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The LTTE – A Spent Force?

A side issue arising from Professor Michael Roberts’s Dilemmas at War’s End: Clarifications & Counter-Offensive

According to Professor Roberts, dissident SL Tamils are of the view that the LTTE has passed its use-by date and a new leadership is needed to fight for their rights. He thinks these dissident Tamils have a far better understanding of the immediate priorities of the Tamil people. Is he referring to the ones now in positions of power because they claim they have accepted the democratic process? If so, has their record to date in upholding these democratic norms stood up to scrutiny? Or, is the hope a thousand flowers will bloom as soon as the LTTE leader Pirapaharan is dead? Or, could there be other reasons?

The argument that the LTTE has reached its use-by date is also debatable. The numbers do not seem to add up. If all the civilians trapped in Vanni are LTTErs, if a significant number of Tamils living in the non-Vanni areas are LTTErs, if the majority of the Tamil diaspora (as evident from recent mobilizations) are LTTE supporters, it will be simplistic to assume that the LTTE is a spent force, much as one would hate to admit it. The LTTE “has had considerable popular support both within and outside its terrain”, even Professor Roberts himself admits.

Apparently, some Tamils who opposed the LTTE during the days of the cease-fire agreement are now grudgingly recognising the role played by the LTTE in bringing attention to the Tamil ‘grievances’. By Professor Roberts’ own admission, “even those who are hostile to the LTTE have responded emotionally to this situation”. I believe that no one would be able to deny that the LTTE, with or without its current leader, will remain as one of the major representatives of the Tamil people in Sri Lanka. However, one factor that led to the LTTE’s disaster was its claim of being the sole representative of all Tamils in Sri Lanka.

Those who support the LTTE today cannot be said to be doing so under compulsion, simply because the LTTE is at its weakest point since its inception. They support the LTTE under trying circumstances when all the international forces from India to the United States, from Russia to China, from Pakistan to Venezuela are supporting the GOSL while opposing any pro-LTTE activities by the Tamil diaspora.

As I have said previously,

“I am no admirer of the LTTE or of its ideological and military tactics, but I do not hesitate to recognise that it does represent a sizeable proportion of Tamil political spectrum and aspiration. So it is politically untruthful to claim that any true rapprochement can be conducted or achieved without their participation. This will be the reality. Those politicians and bureaucrats who claim a settlement can be gained without the LTTE seem to be deluding themselves.”

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February 24, 2009 | 7:02 AM Comments  0 comments

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Heroes for peace: A video against war


February 23, 2009 | 7:02 AM Comments  0 comments

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Resonating the interests of chauvinism? - My response to the two articles by Prof. Michael Roberts

I would like to preface my response to Professor Michael Robert’s two articles (Dilemma’s at Wars End: Responding to Hard Realities and Dilemma’s at Wars End: Clarifications and Counter-offensive). By writing this, I have no wish to devalue my friendship with Professor Roberts. For at the end of the day both of us stand for an inclusive Sri Lanka that recognizes the pluralist nature of its society comprising Sinhalese, Tamils and Muslims. I am completely with Professor Roberts when he emphasizes this as a central plank in addressing the current conflict.

Disregarding the many allegations raised in the new article, I still cannot find grounds from the two articles to resile from the position I have taken.

In Professor Robert’s view, we are caught between two evils; the fascist LTTE and the populist Government of Sri Lanka (GOSL) with fascist tendencies. By implication the GOSL is the lesser evil. Both the GOSL and outsiders (i.e., Sinhalese) consider these Tamils as citizens of Sri Lanka, but Tamils reject this identity and recognise themselves as citizens of Tamil Eelam or Eelavars.

Identity of a people is subjective and can be hardly imposed. As such, Tamil civilians trapped in Vanni are supporters and a potential auxiliary force of the LTTE. This may happen willingly or through conscription and these people have become influenced by sacrificial ideology of the LTTE. A civilian tragedy remains real, but it is being used as a form of political blackmail.

