affect the prospects of their kin in Lanka to live in peace and security.

It is well known, as with the Palestine/Israel conflict that Diasporas often tend to be far more intransigent and unwilling to compromise than those who remained at home, but the international context that enabled the LTTE become a powerful global terror network during the post-Cold war period of unfettered globalization, no longer exists. Tamil and Sinhala ultra-nationalism and extremism is most visible at this time from the respective diasporas, but there is also an emerging disconnect between the diaspora leadership and those in-country who wish to compromise, co-exist, and work with “other” communities to build back better. The declaration of a virtual state of Tamil Eelam merely serves to legitimize continued militarization in post/conflict Lanka, and the concomitant  (in)securitization of  minorities. It is not the best way to keep up the pressure on a regime that may suffer the Macbeth syndrome.

Different Strokes to Mark V-day
Before the intervention of the weather gods, the Sri Lankan State had called on its citizens and subjects to celebrate V-Day with pomp and ceremony, and ordered flags flown in all official buildings in the districts. The public of the Capital, particularly residents of snooty Colombo 7, where the Hambantota interlopers have been ironically on a tree-cutting, road- beautifying, charm-offensive, (consonant with the Urban Development Authority (UDA), being handed over to the Defense Ministry), had once again braced itself to be inconvenienced by ‘security’ arrangements for the ruling extended family. On the other hand, Tamil politicians and the TNA had called for a day of mourning, since the defeat of the LTTE represents to them the defeat of Tamil nationalism.  Civil society meanwhile tried to be tempered and emphasized the need for balance, proportionality, dignity, and respect for the grief of those who lost kin when marking the first anniversary of the end of armed violence in Sri Lanka. At the same time, the International Crisis Group and Human Rights Watch saw fit to renew calls for accountability for war crimes to mark the first anniversary of the end of war in Lanka. Unfortunately, they may also have renewed the Macbeth complex of the establishment – fear of trees and the ghosts of murdered souls– (Out, out, damn spot and all that…), that seems to be at the root of Sri Lanka’s post-conflict militarism and insecurity.

What is to be done?
The best and only way to ensure that Lanka becomes the “wonder of Asia” and honor those who defeated terrorism is to ensure that there would not be a recurrence of violence. Rather than fighting windmills and appointing commissions to reveal lessons already known, the government’s best option would be to set things right on the ground in Lanka by ensuing speedy and dignified resettlement of the war displaced, securing minority rights, reparation, and reconciliation among the various ethno-religious communities. For this, fully implementing the 13 Amendment to the Constitution in the North and East would be a beginning. These should be the priority at this time, rather than constitutional changes to extend the term of the Presidency.

Unfortunately both the head of State and the Opposition seem to suffer the same malaise—an aversion to relinquish power and dislike for term limits on political power, to ensure that they move on and hand over to the younger generation, which may partly explain the propensity for youth uprisings and rebellions among youth from the different ethnic communities in post/colonial Lanka. The Buddhist principle that “all things change” must surely apply to politicians in the land of the peaceful one and those in power today must know that they are merely custodians of the land who need give way to others tomorrow? The United National Party must sort out its internal crisis speedily rather than dragging its feet and mimicking the government on reforms, in order to engage the UPFA government on the priorities for constitutional reform since most Presidents of Lanka have displayed an unseemly aversion to giving up power when their term runs out. But until Wickramasinghe passes on the torch to someone else, this may be a case of the pot to call the kettle black!

Finally, during the Tsunami disaster local civil society organizations worked ceaselessly, across ethno-religious identity lines to assist those who were displaced, and to help them resettle and reconstruct.  The Sri Lanka diaspora also contributed enormously to relief and recovery. More than the government and international donors (the UN which consumes most of the funds raised for disaster victims again mourning about donor fatigue), similar efforts by civil society with the help of the Diaspora should be able to see the war-displaced resettle with dignity rather than living in miserable temporary huts once they have returned to their home villages, as is the case in much of Killinochchi and Mullaithivu. The scale of assistance necessary to support the conflict-displaced at this time is far smaller than on the first anniversary of the Tsunami disaster. Perhaps some of the energy and funds of the TGTE may be diverted to help the Vanni IDPs and returnees, and the Defense Ministry remove restrictions on access to the north — to prevent “terrorism” becoming a self-fulfilling prophesy again in Lanka?