So, in this situation, Dr Roberts asserts that we need to choose between the following two options: 1) eliminating the LTTE’s conventional military capability and 2) rescuing the Tamil civilians who are trapped in the war zone. Pointing out that some consider the defeat of Tigers as an opportunity, he implies that those who chose option 2 to save these Tamil civilians will aid the LTTE.

This is the gist of his position. From my point of view, this position is not only politically naïve but also resonates well with the interests of chauvinism. This is the major weakness of this approach. I believe his position provides the state a political and ideological veneer to justify gross violation of the fundamental and inalienable rights of the Sri Lankan Tamils. Many associates of Professor Roberts would not expect such an approach in his analysis and a position that will serve extremism.

In my view, to suggest that UN humanitarian intervention on behalf of the Tamil civilians trapped in Vanni is tantamount to helping the LTTE is ridiculous. Perhaps Professor Roberts means that some LTTE cadres whom he is keen to see eliminated may manage to escape with rescued civilians! Otherwise, he has not convincingly clarified how a UN humanitarian intervention could help the LTTE, if the GOSL allowed such an intervention.

There are hundreds of thousands of people still that remain trapped in Vanni. Professor Roberts’ position implies that all those in Vanni can be put into a single basket, “auxiliaries in the LTTE war machine”. He spares no consideration for Tamil civilians, who have lived under the LTTE control for more than a decade, and probably with no avenues to communicate with the outside world. Should we ignore the lives of these civilians simply for the sake of capturing the LTTE leader?

Furthermore, if everyone who worked in the decade long LTTE administration is to be labeled an enemy combatant it will amount to a case for eventual partition of the island, not integration. The fact of the matter is that the Tamil community has for a long time felt alienated and their rallying around a purported liberation movement is a consequence of this. Professor Roberts’ recommendations and way of looking at things will aggravate not ameliorate this alienation.

Professor Roberts while admitting to anticipating some misreading of the article by those with “empathetic hearts”, seems bewildered about “the degree of misinterpretation” attributed to his first article. Furthermore, he suggests the need for learning “how to read”. He takes my criticism of his view as an attempt to brand him as a “heinous warmonger”. In my previous response, I used the word “casts” to mean that the position he had taken on this particular issue, is consonant with the current position of the GoSL and has been welcomed by extreme Sinhala nationalist groups. I did not mean that Professor Roberts has become a war monger or an extreme nationalist. On the contrary, he is not writing in a political vacuum unaware of the manner in which his contributions will be used. In the second article, he maintains and reinforces this position while clarifying certain aspects of the first article.

According to him, Professor Kumar David and I have not paid attention to the way the context of the article was framed and, in particular, I have failed to recognise its deliberately restricted parameters. I appreciate Professor Robert’s position about the limitations one encounters, particularly due to spatial and parametric restrictions of writing and discussing a sensitive topic like this. However, could this become an acceptable excuse?

Professor Roberts goes onto categorise those who do not adhere to his choice, by lambasting the human rights lobby (HRL) being more naïve, asking them to pay more attention to the specificities of context, and to reveal greater political acumen and less extremism. He seems to be unaware that even many dissident Tamils both in Sri Lanka and in the diaspora who have read his article interprets it the way I have interpreted it.

From my point of view, justification of any attempt to wipe out the LTTE at any cost to Tamil civilians trapped in Vanni is not different from the justification by the Israeli and the US governments of Israeli attacks on Palestinian people in Gaza and West Bank. Some of the apologists for this action could not be construed as warmongers but they are apologists for the strategic aims of USA and the expansionist polices of Israel.

This brings out two ancillary points. I am no admirer of the LTTE or of its ideological and military tactics, but I do not hesitate to recognise that it does represent a sizeable proportion of Tamil political spectrum and aspiration. So it is politically untruthful to claim that any true rapprochement can be conducted or achieved without their participation. This will be the reality. Those politicians and bureaucrats who claim a settlement can be gained without the LTTE seem to be deluding themselves. If the Palestinian struggle is anything to go by then even though the Palestinian struggle for nationhood has been repeatedly defeated by the Zionists and their backers, the struggle mutates and starts anew. At the same time the strains of a continual war on the occupier deform their body politic.

He agrees that his reference to World War II was not a strict analogue. Yet, he goes on to emphasise that these analogues are pertinent in this situation. He states that the suggestion for intervention and to stop war is “simply preposterous and simply simpleton”. He seems to imply that all Tamils are willing to commit suicide, if the LTTE asked them to do so. He cannot claim to be unaware that his analogues will be jumped upon with glee by anyone who wants a free hand to go ahead with the war with great force.

It is also preposterous to state that all Tamils would willingly commit suicide if the LTTE asks them; this lacks evidence. The only evidence we have is that the civilian population is trapped in a vice like grip between the opposing forces of GOSL and the LTTE. History is sadly littered with examples of civilian population being punished for their nationality or political preferences, but there are no examples that they want to commit mass suicide.

Professor Roberts compares two different situations while taking only the military aspects into consideration. My view is that World War II situation is completely irrelevant in discussing the current issue in Sri Lanka. This suggestion utterly disrespects those people who have already gone and will continue to face enormous challenges and difficulties. I thought a cartoon by David Pope, an Australian cartoonist, on what the Americans did in Hiroshima, Japan in 1945 would be relevant in this regard.

Hiroshima

“Numbers are manifestly significant here in contradiction to Bopage’s contention.” claims Professor Roberts. Perhaps my intention may not have been clear enough when I said: “It does not really matter whether the number of affected civilians is 100,000 or 250,000”. Here I did not say that the number of civilians is not significant. It was the GOSL not I, who stated that there were only 100,000 civilians trapped - not 250,000. The clear implication being the reduced number of civilians should blunt our emotional and political response to the unfolding tragedy. From my point of view, killing Lasantha Wickrematunga, Richard de Soyza or Sivaram, although different in scale from what is happening in Vanni, also represents flagrant violations of the human rights of Sri Lankan citizens, whether such violations are frequent in many other countries or not.

Finally, he concludes that my idea of a safe passage for affected civilians ensuring their protection, canvassed in my response, is already in place. It is true that the GOSL has designated some safety zones for civilians; nevertheless, there have been no modalities developed to allow civilians to access these zones, as they have been constantly subjected to aerial bombing, shelling and artillery attacks by parties to the conflict. These civilians have suffered, and continue to suffer at the hands of the LTTE. To these people, who have been living in these areas throughout their lives, to place their complete trust now in the GOSL forces and move to unknown territories will be an extremely traumatic experience. That is why a humanitarian intervention sensitive to these fears is necessary to ensure safe passage for these civilians.

In the second article Professor Roberts raises another issue regarding the views of dissident Sri Lankan Tamils. As I do not wish to divert from the main issue: the precarious situation of Tamil civilians trapped in the war zone, I will deal with it separately in a brief article.

Professor Roberts goes further and categorises us as Human Rights Extremists (HREs) embodying “the same features as the Sinhala chauvinists and the Tamil Tiger enthusiasts”, and asserts that the position of the HREs “serves the interests of the LTTE and the pro-Tiger Diaspora.”

So, Professor Roberts prescribes only 2 choices, which are clearly black and white, ‘either/or’ options. While doing so, he labels us utopian human rights extremists (HRE) of a messianic hue guided by a ‘black/white’ and ‘either/or’ epistemology perception of the world, what a tragic misconception and misinterpretation he has arrived at!