Similar Posts:

• Should We Fight Terror?
• Post-conflict Transition and Aid Effectiveness: Reconstruction and Reconciliation in Sri Lanka – Part 1
• The unlearnt lessons of July 1983
• Prabhakaran is dead – join debates on what next for Sri Lanka
• Fear: A Personal Experience in Sri Lanka

Interestingly of the four best pieces I have read on the first anniversary of the war, three are by Indian analyst/commentators, of whom two are military professionals: Gen Ashok K. Mehta’s Manekshaw paper No 22 for the Centre for Land Warfare Studies (New Delhi) on ‘How Eelam war 4 was Won’ (which cannot be read by any patriot or anti-fascist without a lump in one’s throat or mist in one’s eyes), the piece by Col R Hariharan in The Hindu and by PK Balachandran in the Indian Express. The fourth is by a youthful security researcher Sergei de Silva Ranasinghe writing in the respected Australian periodical, The Diplomat.

Within Sri Lanka and among Sri Lankans, the debate on the war may be differentiated into four positions:

1. Those who condemn both the war and the voices that justify it and approve of its results (such as mine),
2. Those who applaud both the war and its aftermath, condemning both the critics of the war and the post-war present.
3. Those who criticise both the present policy of the state and the past of the Tigers, while either criticising or observing a vow of silence on the last war and the politico-military leadership that took it to success. This position is both intellectually dishonest as well as a-historical: it seems to assume that Prabhakaran and his Tigers were whisked away by a magician or wished away by pious preaching.
4. Those who advocated and supported the war and still do in retrospect, refusing to allow a reversal or revision of the ‘correct historical verdict’ that it was a necessary and Just war, while simultaneously seeking and struggling for a just peace.  This stance holds that external-internal (chiefly but not exclusively Indo-Lanka) dynamics would open space for the transition from a Just War and victory—which requires consolidation– to a Just Peace.

This last position (which I hold) is hardly represented on GV and may seem unrepresentative to the GV constituency, but its fundaments (‘we supported Sri Lanka’s war and are pleased you won, but you must not waste time, and should move towards a sustainable peace based on a political settlement with the Tamils’) are shared by all those states which supported the Sri Lankan war effort by military, economic and politico-diplomatic means, i.e. the majority of states in the international system, including all of Asia. More pertinently, all public opinion surveys, including the most recent (Colin Irwin’s surveys of 2009 and 2010 for the Univ of Liverpool) reveal that in respect of its basics, this is indeed the position of the vast majority of Sri Lankans (anti-Tiger, pro-war, pro-victory, pro-Mahinda, anti-federalism, pro-enhanced provincial devolution within a unitary system). A trawl through GV archives reminds us of a 2007 MARGA institute opinion survey introduced and summarised by Godfrey Gunatilleke, revealing complete congruency with the Irwin surveys of 2009-2010. In 2007:

• the large majority — 84% — favour a total military defeat of the LTTE and recapture of the territory presently held by it
• While only 22 % approved a federal solution, most of the respondents — 87 % — were in favour of the provincial council system. 51% wanted the two provinces to be de-merged and continue as separate provinces

What is utterly significant is that no mainstream political formation, leadership, or intellectual tendency comes close to this binary view. The government reflected and implemented the first part, which no preceding administration did.  The CBK administration ignored the majority view on the second aspect, and toyed with the minority view, possibly under the ideological influence of the peace lobby. The Sinhala ultranationalists ignore the preference for provincial devolution, as do their targets and foes, the cosmopolitan liberals, who go for the federal model.

This brings us to the challenge of today and tomorrow. Provincial autonomy must be fought for because there is a serious danger that it will go by the board. It is a battle that can be won because there is a bed-rock of public opinion in favour and the realities of external factors and forces  pushing (or at least nudging) in this direction.  Ironically, the ‘moderate’ TNA and ‘enlightened liberal’ opinion is not for it; preferring to push for a federal or quasi-federal outcome.  The problem is that there is no significant public support for it and enormous public opposition to it.  As philosophical method cautions us, ‘Is’ cannot be derived from ‘ought’. Realism teaches us on the contrary that ‘ought’ must bear relation to ‘is’, by which is meant that in order to be feasible, the ideal aim — ‘ought’ — must not be simply a wish-list, but a projection of the most progressive tendencies and probabilities of the present.