In conclusion we must not fall for that simplistic Bush dictum “you are either with us or against us”. It has proved disastrous for the world. For, instead of the freedom and peace it offered, the world is a less safe and much poorer place before his reign. We must be intelligent in our political responses; we must prepare for the peace not the spoils of victory. Otherwise we will only repeat the folly that has plagued our country for the last fifty years.

Since the so-called war on terror in Iraq led by the “coalition of the willing”, this sort of binary logic is used to polarize situations, to compel others to either become allies or accept the consequences of being deemed an enemy or a traitor. Thus, in Professor Roberts’ eyes, there is no choice for people who are against both these evils, but to choose between the two evils. Anybody who expresses concerns about the civilian casualties thus becomes a LTTE supporter. This is very wrong and, so is the position adopted by the GOSL and extremist chauvinist forces.

Neither I, nor Professor Roberts, know what the political views of the Tamil civilians are, personal choices they made, or whether they were coerced to do so or not. But I stress these civilians are not collateral damage or, as he disparagingly puts it, “auxiliaries of the LTTE”. They are human beings and our response has to be a humanitarian one, not in an idealistic way but in a humane and practical way. For how well or badly they are treated will determine their response to our vision of an inclusive pluralist Sri Lanka.

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February 23, 2009 | 7:02 AM Comments  0 comments

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Government and LTTE differ on value of life

Banyan News Reporters

by Global Citizen for Banyan News Reporters

Colombo, Sri Lanka: Researchers at the Sri Lankan Ministry of Defence and their counterparts at the LTTE Humanitarian Research Institute at Puthukkudiyirippu (formerly based in Kilinochchi and which did not at any time have a hospital) have been competing for months to produce the most accurate calculation of the value of life.

The Defence Ministry spokesman who leads the government research team revealed their preliminary findings several months ago through the Media Centre for National Security. Speaking to Journalists, he reported that eight soldiers had died in battle the previous day, when the actual body count of security forces personnel killed in battle was thirteen. He assured that according to his scientific calculator, the given numbers indicated the value of a soldier’s life was approximately 0.6153846153846. Based on these figures, he said that 36.92307692307 valiant soldiers laid down their lives for the motherland when their busses came under terrorist attack a couple of weeks ago.

When BNR contacted mathematicians at the LTTE Humanitarian Research Institute, they rejected these figures as ‘laughable’. They claimed to have adopted more accurate methods which have enabled their organisation carry out hundreds of suicide bombings and still manage to balance their accounts at the end of every humanitarian year.

Analysts believe that the LTTE uses sophisticated equations where the value of life is believed to be:

(a) directly proportional to the number of civilians they hide behind

(b) inversely proportional to the number of white hairs in their leader’s moustache

BNR learns that progress is being made at a heightened pace of late in and around Puthukkudiyirippu towards the harmonisation of the GoSL’s and LTTE’s varying value of life calculations by civilians who are killing and dismembering themselves in the name of pure mathematics. 

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February 22, 2009 | 8:02 AM Comments  0 comments

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THE TIGERS’ TICKING TIME BOMB

Velupillai Prabhakaran is about to be defeated but he has left a time bomb hidden in plain sight which must be defused if he is not to wreak a posthumous revenge. This is the time bomb placed under a strategic four lane intersection, that between the Sinhalese and the Tamils and Sri Lanka and the world.  The time bomb can be seen in the epidemic of demonstrations by the Tamil Diaspora and the statements critical of Sri Lanka that flood the international media. Prabhakaran is hoping that the time bomb will go off in time to save him, his army and his project. It is unlikely to do so, though we must not take that for granted and must crush the LTTE before external political trends especially those in the neighborhood, turn hostile. However, even if we defeat the LTTE militarily before the external turns unpropitious, we still have to defuse the time bomb.