A sustainable peace is not easy to conceptualise. For it to be implementable it must be viable and for it to be viable it must guarantee security – both ‘national’ and ‘human’ — and be in accordance with the strategic needs of the Sri Lankan state.  It is, in short, problematic and must not merely be prescribed but ‘problematized’ by public and policy intellectuals.  Years after the war, the Sinhalese and the Tamils, the two major communities on the island have lessons to learn, but are they doing so? Will they do so? It is far too late in the day to place postures of politically correct punditry ahead of the political truth, however deep one has to cut and drill down in order to get to it and however deep the truth itself cuts when expressed coldly and analytically.

Antonio Gramsci drew an important distinction between the West and the East, by use of metaphor. In the East, once you capture the main fortress, you win the war, but in the West, you may capture the fort but then you see a complex network of fortifications and tunnels etc snaking all round. This spoke to the difference between the East where ‘the state was everything and civil society nothing’ and the West, where the opposite was true. Therefore in the East you can win by war of manoeuvre and frontal assault but in the east you have to fight a long and patient war of position, capturing trench by trench, which takes time. This is the strategy of the long march through the institutions, where one accumulates intellectual, cultural ethical and moral leadership, so that you have established consensus before the final a decisive assault.

Whether they know it or not, the same experience has been undergone by the Sinhalese and Tamils. Both the Sinhalese and Tamils thought that each other resembled a relatively simple ‘Eastern’ formation (in the Gramscian sense) which could be knocked out by a frontal blow, while the reality is that both have a ‘Western’ configuration, with significant complexity and ‘reserves’.

The Tamils thought that Prabhakaran and his miraculous Tigers had punched the Sinhala armed forces into submission and always would. They did not understand that however many Mankulam ( 1990), Mullaitivu ( 1996) and Elephant Pass (2000) fortresses fell to the enemy, behind these forts and this army, were the Sinhala people who just kept resisting; refusing to give in.  Similarly when the armed forces beat Prabhakaran last year and decimated the Tigers, the Sinhalese thought that the Tamils had been decisively beaten at Nandikadal and thus it would be easy to cow them. The Sinhalese did not understand that behind the Tigers were a globalised community, the mobilised Diaspora.

In my perspective on Sri Lankan politics, especially the politics of ethno-nationalism, I have gravitated to what might be called a combination of the Realist and Prudentialist schools. While the Idealists range from Kant to Kofi Annan, and the Realists range from Thucydides, through Machiavelli, to Lenin, Morgenthau and Kissinger, the Prudentialists claim ancestry from Aristotle, Montesquieu, Pascal, and Tocqueville through to Raymond Aron. More recently the Prudentialist school became indistinguishable from the new Ethical Realist tendency (Anatole Lieven). I agree with those who consider the best post-war Western strategic and foreign policy thinkers such as Reinhold Niebuhr, George Kennan and Stanley Hoffman, to be Ethical Realists.

The father of the Realist school of political theory and international relations, Thucydides, tells us that as Athens grew strong there was apprehension in Sparta. Applying realism I conclude that the outbreak of the war was inevitable as was the LTTE’s defeat. The policies and practices of the decade extending roughly from 1973-83, pushed the Tamils to the brink of what must have seemed like eternal victimhood and servitude. This posed an existential threat. The Sinhalese gravely underestimated the Tamils. Given their sense of selfhood, deriving in part from their numbers in the neighbourhood, their global spread, and the status they enjoyed in other parts of the world, they decided to make a fight of it. That much was inevitable. What was not was the nature, the character of that war; its duration and its dynamics.

A Realist reading would similarly yield the following conclusion: Given the sheer demographic weight and the fact that the Sinhalese as a collective are unique to the island of Sri Lanka, it was inevitable that they would fight back, especially when, with the CFA, the ISGA demand and the emergence of the LTTE air arm, it looked like the Tamil Tigers would establish a dominant position on the island while raiding the South at will, murdering its leaders and keeping the Sinhalese in their thrall.

In this stage the Tamils and the West, underestimated the Sinhalese, and lost the war. That too was inevitable, given the numbers and the Sinhala sense that their backs were to the sea and they had no strategic space to retreat. Then, they morphed from lambs to lions, rose against the Tigers and devoured them.

The international targeting of Sri Lanka on this first anniversary of the victory in the war shows that the Sinhalese have once again underestimated the Tamils, who despite their military decimation, have a significant global ‘reserve army’ and international leverage sufficient to bring an avalanche down on the head of the  Sinhala leadership.

Following in the tradition of Thucydides, a Realist reading would remark that there are three strategic perspectives for and of the island. Some among the Sinhalese hold that though the island holds more than one community, given the overwhelming superiority of numbers and the civilizational-linguistic uniqueness of the Sinhalese, they must enjoy sole ownership of the island, while the minorities remain as tenants. The second perspective is that of many Tamils who hold that given their numbers off the island and their cultural-civilizational antiquity and achievements, they should have co-equal sovereignty with the Sinhalese over the island — that being the animating spirit from 50:50 to the ISGA/PTOMS.

The third perspective, which is the Realist-Prudentialist one that I share, is that given the existence of more than one community on the island, power and sovereignty must be shared between them all; given the Sinhalese specificity and huge demographic preponderance on the island  that power and sovereignty cannot be shared equally and must of necessity be unequal and hierarchical; and given the external ( regional and global)  spread and demonstrated leverage of the Tamils, that unequal sharing cannot be quite as unequal as the Sinhalese would wish.

So the Realist-Prudentialist perspective would conclude that the solution is for both communities to accept that there will be neither sole ownership nor equal partnership but there will be shareholder ship by all communities; a shareholding in which the Sinhalese will have a majority but now quite as overwhelming as they would wish. The Tamil share or stake will not be merely tokenistic but they will be minority shareholders, even in combination with other minorities.  This is the case because the domestic balance of power is such, and the Sinhalese have a much bigger stake, existentially, in Sri Lanka than does any other community. They cannot but be the major stakeholders of and in the island. This is a consociation model of sorts but I would prefer to see it as uneven, hierarchical sharing of political space and power. It is not a model of Sinhala political monopoly, but of Sinhala political pre-eminence (hegemony?) in power relations. This is not to be mistaken for unequal rights the level of citizens: all citizens must have equal rights, in law and enforcement, be they Sinhalese, Tamils or of any other ethnicity.  This is a model of equal citizenship but of unequal political power and influence; a domestic Yalta model. It is a model that is neither a hyper-centralised unitary one (1972-1988), nor a federal, still less con-federal one, in which the units have a veto (union of regions package, ISGA). It is a strong state, unitary not federal, centralised but not hyper-centralist, with a degree of autonomy that is sufficiently broad to be authentic and centripetal, but sufficiently circumscribed not to be centrifugal.

After the war, the only serious conversation should be about negotiating the degree of unevenness in a necessarily, inevitably hierarchical of power relations in a structure of shared power and sovereignty among the citizens of our common island home. My personal perspective is that the deliberation should take place somewhere within the square constituted by the 13th amendment (1988), the draft Constitution of August 2000, the APRC Experts Committee ‘majority report’ (2007) and the APRC proposals of 2009.

Some may observe critically, that mine seems an ethnic if not primordial perspective, and that this is not the way things are in other parts of the world. However I am a universalist who has grown to respect the Aristotelian contribution of focusing on specificity and particularity, in historical time and geographic space. For instance, India has many nationalities and is thus multi-polar while Sri Lanka’s demographic and power distribution is bi-polar, if not strictly on the island, then in a sub-regional frame. Our problem is to prevent the bi-polar distribution from becoming a perpetual zero-sum game. Singapore has four national languages, but its communities (Chinese, Malays, and Indians/Tamils) have a regional or global presence. The Sinhalese do not. The Tamils do. This means that the Sinhalese feel they cannot afford a level playing field. They are apprehensive about a trade off, in which they retain an uneven playing field with politico-cultural space at the periphery, because of the proximity of Tamil Nadu and the fear of osmosis. This is why under Mahinda Rajapakse there is dawdling on movement in either direction: equality at the centre or space at the periphery.   For better or worse, the Sinhalese do not have the external component of national strength and power, to avoid making reform on one or the other, without a world of pain being brought down on them. This past week’s international offensive is just the arrowhead.