Things become clearer when we think back to Prabhakaran’s great gamble which has failed (or his Strategic Miscalculation as Shanaka Jayasekara put it in a thoughtful recent piece). Having milked the Ranil Wickremesinghe administration dry, Prabhakaran pulled out of peace talks in April 2003, and submitted a maximalist proposal – the ISGA - which was bound to politically weaken the UNP. He was geared up, by his own public admission, to go to war in 2004, except that the tsunami forced its postponement. As the Human Rights Watch report of late 2005 revealed, he was collecting funds for The Final War, as it was billed in Diaspora circles.

Well, it certainly is proving to be the Final War for Prabhakaran. His apologists and weak-kneed Sinhala critics, who forewarn – the former, gleefully the latter gloomily-about an unending or subsequent war, simply have not grasped that a Final War is just that: once you’ve upped the stakes, you either win or lose and there are no second chances. Prabhakaran fought the Final War and has lost it or is about to. There will be no other. The Final War doesn’t become the penultimate war or just one more war or the less than final war simply because the side that was supposed to win it lost and the side that was supposed to lose it, won.  As for romantic notions that a war isn’t over until memory fades, just ask the Serbs or the Chechens: once you’ve lost a war, you’ve lost it. “Gone Baby Gone” as Denis Lehane put it. Memories of the US Civil War remained in myth and song among the Southern whites (“The Night They Drove Old Dixie Down”) for decades if not a century, but the war was long over, lost and won, done.

Prabhakaran sabotaged the election campaign of Ranil Wickremesinghe (who in his manifesto had promised to explore the Oslo understanding on federalism) having assassinated Lakshman Kadirgamar, because he preferred a Sri Lankan administration that would be or could be isolated internationally. What he failed to assess was the tremendous domestic mobilization effort that the populist-nativist administration of his “choice” was able to put in; a mobilization that has almost swamped Prabhakaran militarily. He completely overestimated his own military strength and prowess; an overestimation rooted in the Jaffna Tamil sense of superiority and racist underestimation of the Sinhalese (and also the North Indians, if one recalls the propaganda and hatreds of the IPKF days).    

Let’s face it: they hate us. The bulk of the Tamil Diaspora hates us Sinhalese and this country, Sri Lanka. Their consciousness is almost pathological. They are racists and fanatics, among whom there are those who set themselves on fire. The hatred of Tamils the world over can be managed if only we unpack the problem and address its components. The 80 million Tamils that Prabhakaran appealed to in his last two Mahaveera day speeches can be disaggregated into four categories or groups:

  1. The Tamils of the North and East, and outside those provinces but on the island of Sri Lanka, i.e. Sri Lankan Tamils
  2. The Tamils of Tamil Nadu
  3. The Tamils of the Western Diaspora
  4. The Tamils of older immigrant origin in other parts of the world such as Malaysia, Mauritius and South Africa.

The key resides in Sri Lanka. If we are able to satisfactorily address the disaffection of the Tamils in Sri Lanka, the we can begin to make inroads into Tamil opinion elsewhere. Just as Home Rule of the 1920s split the Irish republicans between those who accepted it and those extremists who thought it a sell-out, Tamil nadu and the Tamil Diaspora will find themselves internally demarcated between realists and irrationalists; pragmatists and fanatics. At worst, even if this does not happen, Sri Lanka can ignore the Tamil Diaspora and manage Tamil Nadu, if the Sri Lankan Tamils are in the main, integrated. If the Tamil Diaspora insists that nothing short of a confederation or federalism can satisfy Tamil aspirations they are welcome to negotiate such a solution within Canada or wherever they are, or they can migrate to the only quasi-federal Tamil linguistic region in the world, Tamil Nadu.

However, we can take this stand only if we occupy the high ground. That high ground consists of the elimination of all forms of discrimination and privilege, and the coming into being of a society where all men and women have equal rights and equality of opportunity, together with adequate space for a measure of self government in the areas where they and their culture preponderate.