The Sinhalese simply do not have the strategic space to afford the generosity of conceding equal power on the island, but they do not have the strategic weight globally to retain sole power or sole ownership of the Sri Lankan state. They are simultaneously too strong (on the island) and too weak (off it).  The Tamils are too strong off shore, to be crushed as a collective under the Sinhala jackboot though Prabhakaran was, but they are too weak on the island to carve out the political arrangement that fulfils their self image and self-esteem. A prudent, pragmatic compromise is imperative.

Departing further from postures of politically correct pedagogues, I would argue that a Realist re-reading of Dutugemunu (a reading I had ventured in print slightly a decade ago) would trace the contours of such a pragmatic compromise. Dutugemunu of Mahavamsa legend evokes polarised responses: hero to the Sinhala chauvinists, anathema to the cosmopolitans. In a pioneering and valuable critique Gananath Obeysekara homed in on the consolatory episode in which the dying king is assured that his pangs of conscience are not in order.  While I agree with Prof John Richardson that this prevented the ‘Dharmasokan turn’ on the part of Dutugemunu and thereby Sinhala Buddhism, my own point is the facile resolution of the question of violence prevented the wrestling between religio-philosophical ethic of non-violence and the state imperative of the use of violence, which in the Christian case resulted in the theology of Just War, which has become a part of secular political philosophy. But I digress: the Dutugemunu legend contains a doctrine which I believe to be the viable strategic solution of our dilemma.

The Dutugemunu doctrine is twofold:

1. The Indian ocean at our back and a Tamil kingdom in the North (with a Tamil hinterland further back) gives us little strategic space; given this strategic situation, a rival Tamil power centre on the North of the island will always be strategically intolerable and will have to be eliminated; The island’s geopolitical situation dictates strategic uni-polarity. Thus, a unitary state, not federalism still less con-federalism.
2. The Mahavamsa legend has it that having won the war Dutugemunu appoints a Tamil ‘sub-king’ to rule the area ‘in accordance with the traditions and customs’ of the area and its people. Thus devolution and autonomy, not demographic incursion.

Now, the cosmopolitan liberal idealists refuse to accept the grand strategic validity of Proposition (1), and the contemporary Sinhala chauvinists fail to practise, indeed do not accept the validity of proposition (2). The fact that Sinhala chauvinism has deviated from Dutugemunu is a massive vulnerability which cannot be exploited ideologically because there is no one to do so, since that would require acceptance of and adherence to Proposition (1), in order to have viability and legitimacy, and indeed strategic soundness. The two propositions constitute an inseparable, organic strategic unity; a strategic synthesis. What makes matters more interesting is that public opinion surveys from 1997 (available in a PRIO bibliography) right up to the University of Liverpool’s survey of 2009-10 conducted by Prof Colin Irwin, reveals majority support precisely for the combination of the two propositions of my Realist reading of the Dutugemunu doctrine: strong centre, unitary state, no federalism or Indian model, tri-lingualism, zero tolerance of a parallel Tamil army, improved devolution and provincial autonomy.

I am a universalist-modernist who is also a pluralist, because I recognise uneven development.  The universal is an abstraction which is mediated by the particular in order to become real-concrete. Some think that world history is heading in one political direction – which I do not, preferring to think that each model has its advantages and disadvantages and that history remains open. Even though I respect and applaud genuinely universal norms and standards, I am enough of a votary of uneven development to know that not every state or society is at the same level of development as the other and that states have to go through a process of evolution. A reading of the Springtime of Nations, namely Europe in 1848, would reveal a picture of ethno-lingual nationalism as the propellant of nation building and a zero-sum game with minorities, rather like post Independence Sri Lanka.  That first great wave of European nationalism and state-building left an unfinished problem of internal ‘national questions’.

Sri Lanka, like many societies in the periphery, was impacted by colonialism with paradoxical results: one the one hand, internal development was retarded, holding back certain changes that would otherwise have come about, and on the other hand, accelerated certain processes ‘artificially’ as it were, rendering their results rather rootless in the native soil and consciousness. This is so in the matter of nation and state building. There are stages of political growth and Sri Lanka and many states in the global South at different stages of politico-historical development from those in the First world. Therefore, notions of nation, nationalism and nationality and concepts of citizenship are rawer and rougher edged, less refined and evolved.  Is Demos of mature or mid- modernity, Ethnos of and in early modernity?  We have a historical journey to complete, towards a universalism which accommodates pluralism; towards modernity, guided by Reason.

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