What does this mean concretely? For the Sinhalese it means implementing the 13th amendment that has been part of our Constitution for over two decades. “13 Plus”, emanating from the APRC, may require step by step implementation.  The 13th amendment simply has to be activated fully and swiftly, perhaps with an interim or transitional arrangement until the election can be held in the North. For the Tamils this means acceptance that the 13th amendment is the start line and that the ceiling is maximum devolution within a unitary framework (as in the UK, China, Turkey, the Philippines, etc), while the modes of politics are strictly systemic: elections and the courts.  Though legal, legitimate and understandable, the history of the Federal Party shows that nonviolent agitation in an ethnically polarized context soon triggers violence — and is thus imprudent.

The Sri Lankan crisis today is a multiple one. One of its aspects is a failure to communicate. We just do not know how to talk to each other or to the outside world. The recent election results show that the President’s appeal has moved beyond the Sinhala Buddhist to the Sinhala as a whole and even wider, to the multi religious (Catholic majority areas in the Puttalam district), multiethnic and multi cultural. The fold-up of the Opposition (25-30% is a vastly diminished base vote) shows that the UNP is becoming representative of an enclave or antibody that cannot communicate with or even comprehend the sentiments of the large majority, the mainstream, which is nationalist. That mainstream is flanked by two minority enclaves, one large r than the other: the urban/UNP and the “class struggle” JVP. For its part the political and ideological representatives of that national and nationalist mainstream do not know how to communicate with the urban classes who are absolutely imperative for economic growth and prosperity. This disjunction is tolerable at the moment because the world economic downturn makes tight integration with the world economy less than imperative, indeed an unwise option.  Thus Sri Lanka experiences the class struggle as a cultural Cold War and a mutual failure of social communication.

That failure is a multi-vector one. The smaller enclave can communicate with the outside world and the outside world communicates with it. In short the UNP and its anti-war civil society allies produce politically for an “export market” and a domestic “niche market” which is a silly thing to do in a competitive electoral marketplace. The SLFP wins because its political product is for a national mass market, which is sensible as an electoral option. However, the national mainstream’s failure in communicating with the outside world and the international community’s failure to communicate with the national/ist mainstream is a loss for both, and diminishes the prospect of an enlightened reformist outcome of our crisis.

The populist nationalist “pro-war” bloc is as organic as the Oppositional –NGO “antiwar” bloc is inorganic. The organic character of the nationalist bloc is the secret of its domestic political and military success, while the inorganic nature of the Opposition is the secret of its failure. Is its organic character also the secret of the external limitations of the pro-war patriotic bloc? That this is not inevitable is best evidenced by Cuba. But is it that, unlike the Cubans, the nationalists are culturally self-referential, or that our mainstream culture is self-referential? Have we as a country lost our capacity to communicate effectively in the outside world? Have we lost our voice or simply unlearnt the language? This is why History may judge Prabhakaran’s assassination of Lakshman Kadirgamar as one of the two most damaging blows he dealt Sri Lanka, equal to or perhaps surpassing the murder of President Ranasinghe Premadasa.         

Sri Lanka does not have to live besieged, but it will unless we prudently yet generously address the question of building a nation while reconciling ethnic identities. Simply put, the question is this: are we ready to follow up our well deserved and hard earned military victory with reconciliatory reform, or are we not?  Do we have the wisdom to avoid Prabakharan’s sin, of overweening and ultimately false pride, of what the Ancient Greeks called hubris? If the answer is no, then our fate will be isolation and social division, driving away or repelling our most educated; a fate which deprives us of the chance to fulfill our potential as a country. Fulfilling that potential requires unleashing the richness of our cultural diversity while forging a new unity. Many commentators rediscovering Donne have cautioned that “no man is an island”, but my old man Mervyn de Silva said it best when, extending the Metaphysical poet’s metaphor he warned snugly and smugly insular Sri Lankans that “no island is an island either”, noting in his last essay that “in this Age of Identity, ethnicity walks on water”.

(These are the strictly personal views of the writer.)

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February 22, 2009 | 8:02 AM Comments  0 comments

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